Marc Rosenberg

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family property.

The trial judge found that the appellant had a beneficial interest in a property that had value on valuation day, despite not having legal title.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding, noting that the definition of 'property' in the Family Law Act is broad enough to include a beneficial interest.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that ordered a new trial and the production of joint counselling records in a sexual assault case.

The summary conviction appeal judge held that the Criminal Code's third-party records provisions did not apply to counselling sessions attended by both the accused and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the provisions do apply, as the complainant retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in therapeutic records despite the accused's presence.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the order for a new trial on the alternative ground that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence regarding the complainant's statements during the alleged assault.

The appellant appealed an order finding that a licence granted by the respondent agricultural society was terminable at will.

The Court of Appeal held that a licence is not revocable at will, but remains in effect in equity in accordance with the terms of the original contract, and was revocable by the society only if necessary to carry out its reasonable purposes, including for cause.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Superior Court to determine whether the licence was properly terminated for cause.

The appellant appealed a four-year consecutive sentence imposed for robbery and robbery with a firearm, arguing it created an unjustified disparity with his co-accused.

The co-accused, who was older and played an equal role, received a global sentence of seven years for the same offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the appellant's global sentence should not be four years longer than his co-accused's.

The appeal was allowed, and the four-year sentence was varied to be concurrent with the appellant's existing seven-year sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that he did not receive proper Crown disclosure of wiretap authorizations, supporting affidavits, and related appendices.

The Court of Appeal reserved its decision to allow the parties to file affidavits on the issue.

The respondent filed an affidavit confirming that the relevant disclosure was provided, while the appellant filed no affidavit.

Concluding that proper disclosure was made, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed in writing from the sentence imposed for breach of recognizance, failing to comply with a recognizance, and unlawful entry into a dwelling house.

He argued that the sentence was excessive, that the trial judge failed to consider pre-trial custody, that his trial counsel was incompetent, and that his right to a speedy trial was violated.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the appeal, noting the trial judge properly accounted for pre-trial custody and there was no evidence to support the claims of incompetence or delay.

Leave to appeal sentence was refused.

The appellant, a Convention refugee, was ordered deported after the Minister determined he constituted a danger to the security of Canada due to his involvement in terrorism.

After exhausting domestic remedies, the appellant petitioned the UN Human Rights Committee, which requested Canada stay the deportation.

When Canada refused, the appellant sought an injunction, arguing that his deportation violated section 7 of the Charter and his legitimate expectations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that unincorporated international treaties do not create binding domestic obligations and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not grant substantive rights to remain in Canada.

However, the Court granted a 30-day stay to permit the appellant to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The young person appellant was convicted of sexual assault and related offences against a 13-year-old complainant.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by the complainant.

He also appealed his sentence of three months in secure custody followed by 20 months of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also rejected the fresh evidence, concluding it did not meet the Palmer test as it would not have affected the trial's outcome.

The sentence was upheld as fit and reflecting no error in principle.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that the relationship between the parties was a debtor-creditor relationship rather than a partnership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to make that determination.

The appellant appealed a judgment, arguing that the respondent's claim was barred by cause of action estoppel due to an earlier small claims court action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that cause of action estoppel did not apply because the earlier action was resolved by a settlement without a court determination or releases.

Furthermore, the respondent was not required to assert its complaint as a counterclaim in the small claims court, as it would have exceeded the monetary jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed an order approving a debtor's proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, seeking an order that the debtor pay them $244,049.10.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the approval of the proposal.

The Court noted the appellants could pursue claims against individuals or follow statutory procedures to question the claim amount.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault and multiple breaches of recognizance arising from a deteriorating relationship with his wife.

Almost a year later, he applied for an extension of time to appeal his convictions, which was dismissed by the summary conviction appeal court.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the appellant failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, did not adequately explain the lengthy delay, and failed to show any merit to the proposed appeal or that an injustice had occurred.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Corbett application to exclude his prior criminal record.

The prior convictions were all for sexual offences and were at least 14 years old.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by admitting the record simply because credibility was a central issue, without properly balancing the significant prejudicial effect of old, similar convictions against their minimal probative value.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The parties separated and exchanged correspondence to settle their family law dispute prior to commencing litigation.

The respondent made an offer to settle that referenced Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant made a counter-offer, which was rejected, and then purported to accept the respondent's original offer.

The appellant brought a motion for judgment to enforce the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 49 does not apply to pre-litigation offers and that the reference to Rule 49 in the offer did not incorporate its provisions by reference.

Therefore, under the common law, the appellant's counter-offer destroyed his power to accept the original offer.

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their claim for partition and sale and granting other relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the partition and sale claim, finding that the joint venture agreement provided a proper basis for denying this relief.

However, the Court found material facts in dispute regarding mortgage disclosure and directed those issues to proceed to trial.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed its conviction relating to the operation of two crane games, arguing they were games of skill rather than mixed chance and skill under s. 206(1)(f) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the games involved an overwhelming degree of chance and only a minimal element of skill for the ordinary player.

The court noted that virtually all elements of the game were beyond the player's control, making it a game of mixed chance and skill.

The appellant appealed his life sentence imposed by the trial judge for a serious attack.

The trial judge had imposed the life sentence based on a finding that the appellant was a dangerous person, despite the absence of a pre-sentence report or expert evidence, and the Crown having sought a definite sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by imposing a life sentence without clear evidence to support the finding of dangerousness.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a definite term of 15 years' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction for impaired driving.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in law by re-weighing the evidence regarding whether the police officer had objective reasonable grounds to make a breath demand.

The trial judge's finding that reasonable grounds existed, based on a civilian tip and the officer's observations of swaying, odour of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes, was reasonably open to him.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant, who suffers from AIDS, uses marihuana for medicinal purposes and obtained a personal exemption under s. 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He applied for a declaration that his s. 7 Charter rights were infringed because the exemption did not protect his caregivers from criminal liability and the government failed to provide a safe supply of marihuana.

The Court of Appeal held that while the provincial superior court had jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge to the Act, the appellant failed to establish a s. 7 violation.

The Act itself did not preclude caregiver exemptions, and the appellant was not dependent on the government for his supply.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict apportioning liability for a motor vehicle accident involving a child on a rock slide, and the trial judge's award of a $25,500 costs premium to the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury's finding that the driver was only 10% responsible, noting the high threshold for interfering with a jury's apportionment.

The court also upheld the costs premium but allowed an amendment to reduce the judgment by $10,921.44 based on recent case law.