Margaret Bojanowska

The appellant appealed a conviction and sought to have a no-contact condition removed from his probationary term.

The condition prohibited him from contacting his mother, the victim of the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that it could not remove the condition without the victim's consent.

The victim did not respond to contact attempts.

The court advised the appellant that he could raise the issue with his probation officer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, obstructing a peace officer, and breach of recognizance.

He appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, failed to address certain evidence, gave uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and received ineffective legal representation.

The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, made reasonable inferences from the complainant's testimony and physical evidence, and that counsel's tactical decisions fell within the ambit of reasonable professional assistance.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident at a party on February 11-12, 2011.

The defence raised the issue of sexsomnia (sexual activity during sleep), claiming the accused was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.

The trial judge rejected the defence's evidence, finding the accused was awake and aware during the assault.

The judge found the expert evidence of Dr. Shapiro to be biased and unreliable, and rejected the accused's testimony as not credible.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

Jose Patricio Serrano and Victor Samaniego were found guilty by a jury of possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

Samaniego initiated aggressive conduct at a nightclub, displayed a firearm, and passed it to Serrano, who then took it into the club and later attempted to discard it when approached by police.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the public nature of the offence, the loaded firearm with a removed serial number, and alcohol consumption.

Mitigating factors included Serrano's dated criminal record, remorse, and family support, and Samaniego's lack of prior record, remorse, and family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing purposes in firearms cases.

Serrano was sentenced to 31 months and 3 weeks imprisonment, and Samaniego to 45 months imprisonment, after accounting for pre-trial custody and house arrest credits.

Ancillary orders included lifetime weapons prohibitions and DNA orders.

The Crown applied to admit a video statement from a deceased complainant under the principled exception to the hearsay rule in a sexual assault prosecution.

The complainant had passed away before trial.

The Crown argued the statement had sufficient procedural and substantive reliability.

The respondent opposed admission, contending the statement lacked adequate procedural and substantive reliability and that cross-examination could not be substituted.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown had not established sufficient reliability on either ground.

The statement was not made under oath, the declarant was not warned about false statements, and there were inconsistencies with other evidence including the complainant's own handwritten statement.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial where the sole issue was whether the complainant had the capacity to consent and whether she in fact consented to sexual intercourse.

The complainant was a self-described alcoholic who had consumed significant alcohol in the 48 hours preceding the incident.

The appellant did not testify at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was denied effective representation by trial counsel, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The court determined that trial counsel prevented the appellant from testifying or making his own decision about whether to testify, failed to conduct an effective cross-examination of the complainant, and failed to introduce an expert toxicologist's report that was part of Crown disclosure.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, A.J., was sentenced for three sexual assaults, two counts of surreptitiously making visual recordings of sexual activity, forcible confinement, assault, and theft of a cell phone, all involving his common-law partner.

The case had a protracted procedural history, including a jury trial for some charges and guilty pleas for others, and a withdrawn Dangerous Offender/Long Term Offender application.

The court considered aggravating factors such as victim vulnerability, force used, internet publication of images, and the accused's criminal record, alongside mitigating factors including guilty pleas, family support, rehabilitation efforts, and significant pre-trial custody in harsh conditions.

A joint submission for a total sentence of 71 months (five years and eleven months) was accepted, with a remanet of six months to be served, followed by three years of probation with strict conditions.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their first-degree murder convictions and sought to introduce fresh evidence in the form of a recantation by key Crown witness Ronnie Khananisho.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit the fresh evidence and confirmed the prior panel's dismissal of the appellants' appeals from conviction.

The court found that while the recantation was admissible and the due diligence requirement was satisfied, the evidence failed the cogency test.

The recantation suffered from serious credibility issues, including implausible origins involving contact with the incarcerated appellant's former girlfriend, and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial verdict given that the central witnesses were Jorge Restrepo and Jorge Acosta, whose testimony was corroborated by powerful independent evidence including cellphone records and medical evidence.

The accused was tried on a single count of sexual assault arising from alleged non-consensual sexual contact with a workplace subordinate during an overnight work-related gathering.

The court reviewed the reasonable doubt standard, the law of consent under ss. 273.1 and 273.2 of the Criminal Code, and the principles in Ewanchuk concerning implied consent and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

Although the complainant's prior accounts contained omissions and incremental disclosure, the court found these did not undermine the core of her evidence and rejected the defence theory that the allegation was fabricated for financial gain.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence that there was non-consensual touching both near the stage and in the trailer and entered a finding of guilt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence and the lawfulness of police entry into his home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was not based solely on eyewitness identification but rather on a combination of circumstantial evidence and observations by experienced police officers conducting surveillance.

The court also found that exigent circumstances justified the initial police entry to prevent destruction of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court addressed whether Crown counsel could cross-examine the defence expert witness, Dr. Shapiro, on handwritten notes prepared by the accused shortly after the alleged incident and subsequently provided to the expert for his review.

The defence asserted solicitor-client privilege over the notes.

The court found that the notes were intentionally provided to the expert and that any privilege was waived when the expert testified.

The court ruled that the Crown could cross-examine Dr. Shapiro on all materials listed in his report that were relevant to his expert opinion or his credibility and objectivity as a witness.

The accused, J.A., facing charges of first-degree murder and attempt murder, applied to be permitted to sit at counsel table during his jury trial instead of the prisoner's dock.

The application was based on concerns about potential unfair adverse inferences by the jury, the absence of security concerns, and the desire for more meaningful participation in the trial.

The court reviewed the principles governing a trial judge's discretion in seating the accused, noting that the customary position is the dock and that this does not inherently violate Charter rights unless it manifestly precludes the accused from making full answer and defence.

Expert testimony from a criminologist regarding mock trial studies suggesting juror prejudice was considered but ultimately dismissed due to methodological limitations and the inability to replicate a real trial's solemnity and dynamics.

The court emphasized the importance of trusting jurors to follow instructions on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.

The application was denied.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder of his six-year-old daughter and attempted murder of his seven-year-old son.

The offences occurred when the accused, motivated by a desire to spite his estranged wife, administered sleep medication to the children in a hotel room.

The court considered the egregious breach of parental trust, the vulnerability of the victims, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility set at 18 years for the murder, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for the attempted murder.

The accused was tried for the first-degree murder of his daughter and the attempted murder of his son after giving them sleep medication and alcohol during a suicide attempt.

During the pre-charge conference, defence counsel requested that criminal negligence causing death be left with the jury as a discrete included offence to first-degree murder.

The trial judge declined the request, ruling that in the circumstances of the case, criminal negligence causing death is manslaughter by another name and leaving both would unnecessarily complicate jury deliberations.

The appellant, a 19-year-old, was convicted of importing nearly 2 kg of cocaine and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on her out-of-court statements, the W.(D.) framework, and her criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence fell within the established range for first-time couriers importing large amounts of cocaine and appropriately accounted for her youth.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued his s. 11(b) Charter rights were infringed due to unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial was completed under the 30-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

On the sentence appeal, the court allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 pre-trial custody credit and reducing the sentence by three months because the trial judge improperly considered the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The forfeiture and s. 161 orders were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to order a psychological assessment in preparation for his trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that such an assessment would not have been relevant to the factual determinations underlying his conviction.

The court also upheld the sentence as fit for the serious crimes committed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraudulent possession of credit card data and possession of a credit card forgery device.

A USB device containing credit card information and a credit card reader were found in the console of his car.

The appellant conceded control but disputed knowledge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample circumstantial evidence to support the trial judge's inference of knowledge, including the appellant's attempt to evade police and the rejection of his testimony as a complete fabrication.

The offenders, both members of the 'Young Buck Killas' street gang, were convicted of various firearms and drug trafficking offences committed for the benefit of a criminal organization.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of their extensive criminal records, gang affiliation, and the nationwide scope of the drug enterprise against minimal mitigating factors.

The court sentenced one offender to 12 years and 1 month and the other to 28 months, after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court also ordered delayed parole eligibility for both offenders, requiring them to serve at least half of their sentences.

During a criminal trial for firearms and criminal organization offences, the court ruled on several evidentiary and procedural applications.

The court denied the accused's requests to sit at counsel table rather than the prisoner's dock, citing security concerns and courtroom configuration.

The court admitted voice messages retrieved from an accused's phone that demonstrated a willingness to commit robbery, finding them highly probative of gang association.

The court also delivered mixed rulings on the admissibility of intercepted communications used for voice identification, admitting one as circumstantial evidence of state of mind while excluding others.