Louise Charron

The appellant, a dual Canadian-American citizen, was convicted in Canada of drug offences.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition for a related drug transaction in Detroit.

The Minister of Justice ordered his surrender, concluding that extradition would not unjustifiably infringe his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Minister's decision to surrender a fugitive, including the assessment of Charter rights, is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.

The Court found that the Minister provided adequate reasons and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not already been punished in Canada for the U.S. offence, and that the U.S. had a greater interest in prosecuting the conduct that occurred on its territory.

The appellants were subcontractors to a general contractor who submitted a bid for a design-build construction project.

The owner awarded the contract to a non-compliant bidder.

The general contractor settled its claim against the owner, but the subcontractors sued the owner in tort for pure economic loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the owner did not owe a duty of care to the subcontractors.

The claim did not fall within a recognized category of pure economic loss, and recognizing a new duty of care was not justified because the subcontractors could have protected themselves by forming a joint venture with the general contractor.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals involving offenders who had been detained for significant periods before being sentenced.

The trial judges imposed custodial sentences of less than two years and probation for three years, taking into account the pre-sentence custody.

In one case, the judge also ordered the offender to serve half his sentence before being eligible for parole.

The Court held that the term of imprisonment is the term imposed by the judge at the time of sentence, and pre-sentence custody is not part of the sentence but a factor taken into account.

Therefore, the sentences were less than two years, making the probation orders valid and the parole ineligibility order invalid.

The appellant was stopped by an RCMP officer at a bus terminal based on suspicious behaviour.

The officer called for a sniffer dog, which indicated the presence of drugs in the appellant's bag.

The appellant was arrested and a search of the bag revealed cocaine and heroin.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a dog sniff constitutes a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

While the police have a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on a standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer in this case did not have sufficient grounds to meet that standard.

The search was therefore unreasonable, and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the appeal being allowed and the conviction set aside.

The police accepted an invitation from a high school principal to bring sniffer dogs into the school to search for drugs.

The police had no specific knowledge of drugs present and conducted a random search while students were confined to classrooms.

A sniffer dog reacted to the respondent's unattended backpack in the gymnasium.

The police opened the backpack without a warrant and found illicit drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dog sniff constituted a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court found that while police possess a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on reasonable suspicion, the search in this case was random and lacked reasonable suspicion, thus violating s. 8.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the acquittal was upheld.

The appellants were charged with driving 'over 80' after failing breathalyzer tests.

At trial, they adduced expert 'straddle evidence' indicating that, based on their drinking patterns and average alcohol elimination rates, their blood alcohol concentrations could have been either above or below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that straddle evidence does not rebut the statutory presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, as it merely confirms the accused consumed enough alcohol to reach a level exceeding 80 mg and does not tend to show the concentration was below the legal limit.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions/orders for new trials were upheld.

The appellants brought actions seeking a declaration that the RCMP, when acting as a provincial police force in New Brunswick under an agreement between the federal and provincial governments, is bound by the language obligations imposed on New Brunswick institutions by s. 20(2) of the Charter.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the RCMP was only bound by federal language obligations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that because RCMP members are designated as provincial peace officers and perform the role of an institution of the New Brunswick government, they must comply with s. 20(2) of the Charter and provide services in both official languages.

The appellant entered into a contract with a mechanical inspection centre to carry out vehicle inspections.

An employee of the centre was designated as an accredited mechanic in an appendix signed by the appellant, the centre, and the employee.

The appellant subsequently revoked the employee's accreditation for failing to apply regulatory standards.

The employee sought judicial review, arguing he was denied procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the employee was entitled to procedural fairness under section 5 of the Act respecting administrative justice.

The Court found that the delegation of power to conduct vehicle inspections constituted an administrative authorization governed by public law, rather than a purely private contractual matter, and therefore required procedural fairness before revocation.

The appellant telecommunications company sought an exemption from two production orders requiring it to produce call data records for criminal investigations, arguing that compliance without compensation was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Criminal Code production order scheme does not permit a judge to order compensation for compliance.

A judge can only consider the financial aspect of compliance when deciding whether to grant an exemption on the basis that the financial burden is unreasonable.

The Court found that the appellant had not established that the cost of compliance was unreasonable in this case, and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown alleged the respondent breached her conditional sentence by violating curfew and possessing stolen property.

At the breach hearing, the Crown relied solely on a supervisor's report that attached an unsigned police report summarizing witness statements, without including signed statements from the witnesses themselves.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under s. 742.6(4) of the Criminal Code, the Crown may use documentary evidence to prove a breach, but the report must include signed witness statements if the supervisor lacks personal knowledge of the material facts.

Because the hearing judge had no admissible evidence to base the breach finding on, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following a single-vehicle accident.

At trial, the main issue was whether the appellant or another survivor was driving.

The trial judge admitted prior consistent statements of the other survivor to rebut allegations of recent fabrication.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge improperly used these statements for the truth of their contents and to bolster general credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly understood the limited use of prior consistent statements and did not rely on them for the truth of their contents.

The appellant, a non-unionized public employee holding office 'at pleasure', was dismissed without cause and given four months' pay in lieu of notice.

He grieved the dismissal, and an adjudicator ordered his reinstatement, finding a breach of procedural fairness and interpreting the governing legislation as requiring cause for dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator's statutory interpretation was unreasonable and that public employees governed by a contract of employment are not owed a public law duty of procedural fairness upon dismissal.

In doing so, the Court fundamentally restructured the framework for judicial review of administrative decisions, collapsing the three previous standards of review into two: correctness and reasonableness.

The appellant, a childcare worker, was sued in negligence after a child suffered a brain injury in her care.

During the civil proceedings, the police investigated the appellant criminally.

The appellant sought to prevent the disclosure of her civil discovery evidence to the police, relying on the implied undertaking rule.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the implied undertaking rule applies to discovery evidence that may disclose criminal conduct, and that parties cannot generally disclose such evidence to the police without a court order.

The Court allowed the appeal, preventing the disclosure of the discovery transcripts to the police without a proper search warrant.

The appellants, owners of hotels, restaurants, and bars in Jasper National Park, challenged the annual business licence fees required to sell alcoholic beverages, arguing they constituted an ultra vires tax rather than a valid regulatory charge.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the fees possessed characteristics of a tax, they were in pith and substance regulatory charges connected to the regulatory scheme governing the administration and operation of the park.

The Court found a sufficient relationship between the fees paid and the regulatory scheme, as the revenues generated did not exceed the costs of operating the park, and the appellants benefited from the park's regulation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an RCMP officer, shot and killed a detainee in a cell and was convicted of manslaughter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum four-year sentence under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code constituted cruel and unusual punishment and granted a constitutional exemption, imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the four-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate on the facts.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that constitutional exemptions are not an available remedy for mandatory minimum sentences that violate s. 12 of the Charter; such laws must be struck down under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The appellant was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death after his vehicle crossed the centre line into oncoming traffic, killing three people.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding that his momentary lapse of attention did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent driver.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that a momentary lapse of attention, without more, cannot establish the actus reus and mens rea of the offence of dangerous driving.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by a prison official while incarcerated.

After his release, he developed a heroin addiction and spent 12 of the next 15 years in prison.

He successfully sued the province for damages, including past and future wage loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent was not entitled to compensation for wage loss during his periods of incarceration.

Applying the ex turpi causa doctrine, the Court found that awarding damages for time spent in prison would create an inconsistency between criminal and civil law, effectively providing a rebate on a lawfully imposed criminal sanction.

The appeal was allowed to exclude wage loss during incarceration, and the cross-appeal regarding the reduction of future wage loss was dismissed.

A 14-year-old uninsured driver stole a car and, while being pursued by a police officer, collided with another vehicle, killing its driver.

The trial judge found the uninsured driver 90% at fault and the police officer 10% at fault.

The Attorney General of British Columbia appealed, arguing its vicarious liability under the Police Act should be limited to the 10% fault attributed to the officer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that because the officer would have been jointly and severally liable under the Negligence Act but for the statutory immunity in the Police Act, the Attorney General steps into the officer's shoes and is jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the indivisible damages.

The appellant, a teenager, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against a child he was babysitting.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence, finding the complainant credible before assessing the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence and misapplied the burden of proof by shifting the onus to the accused after accepting the complainant's evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that upheld his convictions and dismissed his motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the motion to adduce fresh evidence did not meet the established criteria and that the appellant failed to show the guilty verdict was unreasonable or that a miscarriage of justice occurred.