Sexual assault

The defendant, K.N., was charged with sexually assaulting M.M. The Crown proceeded by indictment, and K.N. pleaded not guilty.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant (M.M.) and the defendant (K.N.).

The court found M.M.'s testimony to be credible and reliable, despite a memory gap and delayed reporting, rejecting the defence's argument of fabrication.

K.N.'s testimony, which claimed consensual activity and an attempt to appease M.M. with text messages, was found to lack credibility, particularly due to inconsistencies with text messages where he admitted M.M. said "no" but he continued.

The court found K.N. guilty of sexual assault.

The appellant, D.B., appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offences against his niece.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of evidence regarding the appellant's reaction/inaction when confronted with allegations, improper Crown submissions inviting the jury to infer the appellant lied to secure an acquittal, and failure to caution the jury on extrinsic misconduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury was not sufficiently instructed on the lack of probative value of the reaction evidence and on the impermissible reasoning regarding the appellant's motive to lie.

These errors undermined the presumption of innocence and left the jury unequipped to fairly decide the case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentence set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of assault.

He appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's motive to fabricate, alleged "oath helping" to bolster the complainant's credibility, and the admission of electronic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment that the mere existence of family law litigation did not establish a motive to lie, no impermissible oath helping in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting, and that the electronic evidence met the low bar for admission under the Canada Evidence Act and was not central to the credibility analysis.

This is a sentencing decision for N.L., who was found guilty of sexual assault and mischief to property against his intimate partner, K.L. The court considered aggravating factors including the intimate partner relationship, breach of trust, the victim's vulnerability due to injury, premeditation evidenced by vile text messages, and the accused's misogynistic attitudes and lack of remorse.

Mitigating factors included the accused's lack of prior record and good work ethic.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, rejecting a conditional sentence due to the high moral culpability and severe, long-lasting harm to the victim.

The judge imposed a custodial sentence, a probation order, a no-contact order, a DNA order, and a weapons prohibition.

The defendant, G.S., was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, voyeurism, and assault against his estranged wife, A.H., following the breakdown of their marriage.

The Crown conceded the voyeurism charges during the trial.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both A.H. and G.S., noting significant inconsistencies and exaggerations in A.H.'s testimony, as well as the timing and context of her allegations (made jointly with her new partner, B.).

Despite finding G.S.'s denials of the assault and sexual assaults not entirely credible due to his admitted bitterness and intent to make A.H. uncomfortable, the court found A.H.'s evidence unreliable and insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

G.S. was acquitted on all remaining charges.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on three grounds: inferring the complainant's non-impairment without expert evidence, alleged improper conduct by the Crown regarding the complainant's prior relationship, and uneven scrutiny of the appellant's and complainant's testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the complainant's evidence regarding non-impairment, that the Crown's submission, while potentially improper, caused no prejudice as the prior relationship's nature was irrelevant to consent, and that the trial judge's differential treatment of argumentativeness and assessment of inconsistencies did not constitute reversible error or uneven scrutiny.

This criminal trial concerned an allegation of sexual assault by G.P. against E.C. at a New Year's Eve party.

The case primarily hinged on the credibility and reliability of the complainant, the accused, and a third witness (D.T.), all of whom were intoxicated to varying degrees.

The court rejected the accused's denial, found the third witness credible, and accepted the complainant's testimony, which was corroborated by the accused's admission to the third witness.

The court found the accused guilty as charged.

The accused, A.R.A., was charged with multiple counts of sexual interference, sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and invitation to sexual touching involving his two nieces.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainants and the accused, and considered the admissibility of similar fact evidence.

The court found the accused's testimony not credible and identified significant inconsistencies in the complainants' accounts, as well as potential collusion between them.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the Crown had not proven the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the charges.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence from a prior sexual assault allegation (F.J.) against the accused (J.R.) in his current trial for sexual assault (D.F-H.).

The defence argued the evidence was inadmissible due to issue estoppel, abuse of process, or failure to meet the orthodox test for similar fact evidence.

The court found that a prior stay of proceedings for delay (s. 11(b) Charter) on the F.J. charges did not constitute a determination on the merits, thus issue estoppel and abuse of process did not apply.

The court further found that the F.J. evidence met the test for admissibility as similar fact evidence, demonstrating sufficient similarities in context and method, and that any prejudice was minimized in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application was allowed.

The appellant, R.F., appealed convictions for two sexual offences involving his niece, while having been acquitted of two other sexual offences involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically arguing that the judge erred by not considering all evidence holistically and by applying a lessened standard of scrutiny appropriate for children, despite the complainant being a teenager at the time of testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to credibility or the assessment of the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding the core allegation of the "couch incident" versus peripheral inconsistencies.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and choking to assist in the commission of a sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The court found the complainant's testimony, despite inconsistencies regarding intoxication and memory, to be credible on the core facts of non-consensual sexual activity and choking, corroborated by physical injuries and DNA evidence.

The accused's testimony was disbelieved due to contradictions with physical evidence.

The defense of mistake of age was rejected, as the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and was found to be reckless as to her underage status, having ignored "red flags" regarding her appearance and circumstances.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The accused, O.Y., was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against his former partner.

The Crown faced significant obstacles in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including evidence of the complainant's motivation to fabricate, unconfirmed testimony, and the accused's denial.

The court also addressed a Crown application for the complainant to testify behind a screen, which was denied.

Ultimately, the court found a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The accused, K.L., brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay in a sexual assault and exploitation case.

The total delay was 20 months and 13 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Crown argued the delay was an exceptional circumstance due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the case's complexity (novel defence argument, s. 276 application).

The court found the Crown failed to demonstrate reasonable steps to mitigate the nine-month delay in providing initial disclosure.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments regarding complexity and the pandemic as a blanket excuse, concluding the delay was unreasonable and staying the charges against the accused.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, sought bail pending appeal.

This was a renewed application after a previous denial.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the appellant was not a flight risk, but opposed bail on public interest grounds, specifically public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that while public safety concerns could be mitigated by strict conditions, the high enforceability interest due to the serious nature of the offences and the appellant's lack of insight into the harm caused by prior breaches outweighed the reviewability interest, which was deemed low despite arguable grounds of appeal.

The motion for bail pending appeal was denied.

The accused, T.K., charged with sexual interference and sexual assault, brought an application under section 278.4 of the Criminal Code seeking production of the complainant's and witnesses' electronic communications and photos/videos from a specific period.

The defence argued these records were relevant to the accused's belief regarding the complainant's age and consent.

The Crown and witnesses opposed, citing privacy and arguing the records were not necessary for full answer and defence.

The court, applying section 278.5(2) factors, found potential relevance and ordered the records to be produced for judicial review to determine if they are necessary for full answer and defence, balancing privacy interests against the accused's right to defence.

The accused, Diego Doncel, charged with sexual assault, applied under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of third-party records relating to the complainant, R.W. The application was opposed by the Crown and complainant.

Following a two-stage Mills regime analysis, the court ordered a specific 2010 psychological assessment report from Surrey Place to be disclosed to the defence, finding it relevant to the complainant's capacity to testify and credibility/reliability.

Disclosure was subject to redactions and a non-disclosure condition.

Other requested records from CAMH and Toronto Western Hospital were deemed not relevant or too dated and were not disclosed.

The accused, Diego Doncel, applied under section 278.3 of the Criminal Code for production of various third-party records relating to the complainant, R.W., in a sexual assault case.

R.W. has a severe mental disability.

The court ordered a narrow subset of records (formal assessments or diagnostic evaluations of R.W.'s cognitive functioning) to be produced for judicial review, finding them likely relevant to R.W.'s testimonial competence and credibility/reliability at trial.

The application for broader medical/therapeutic records and records related to an unrelated prior criminal charge involving R.W. (from police and Crown) was denied, as these did not meet the "likely relevant" threshold or were deemed speculative.

The court also declined to order disclosure of identifying details from the unrelated charge to facilitate public record searches.

The applicant, J.M., sought an order from the Court of Appeal for Ontario under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for state-funded counsel to represent him in his appeal against a sexual assault conviction, after Legal Aid Ontario denied funding.

A chambers judge had previously dismissed a similar application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that there is no right of appeal from a chambers judge's refusal to appoint funded counsel under s. 684.

The court clarified that while it has concurrent jurisdiction with a single judge to consider such applications, it would only exercise this de novo jurisdiction if there were a sufficient change in circumstances since the initial decision, which was not present in this case.

The court also affirmed that provincial legislation cannot create rights of appeal in criminal matters.

The accused, a paraplegic, was charged with sexual assault against his Personal Support Worker (PSW).

The complainant alleged the accused groped and kissed her during a routine morning visit, which the accused denied.

Applying the W.D. credibility analysis, the court found the accused not credible due to evasive testimony regarding his physical capabilities.

The complainant was found credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies, with the court noting her demeanor, lack of exaggeration, and absence of a financial motive to fabricate.

The court emphasized the cautious use of demeanor and post-offence conduct as credibility factors.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence (the "Toronto Allegations") and to permit a witness (Ms. H.M.) to testify remotely via Zoom in a criminal trial for sexual assault and related charges.

The defence opposed the admission of similar fact evidence, arguing it was prejudicial and lacked probative value, and also opposed remote testimony for the trial proper.

The court partially granted the Crown's application, allowing Ms. H.M. to testify remotely due to childcare responsibilities and the COVID-19 pandemic, and permitting her to testify regarding the accused's observation/perception of a firearm and his utterances about its contents.

However, the court excluded other aspects of the Toronto Allegations, such as the proposition for sex and credit card purchases, finding them irrelevant and overly prejudicial.