Margaret Bojanowska

The appellant, S.P., appealed convictions for sexual offences against his daughters, which occurred approximately 40 years prior.

The appeal was based on alleged errors in the trial judge's credibility analysis and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but this was later abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, and rejecting the ineffective assistance claim and the admission of fresh evidence.

The appellant, Darren Pearce, sought leave to appeal a five-year global sentence for aggravated assault and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately address the principle of parity between Mr. Pearce's sentence and that of his co-accused, Terrance Goodwin, who received a substantially shorter sentence for the same crime.

The court substituted a sentence of "time served" equivalent to approximately three and a half years, to achieve appropriate parity, considering Mr. Pearce's pre-sentence custody and credits.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault against his former spouse, as well as his four-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting discreditable conduct evidence, dismissing his application to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity, and correcting his counsel's closing address which invoked prohibited twin myths reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal and an application to introduce fresh evidence, holding that the proposed social media evidence did not meet the Palmer test for admissibility and the four-year penitentiary sentence was fit for serious domestic sexual assaults.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving his step-daughter.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based primarily on the complainant's credibility.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed several errors in assessing credibility, including failing to adequately address the complainant's motive to fabricate, failing to resolve material inconsistencies in the evidence, improperly using a prior consistent statement to bolster the complainant's credibility, and failing to apply the W.(D.) principles to determine if the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual and physical assaults against his former common-law spouse and her children.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the primary complainant, improperly used his criminal record, failed to resolve material inconsistencies, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of legal principles.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident in a high school classroom.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility, resolving inconsistencies, and addressing potential collusion and animus.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, noting that discrepancies in witness accounts were natural given their different vantage points and that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's age and the passage of time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a young person with autism, was charged with sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching against his younger cousin.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the evidence of the complainant, who testified via closed-circuit television and a videotaped statement.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be unreliable due to a tainted initial disclosure prompted by suggestive questioning from her mother, material inconsistencies between her various accounts, and the implausibility of the alleged repeated penile penetration occurring undetected in a busy household.

Finding that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.

A young person charged with three counts of sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving his younger cousin was acquitted of all charges.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a 13-year-old girl at trial who alleged repeated sexual assaults including penile penetration occurring approximately 25 times between August and December 2017.

The court found that while the complainant appeared credible in demeanor, her evidence suffered from significant reliability issues stemming from a tainted initial disclosure, material inconsistencies between her accounts to her mother, the Children's Aid Society, and police, and an implausible account of the alleged penile penetration incidents.

The court determined the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

A young person charged with sexual interference and sexual assault sought production of records held by the Durham Children's Aid Society pursuant to section 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the two-stage Mills analysis to determine whether third-party records containing statements by the complainant and her mother regarding the criminal allegations and circumstances of disclosure should be produced.

The court found the records relevant to issues of credibility and narrative but balanced this against the high expectation of privacy attaching to child protection agency records.

The court ordered partial disclosure of specific portions of the records with strict conditions limiting further dissemination and use.

Following a guilty verdict for first-degree murder, the applicants sought a factual inquiry and a mistrial after discovering that a juror had cycled past the murder scene and posted about it on a fitness app during deliberations.

The court declined to conduct the inquiry, finding that the evidence was sufficiently preserved for an appeal and that questioning the juror about the impact of the visit would violate the secrecy of jury deliberations.

The court also dismissed the mistrial application, concluding that the physical layout of the scene was not central to the main issue of identity, was already well-documented in evidence, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including assaults and threats against his wife and son, as well as firearms offences involving possession and unsafe storage of a semi-automatic rifle.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 28 months imprisonment for the assault and threatening convictions, along with fines and ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and reliability of witness testimony, acknowledged inconsistencies in the evidence, and resolved those that mattered for establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was not pressed at oral argument, but the court reviewed it and found no error of law or principle.

The victim surcharges were set aside.

The appellant abandoned his appeal of a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on February 22, 2019.

The appellant was out of custody and did not appear at the hearing.

The Crown confirmed the appellant's intention to abandon the appeal.

As a result, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The accused was charged with four counts of possession, accessing, and making available child pornography on or about May 29, 2017, and possessing child pornography on November 16, 2017, contrary to sections 163.1(4.1), 163.1(4), and 163.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, based on forensic analysis of electronic devices seized during a search warrant execution.

The accused was found in possession of a Microsoft tablet containing extensive child pornography in readily accessible folders, along with personal documents and photographs.

Skype chats associated with accounts on the device showed transmission of child pornography on May 28, 2017.

The defence raised an alibi for May 28, 2017, supported by the accused's mother and aunt, claiming he was installing air conditioning units at his studio during the relevant time.

The court rejected the alibi evidence and the accused's denials, finding the Crown had proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the overwhelming circumstantial evidence.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought pre-trial applications alleging abuse of process and seeking to adduce hearsay and alternate suspect evidence.

They argued the Crown preferred a direct indictment for an oblique purpose to shield a key witness from discovery, and sought disclosure of the materials provided to the Attorney General.

The court dismissed the abuse of process application, finding no evidence of bad faith or improper motive to displace the presumption that prosecutorial discretion was exercised properly.

The court also dismissed the hearsay application and provisionally dismissed the alternate suspect application, finding the proposed evidence lacked a sufficient connection to the crime and its prejudicial effect vastly outweighed any probative value.

During a trial for first degree murder, the applicant sought to preclude the Crown from asking the principal witness to identify him in the dock.

The applicant argued the identification had trifling probative value and was dangerously prejudicial because the witness was intoxicated and the prior photo identification was flawed.

The court dismissed the application, holding that in-dock identifications are presumptively admissible and that any frailties in the evidence are matters of weight for the jury to assess following cross-examination and proper jury instructions.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a mistrial during their jury trial.

The application was based on two incidents: an altercation in the courthouse foyer where the deceased's mother verbally accosted the accused's mother in the jury's presence, and a prior CTV interview given by the deceased's mother.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither incident created a "real danger of prejudice or a risk of a miscarriage of justice." The judge determined that the jury was intelligent and capable of impartiality, and that a strong judicial instruction would suffice to mitigate any potential impact.

Practical considerations regarding the difficulty and delay of selecting a new jury also factored into the decision.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application seeking a remedy for lost telecommunications records from Freedom Mobile Inc. The police failed to preserve these potentially exculpatory records due to unacceptable negligence, specifically an erroneous belief about Freedom Mobile's affiliation with Rogers and its data retention policy.

The court found a breach of the applicants' s. 7 Charter rights but determined that a stay of proceedings was not appropriate.

Instead, the court ordered a strong jury instruction (Bero instruction) as a sufficient remedy, acknowledging the high relevance of the lost evidence but its indeterminate utility.

Following a conviction for sexual assault at a re-trial, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the order for a new trial to the anticipated sentencing date was over 42 months.

The court deducted significant periods of defence delay, largely attributed to the late retention and poor scheduling of a defence sleep expert, as well as exceptional circumstances including counsel illness and unavoidable scheduling conflicts.

The net delay was calculated at 13.5 months, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to take meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and dismissed the application.

Crown appeal of a nine-year sentence imposed on an accused who pleaded guilty to eight counts of sexual assault, eight counts of making child pornography, and one count of possession of child pornography.

The accused, employed as an early childhood educator at a daycare centre, touched and photographed the genitals of sleeping toddlers and possessed a massive collection of graphic child pornography.

The trial judge imposed six years for sexual assault, one year consecutive for making child pornography, and two years consecutive for possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought 15 years, arguing the sentence failed to satisfy the totality principle and violated section 718.3(7) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 718.3(7) is subject to the totality principle and that the nine-year sentence was fit and consistent with sentencing principles for such offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault against his pregnant girlfriend.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation that the contact was accidental on the assault charge.

On the sexual assault charge, the trial judge found the complainant's evidence was corroborated by a witness.

The appellate court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.