Marie Comiskey

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and search the appellant.

The trial judge found such grounds existed based on police observations of the appellant's vehicle making three stops at different locations within 15 minutes, with interactions at each location involving known drug users.

The sentence appeal challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence provision under the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to export ecstasy into the United States and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and corroboration of a co-conspirator who testified for the Crown after receiving a reduced sentence in the U.S. The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including recorded phone calls that demonstrated the appellant's involvement.

The court also upheld the six-year sentence, noting the large quantity of drugs and the appellant's use of a courier to take the cross-border risk.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to detain him and search his vehicle, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act was lawful, even with a dual purpose of intelligence gathering.

The officer was justified in asking the appellant to step out of the vehicle to verify his identity, at which point the drugs were in plain view.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing 800 grams of cocaine hidden in the handles of two suitcases.

The sole issue at trial was the appellant's credibility and whether she had knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and application of the W.(D.) principles, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a convicted drug dealer, appealed a full forfeiture order of his residential property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The property was heavily fortified and used for commercial cocaine distribution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the property was a fortified drug property and that full forfeiture was not disproportionate given the nature of the offences, the appellant's extensive criminal record, and his ties to organized crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking, arguing that the trial judge failed to warn the jury about the dangers of in-dock identification evidence.

The Crown conceded this error for two of the counts, but the appellant further argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and acquittals should be entered.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and ordered a new trial on the two counts, but rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable or that the conviction on the remaining count should be overturned.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant was convicted of making false statements and evading compliance under the Customs Act after importing an illegal exotic car by dividing it into two shipments of parts.

He appealed, arguing that the administrative process under the Act must be exhausted before criminal charges could be laid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no legal basis for the appellant's argument and upholding the trial judge's findings of deceptive conduct.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of income tax evasion after claiming her depression prevented her from filing returns.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in admitting a doctor's letter as hearsay and relying on it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge and further finding that the trial judge erred in law by relying on evidence he had previously ruled inadmissible to support the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

Based on the joint position of the parties, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction on count one and ordered a new trial.

The Crown conceded that the 18-month custodial sentence for the remaining convictions was unfit.

The Court substituted an 18-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant's employment, support for his mother, and compliance with bail conditions.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing and trafficking large amounts of cocaine and was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that his potential deportation could affect his eligibility for day parole.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that speculation regarding the effect of immigration status on day parole eligibility is irrelevant to determining the appropriate sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his knowledge of drugs found in a bedroom closet and misapplied the doctrine of wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to infer the appellant had seen the drugs and cash in the closet of the room he occupied in a house he owned.

The court held that the only available inference was that the appellant knew what was in the jar or was wilfully blind to it, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge's jury charge regarding wilful blindness was confusing in relation to the charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge initially gave a confusing instruction, it was later clarified in the clearest terms, and the decision trees provided to the jury made the distinction clear.

The appellant pleaded guilty to marihuana production and was sentenced to 12 months in prison, along with a forfeiture order for his 122-acre farm property.

He appealed the forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by adopting an overly strict test for relief from forfeiture under s. 19.1(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework from R. v. Craig, the Court held that a forfeiture order would have a disproportionate impact given the appellant's minor role, lack of property modifications, and the fact that the property was primarily used as a legitimate farm and residence.

The appeal was allowed and the forfeiture order was set aside.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy.

They argued the trial judge erred in the jury instructions regarding the elements of conspiracy, that the indictment was deficient for not explicitly invoking s. 465(3) of the Criminal Code, and that trial fairness was compromised by an RCMP officer entering the jury room to fix equipment.

They also appealed their sentences, arguing they should have received credit for time spent in immigration hold.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the jury charge, the indictment, or the trial judge's discretionary refusal to grant pre-trial custody credit for immigration detention.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of marijuana, breach of recognizance, and obstructing a police officer.

The court previously dismissed the appeals for possession and breach of recognizance.

On the obstructing charge, duty counsel raised the issue of the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge failed to consider a possible defence and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal on the obstructing charge, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed an order granting the respondent an exemption from a firearm prohibition under s. 113(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent, who ran a pest control business, claimed he needed the firearm to protect his livestock from predators.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the exemption, finding that the respondent did not solely or predominantly depend on the firearm to sustain himself or his family.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

He argued the evidence only showed multiple sales to the same buyer, not an ongoing conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence of a conspiracy, including frequent contact, the pattern of transactions, the quantity of marijuana, and the buyer acting as a broker.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting that while the trial judge may have erred in treating the lack of remorse as an aggravating factor rather than just a factor against a conditional sentence, the sentence was appropriate given the quantities involved.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a tax protestor, was charged with making a false statement on his tax return and tax evasion after failing to report income and pay taxes based on his belief that the federal government lacked the constitutional power to impose income tax.

At trial, the jury convicted him of making a false statement but acquitted him of tax evasion.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, and the accused appealed the conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals and ordered a new trial on both counts.

The Court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that an honest belief in the unconstitutionality of the Income Tax Act could negate the mens rea for tax evasion.

Furthermore, the Court found the jury's verdicts to be irreconcilably inconsistent, as the same defence was advanced for both charges.

The accused was convicted of possession of contraband cigarettes and faced a mandatory minimum fine of $9,600 under the Excise Act.

Finding the accused unable to pay and concluding that jail was inappropriate, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence in default of payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is a form of imprisonment and cannot be used merely to enforce an unpaid fine where the offender genuinely lacks the means to pay.

The Court set aside the conditional sentence but stayed further collection procedures since the sentence had already been served.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and possession for the purpose of trafficking after 42 kilograms of heroin were found hidden in the washrooms of their flight.

They appealed their convictions and sentences on several grounds, including that a mistrial during jury selection should have annulled the trial judge's pre-trial Charter rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that a mistrial during jury selection does not affect pre-trial rulings made under s. 645(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court also upheld the admission of a video re-enactment, the jury's access to the heroin exhibits, and the 18-year sentences given the massive quantity of drugs involved.