Kofi Barnes

The applicant sought removal of a notice of interest registered on title under s. 71 of the Land Titles Act.

The respondent, the applicant’s sister, had registered the notice to protect a 15% entitlement to net sale proceeds arising from an agreement creating a trust over those proceeds.

The court held that the agreement created a trust in the net proceeds of sale rather than an interest in land.

Because s. 62(1) of the Land Titles Act prohibits the registration of trusts on title, the notice was unauthorized and had to be removed.

The court confirmed the parties’ agreement that upon sale the net proceeds would be distributed 85% to the applicant and 15% to the respondent.

During a trial for attempted murder, the Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, specifically his alleged membership in a street gang called the 'Clean Up Crew'.

The Crown argued this evidence was necessary to establish motive and animus, as the shooting was allegedly ordered by a gang leader.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the evidence was highly probative of motive, its prejudicial effect—the risk that the jury would convict based on gang membership alone—outweighed its probative value.

The Crown was permitted to lead evidence of the relationship between the parties without referencing gang affiliations.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty to public mischief for falsely reporting that an individual had threatened him with a firearm, which led to a police tactical response and the arrest of an innocent person.

The sentencing judge imposed a 14‑day conditional sentence followed by one year of probation.

The appellant argued that the judge overemphasized general deterrence and failed to properly consider a conditional discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the sentencing judge considered the relevant principles and the impact of the conduct on an innocent third party, making deterrence and denunciation significant factors.

The sentence was not demonstrably unfit and no error in principle was established.

The accused, charged with fraud over $5,000, sought a conditional stay of proceedings unless the Attorney General provided publicly funded counsel pursuant to a Rowbotham order.

Legal Aid had denied coverage and characterized the accused’s financial disclosure as incomplete and not credible.

The court considered whether counsel was necessary for a fair trial and whether the accused was indigent.

The judge found the case was not beyond the accused’s abilities and that he was familiar with the underlying transactions, could use an interpreter, and had previously managed a significant business enterprise.

The court also found the accused was not forthright about ownership and proceeds from the sale of a home and therefore failed to establish indigence.

The request for a Rowbotham order was dismissed.

The defendant lawyer moved for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence claim brought by a former criminal client.

The plaintiff alleged negligent representation during the early stages of his criminal trial, including forcing him to testify against his will and mishandling evidentiary issues.

The court held that most allegations required expert evidence on the standard of care, which the plaintiff had not provided.

However, the allegation that the lawyer compelled the client to testify engaged fundamental criminal law principles and could constitute an obvious breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

Because the parties' evidence directly conflicted on that issue, a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 1999 child support order, arguing his income had significantly decreased following a 2009 motor vehicle accident and that his two adult daughters were no longer children of the marriage.

The respondent mother sought ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

The court found a material change in circumstances and varied the child support order.

The court determined the older daughter ceased to be a child of the marriage in 2011, but the younger daughter remained a child of the marriage due to chronic illness and disability.

The father was ordered to pay retroactive section 7 expenses for the older daughter (offset by a child support overpayment) and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses for the younger daughter, to be funded from his long-term disability settlement.

In this family law trial, the court set aside a 2001 separation agreement after finding the parties' post-agreement conduct was inconsistent with an actual separation and that the respondent had been misled as to the agreement's true purpose.

The court fixed the separation date as August 2, 2010, declared the Brampton residence to be the matrimonial home, and ordered an equalization payment of $51,867.20, with sale of the home only if the payment could not otherwise be made.

The interim child support order was varied retroactively due to a material change in the respondent's income, but arrears were cancelled because of hardship and social assistance dependence.

Retroactive s. 7 expenses were denied as delayed and prejudicial, though future s. 7 expenses were ordered proportionately.

The respondent was awarded symbolic non-compensatory spousal support below guideline levels because the applicant bore almost all ongoing child-related expenses.

The applicant municipality sought an order under s. 440 of the Municipal Act to restrain the respondent from using her property as a short-term rental, arguing it constituted an illegal 'Tourist Establishment' under the zoning by-law.

The respondent brought a counter-application seeking a declaration that her use was permitted or that the by-law was unacceptably vague and ultra vires.

The court found that the by-law did not clearly regulate short-term use in the Resort Residential zone and that, by attempting to regulate the identity of the users rather than the use of the land, it was ultra vires the Planning Act.

The municipality's application was dismissed and the by-law was declared of no force and effect to the extent it purported to regulate short-term rentals.

The parties separated in 2011 after a 12-year marriage.

The applicant sought equalization of net family property and the sale of the matrimonial home, while the respondent sought spousal support.

The court determined the value of various disputed assets and liabilities to calculate net family property, ultimately ordering the respondent to pay an equalization payment of $8,053.25 after accounting for post-separation credits.

The court dismissed the respondent's claim for spousal support, finding no entitlement under the Bracklow criteria.

Finally, the court ordered the partition and sale of the matrimonial home, dispensing with the respondent's consent due to his reluctance to sell.

The applicant sought spousal support and a declaration of an interest in a residential property following the breakdown of her relationship with the respondent.

The court found that the parties were common law spouses who cohabited for over 11 years.

The applicant was awarded non-compensatory spousal support due to her inability to work following a bipolar disorder diagnosis.

The court also found that the respondent was unjustly enriched by the applicant's contributions to the maintenance and preservation of the property, awarding her monetary compensation for her share of the joint family venture.

The applicant husband moved to sever the divorce from corollary relief claims for spousal support and property, while the respondent wife cross-moved to stay or dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction and alleged prejudice to proceedings in India.

The court held that jurisdiction existed because the respondent had attorned by filing an Answer seeking spousal support and equalization of property.

Applying Rule 12 (6) of the Family Law Rules, the court found no reliable evidence that proceedings concerning property had been commenced in India or that a Canadian divorce would prejudice the respondent's property or support rights there.

The severance motion was granted and the cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision that dismissed his motion to strike the respondent's claim as statute-barred and struck his statement of defence.

The dispute involved a $16,000 promissory note for a tractor purchase.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence.

However, the court found the Deputy Judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to explain how conflicting evidence regarding the date of the parties' last contact was resolved, which was crucial for determining when a demand was made under the Limitations Act.

The appeal was allowed in part, the order was set aside, and the matter was remanded to Small Claims Court for trial.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim for vehicle damage and awarding the respondent insurer damages on its counterclaim for a staged accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to find a conspiracy against her.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of palpable and overriding error for findings of fact, concluding the trial judge's findings were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with drug offences following the execution of a telewarrant at his residence, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The applicant argued that cross-examination was necessary to challenge the reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant, specifically regarding the urgency of the telewarrant, the need for a night-time search, and the reliability of confidential informants.

The court applied the Garofoli test and granted leave to cross-examine the affiant, but restricted the scope to specific areas including when the affiant learned the applicant's name, the basis for describing the applicant as having a violent record and multiple firearms, and the failure to disclose a linked vehicle.

The plaintiff dentist alleged that the defendants supplied defective dental equipment causing business losses, property damage from leaking equipment, and delays in opening a second clinic.

On competing motions relating to documentary production and discovery procedures, the court applied the relevance standard under Rule 30.02 and the proportionality principle under Rule 29.2.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court ordered various categories of document production from both sides, including financial records, repair invoices, equipment images, and documents relevant to alleged lost profits and misrepresentation.

The court also permitted the plaintiff to examine an individual defendant personally at discovery due to allegations that he was the directing mind of the corporate defendant and personally involved in the representations at issue.

A discovery plan was ordered to move the litigation forward.

A vendor sought a declaration that purchasers breached an agreement of purchase and sale and that the deposit held in trust be released to the vendor.

The purchasers alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, arguing they were misled about the legality of their intended commercial use of the property.

The court held that the vendor made no fraudulent misrepresentation and that the purchasers failed to conduct due diligence despite contractual provisions allowing investigation and requisitions.

The illegal use of the property did not constitute a defect going to the root of title.

Applying the doctrine of caveat emptor, the court concluded the purchasers were in breach and the vendor was entitled to the deposit.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal or a stay of a wrongful dismissal and breach of contract action.

The dispute arose from an employment contract containing a sole employer clause and a forum selection clause requiring disputes to be resolved exclusively in Mexico.

The court found that although Ontario technically had jurisdiction, the employment contract’s choice of forum clause and the existence of ongoing proceedings before Mexican labour authorities justified declining to exercise that jurisdiction.

Applying the principles governing enforcement of forum selection clauses, the court held the plaintiff failed to demonstrate strong cause to depart from the agreed forum.

The Ontario action was stayed pending the outcome of the Mexican proceedings.

In a trademark and passing off dispute between competing consulting businesses using similar trade names, the defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the statement of claim and sought particulars.

The plaintiffs also sought an adjournment of their injunction motion and leave to amend their pleading.

The court held that several paragraphs of the statement of claim failed to plead material facts necessary to support claims for passing off and unlawful interference with economic interests, and improperly asserted trademark infringement despite the mark being unregistered.

Multiple paragraphs were struck, and certain pleadings were ordered corrected or clarified.

The court refused to permit the plaintiffs to withdraw admissions made in an affidavit but granted limited leave to amend the statement of claim provided the amendments were not inconsistent with those admissions.

The applicants sought orders under the Substitute Decisions Act appointing them as guardians of the person and property of an elderly individual alleged to be incapable of managing her affairs.

The court considered medical evidence, family affidavits, and video evidence suggesting the individual was vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation.

Evidence also raised concerns about financial mismanagement by an existing attorney under a power of attorney.

The court found the individual incapable of managing property and personal care, removed the existing attorney, and appointed the applicants as joint guardians.

A formal capacity assessment and management plan oversight were also ordered.

The moving party sought to set aside a default judgment entered after he failed to attend trial in a construction dispute involving unpaid subcontractor invoices and alleged breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The court applied the established three‑part test for setting aside default judgments, considering whether there was a plausible excuse for failing to attend trial, whether the motion was brought promptly, and whether a defence on the merits existed.

The court found the moving party knew of the trial date, deliberately failed to attend, delayed unreasonably in seeking relief, and lacked a viable defence, including evidence that he exercised effective control over the corporation that breached the statutory trust.

The motion to set aside the judgment and related enforcement orders was dismissed, though the court directed steps toward examination in aid of execution and potential production of a mortgage discharge statement.