Kristin Smith

The applicant, acting as substitute decision-maker for his incapable elderly father, brought an application for judicial review challenging a hospital's COVID-19 visitor restriction policy and a related memorandum from the Chief Medical Officer of Health.

The applicant argued the restrictions violated his father's rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter by preventing in-person visits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that neither the hospital's policy nor the CMOH memorandum were subject to judicial review as they did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision with a sufficient public character.

Furthermore, the court held that even if reviewable, the policies did not infringe the Charter, as they were based on sound medical and epidemiological evidence rather than discriminatory presumptions, were not arbitrary or overbroad, and did not constitute state-imposed punishment or treatment.

The applicant physician appealed the General Manager's denial of five claims for surgical procedures.

The General Manager argued the claims were stale dated under s. 18(3) of the Health Insurance Act because the applicant failed to submit requested operating room notes within six months of the service date.

The Physician Payment Review Board found that the claims were submitted within the prescribed time and that the request for operating room notes constituted an interim assessment under s. 18(2), not a prescribed requirement under s. 18(3).

The Board ordered the applicant to resubmit the claims with the notes for a fresh assessment by the General Manager.

The respondent, a convenience store clerk, sold cigarettes to a 17-year-old test shopper after misreading the birth year on the shopper's identification due to 'human error'.

She was convicted of selling tobacco to a minor under the Smoke-Free Ontario Act, but the summary conviction appeal court overturned the conviction, finding her honest mistake satisfied the statutory defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the statutory due diligence defence requires a reasonable belief formed after exercising reasonable care in reviewing the identification, which a mere unexplained human error does not satisfy.

The appellant sued the police and others for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts after criminal charges against him were withdrawn but a peace bond was imposed over his objection.

The motion judge struck most of the claims, finding that the criminal proceedings had not terminated in the appellant's favour.

The appellant appealed, and one police officer cross-appealed the motion judge's decision to allow an abuse of process claim against her to proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, concluding that the imposition of a peace bond was not a favourable termination and that the abuse of process claim was inextricably tied to the failed malicious prosecution claim.

The plaintiffs, comprising 118 limited partnerships, brought an action against the Ontario Power Authority and Ontario for misfeasance in public office and unjust enrichment, seeking $450 million in damages related to changes in the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) program.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process because it attempted to relitigate the lawfulness of the FIT program changes, which had already been upheld by the Divisional Court in a prior judicial review application.

The court also held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for either misfeasance in public office or unjust enrichment.

In a health care cost recovery action brought by the Crown against tobacco companies under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2009, a defendant moved to strike portions of the statement of claim referencing alleged misrepresentations made by tobacco companies before parliamentary committees.

The court considered whether statements made to House of Commons and legislative committees could be relied upon in a civil action.

It held that parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech, protects statements made during parliamentary proceedings and committee appearances, including by non‑members who participate as witnesses.

Because the privilege is absolute and prevents courts from questioning such statements, the impugned pleadings referencing those presentations could not stand.

The motion to strike those paragraphs was therefore granted.

Applicants brought an application challenging the validity of sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 2002 Minimum Maintenance Standards for Municipal Roadways under the Municipal Act, 2001, asserting that the regulation was ultra vires.

The challenge arose in the context of a personal injury action alleging negligent winter road maintenance.

After the Court of Appeal’s decision in Giuliani limited the scope of the regulation and the municipality withdrew reliance on it as a defence, the respondents moved to strike the application as moot.

The court held that no live controversy remained between the parties and declined to exercise discretion to hear the matter, emphasizing judicial economy and the limited relevance of the impugned provisions following amendments and appellate guidance.

Pharmacy and retailer appellants challenged provincial regulations that barred private-label generic drugs from formulary listing and interchangeable designation.

The Court reaffirmed that delegated legislation is presumed valid and is ultra vires only if inconsistent with statutory purpose or outside delegated authority.

It held the regulations aligned with the legislative scheme aimed at reducing prescription drug costs and promoting transparent pricing while maintaining safety.

The measures were rationally connected to preventing circumvention of rebate and allowance restrictions through affiliated manufacturers.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion seeking leave to file seven reply affidavits in an application for judicial review concerning a decision to allow increased sulphur production at a Suncor refinery.

The respondents objected to the vast majority of the proposed reply evidence on grounds including improper case-splitting, irrelevance, and that the evidence was available earlier.

The court held that a less strict standard for reply evidence applies on an application prior to cross-examinations than at trial.

Applying this standard, the court permitted most of the reply evidence, striking only portions that were purely confirmatory, raised new issues that should have been in the main case, or repeated earlier evidence verbatim.

The appellant's proposed wind power project was cancelled by the Ontario government during an election campaign.

The appellant sued for damages, alleging misfeasance in public office, claiming the government acted in bad faith for electoral expediency and specifically targeted the appellant to cripple it financially.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the claim for misfeasance in public office to proceed, but only on the narrow basis that the government's conduct was specifically targeted to injure the appellant financially.

The court held that core policy decisions based on electoral expediency do not constitute bad faith for the purposes of misfeasance in public office.

The plaintiffs appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking their claim for harassment, malicious falsehood, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The claim was based on statements made by the defendant to a Justice of the Peace during judicial proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that communications made during or incidental to judicial proceedings are protected by absolute privilege, which extends to all causes of action pleaded.

An allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias was also dismissed for lack of evidence.

The applicants, owners of designated physiotherapy clinics, sought judicial review to quash Regulation 138/13, which delisted their clinics and changed the funding model for physiotherapy services.

They argued the regulation was enacted in violation of a government policy requiring a 45-day consultation period, thereby breaching their legitimate expectations of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the policy did not create a clear, unambiguous, and unqualified representation, as it expressly allowed for exceptions.

Furthermore, the court noted that quashing the regulation would be futile, as the government could simply re-enact it after a formal consultation period, having already heard and rejected the applicants' views.

This appeal addressed whether trial judges may fix rates of remuneration for amici curiae and order provincial payment in criminal proceedings where amici were appointed to preserve orderly process.

The majority held that while superior and statutory courts may appoint amici in exceptional circumstances, inherent or implied jurisdiction does not extend to fixing compensation rates absent constitutional or statutory authority.

The Court emphasized separation of powers and held public-funding allocation decisions belong to the legislative and executive branches.

Dissenting judges would have recognized fee-setting as necessarily incidental to the appointment power to protect judicial process integrity.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant, Imperial Tobacco Canada Limited, appealed an order declaring that a claim brought by the Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers' Marketing Board in a proposed class action was not a 'Released Claim' under a 2008 Comprehensive Agreement.

The 2008 Agreement settled claims between tobacco companies and government entities regarding tobacco smuggling.

The Court of Appeal held that while the claims might fall within the definition of 'Released Claims', the Board was acting as an agent for tobacco producers to enforce contracts, not as an agent for the Crown.

Therefore, the Board was not a 'Releasing Entity' under the agreement, and the claims were not released.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a not-for-profit organization serving newcomers from Mainland China, alleged that the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration and its officials discriminated against it on the basis of ethnic origin and place of origin by reducing and ultimately denying its Newcomer Settlement Program (NSP) funding.

The applicant claimed that a Ministry official from Hong Kong was biased against the applicant because it was operated by individuals from Mainland China.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry conducted a thorough and fair evaluation process and that the applicant failed to satisfy the mandated eligibility criteria for NSP funding.

The Tribunal concluded there was no evidence connecting the funding decisions to the prohibited grounds.

The General Manager of OHIP alleged that the applicant physician misrepresented the nature of services by billing fee code K070 multiple times for the same patient when modifying home care medical orders.

The applicant appealed to the Physician Payment Review Board, arguing his billing practice was consistent with the Schedule of Benefits.

The Board found that the wording of fee code K070 does not expressly limit its use to the initial home care application.

The Board concluded that the applicant's practice of billing K070 when submitting a fresh home care services request form to modify medical orders was a reasonable interpretation and did not constitute misrepresentation under s. 18(2) of the Health Insurance Act.

The applicant sought a declaration that a proposed class action brought by a tobacco growers’ marketing board against a tobacco manufacturer was not barred as a released claim under a comprehensive settlement agreement resolving governmental claims relating to tobacco smuggling and unpaid taxes.

The respondents argued that the class action fell within the broad release provisions and that the marketing board was effectively a Crown entity bound by the agreement.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation governing releases, including contextual interpretation and the rule that general release language is limited to matters within the parties’ contemplation at the time of execution.

It concluded that the settlement agreement addressed governmental tax‑related claims arising from smuggling and did not extend to private claims by growers for price differentials.

The class proceeding was therefore not a released claim by a releasing entity.

The plaintiff corporation sued the provincial government for $2.25 billion after the government imposed a moratorium on offshore wind farm development in Lake Ontario.

The government moved under Rule 21 to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the moratorium constituted a core policy decision grounded in public policy considerations and therefore could not ground liability in tort.

Claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, expropriation, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, misfeasance in public office, and intentional infliction of economic harm were all found to be inadequately pleaded or legally unsustainable.

The statement of claim was struck and the action dismissed without leave to amend.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Ministry of the Environment decision approving an increase in sulphur production at a Suncor refinery, arguing the failure to conduct a cumulative effects assessment violated their Charter rights.

The respondents brought motions to strike the application as a collateral attack on prior approvals and to strike much of the applicants' affidavit evidence.

The applicants brought a cross-motion for a protective costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to strike the application, finding it was not plain and obvious it would fail.

The court allowed the motion to strike evidence in part, striking improper expert opinion and unattributed hearsay, but leaving relevance determinations to the hearing panel.

The motion for a protective costs order was dismissed, as the applicants had pro bono representation and the narrow administrative issue did not meet the exceptional public importance threshold.

The applicant pharmacy sought judicial review of a decision by the Executive Officer terminating its ability to bill the public drug program due to alleged fraudulent and unsubstantiated claims.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness because it was not given sufficient time to provide evidence addressing the discrepancies.

The Divisional Court held that, given the severe economic consequences to the applicant's business, the duty of fairness required granting the applicant a short additional period to submit supporting evidence.

The application was allowed in part, and the applicant was granted an extension to make further submissions while a stay of the termination remained in place.