Marie Comiskey

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to export ecstasy into the United States and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and corroboration of a co-conspirator who testified for the Crown after receiving a reduced sentence in the U.S. The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including recorded phone calls that demonstrated the appellant's involvement.

The court also upheld the six-year sentence, noting the large quantity of drugs and the appellant's use of a courier to take the cross-border risk.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to detain him and search his vehicle, alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act was lawful, even with a dual purpose of intelligence gathering.

The officer was justified in asking the appellant to step out of the vehicle to verify his identity, at which point the drugs were in plain view.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing 800 grams of cocaine hidden in the handles of two suitcases.

The sole issue at trial was the appellant's credibility and whether she had knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and application of the W.(D.) principles, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a convicted drug dealer, appealed a full forfeiture order of his residential property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The property was heavily fortified and used for commercial cocaine distribution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the property was a fortified drug property and that full forfeiture was not disproportionate given the nature of the offences, the appellant's extensive criminal record, and his ties to organized crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking, arguing that the trial judge failed to warn the jury about the dangers of in-dock identification evidence.

The Crown conceded this error for two of the counts, but the appellant further argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and acquittals should be entered.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and ordered a new trial on the two counts, but rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable or that the conviction on the remaining count should be overturned.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant was convicted of making false statements and evading compliance under the Customs Act after importing an illegal exotic car by dividing it into two shipments of parts.

He appealed, arguing that the administrative process under the Act must be exhausted before criminal charges could be laid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no legal basis for the appellant's argument and upholding the trial judge's findings of deceptive conduct.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of income tax evasion after claiming her depression prevented her from filing returns.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in admitting a doctor's letter as hearsay and relying on it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge and further finding that the trial judge erred in law by relying on evidence he had previously ruled inadmissible to support the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

Based on the joint position of the parties, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction on count one and ordered a new trial.

The Crown conceded that the 18-month custodial sentence for the remaining convictions was unfit.

The Court substituted an 18-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant's employment, support for his mother, and compliance with bail conditions.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing and trafficking large amounts of cocaine and was sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that his potential deportation could affect his eligibility for day parole.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that speculation regarding the effect of immigration status on day parole eligibility is irrelevant to determining the appropriate sentence.

The accused was convicted of possession of contraband cigarettes and faced a mandatory minimum fine of $9,600 under the Excise Act.

Finding the accused unable to pay and concluding that jail was inappropriate, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence in default of payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is a form of imprisonment and cannot be used merely to enforce an unpaid fine where the offender genuinely lacks the means to pay.

The Court set aside the conditional sentence but stayed further collection procedures since the sentence had already been served.