Right to counsel

The defendant was arrested based on the odour of burnt marijuana detected by police during a traffic stop.

Following the arrest, police conducted a strip search at the roadside without proper grounds or informational requirements, and delayed informing the defendant of his right to counsel for approximately 50 minutes.

The defendant was charged with possession of controlled drugs for trafficking, assault with intent to resist arrest, administering a noxious substance, and failing to comply with probation.

The court found multiple Charter violations including an unlawful arrest, unreasonable delay in providing s. 10(b) rights, and an improperly conducted strip search.

All evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in acquittals on all charges.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol count exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police found the defendant asleep in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the engine running.

The defence raised three issues: (1) whether a 30-minute delay in administering the roadside screening device breached Charter rights; (2) whether the defendant's right to counsel of choice was violated; and (3) whether the Crown proved a realistic danger that the vehicle could be put in motion.

The court found no Charter violations and determined that while the defendant rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "Over 80" breath sample.

The defendant sought exclusion of breath test results based on alleged breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no breach of sections 8 and 9 regarding reasonable grounds for arrest, but found a breach of section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel.

The court determined that the police failed to inform the defendant that his requested counsel was a paralegal rather than a lawyer, and failed to provide a "Prosper warning." However, the court found that the breath samples should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty of both counts, with a conditional stay entered on the "Over 80" charge pursuant to R. v. Kienapple principles.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a complaint of erratic driving.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking to exclude breath readings and stay proceedings, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that police lawfully entered the driveway under an implied licence, had reasonable grounds to make the approved screening device demand, and did not violate the accused's right to counsel of choice.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 10(b) when portions of the accused's privileged communications with duty counsel were inadvertently recorded by police audio equipment.

The breath readings were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with being in care and control of a vehicle while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to exclude breath test evidence based on alleged Charter violations: improper wording of the caution under s. 10(b), delay in providing rights to counsel, failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8.

The court found one Charter breach regarding the caution but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court also found the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, allowing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The accused was found guilty.

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample evidence on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving after crashing into a tractor trailer on Highway 401.

The court found that while the applicant's section 7 and 8/9 Charter arguments failed, the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel was violated.

Specifically, the police failed to facilitate the applicant's request to contact a police officer friend who could assist in locating counsel, and the police provided an incomplete explanation of the right to counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit).

The sole issue was whether the accused's Charter rights under s. 10(b) (right to counsel) were breached.

The accused requested to speak with her lawyer of choice, Karl Toews.

Police made six attempts to contact him over 45 minutes during business hours but were unsuccessful.

Police offered the accused the option of contacting another lawyer or duty counsel, which she declined.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights because the accused failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising her right to counsel by declining the offer of free legal aid duty counsel.

The court distinguished the case from precedents where accused persons had been found to be duly diligent.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit of 80 mg/100 ml of blood.

The Crown obtained breath readings of 140 and 130 mg/100 ml.

The defence sought to exclude these readings under sections 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights regarding the delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 rights due to an unjustified six-hour overholding of the accused.

The court determined the breath readings were obtained in a manner that violated the Charter and excluded them under section 24(2), resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with failing to provide an approved screening device (ASD) sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

After being stopped for a traffic investigation, the accused was asked to provide a breath sample into an ASD but failed to do so despite 26 attempts.

The accused challenged the admissibility of evidence of his refusal on the grounds that his Charter rights to counsel (section 10(b)) and protection against arbitrary detention (section 9) were violated.

The court found that the accused was not handcuffed prior to arrest and that evidence of his refusal to provide a sample, as opposed to evidence obtained from compelled participation, was admissible.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and resisting arrest following a motor vehicle stop on June 5, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, breath test results of 180 mg/100 ml, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised multiple Charter arguments and challenged the sufficiency of evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving but acquitted him of resisting arrest due to language barriers and lack of clarity regarding directions.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to provide a proper sample of breath into an approved screening device following a motor vehicle collision.

The accused applied to exclude all evidence of her failure or refusal based on alleged violations of her s. 10(b) Charter rights to counsel.

The court found that the accused was detained prior to the demand being made, that there was a realistic opportunity to consult counsel during the delay before the ASD arrived, and that her s. 10(b) rights were violated both at the scene and at the police station where her conversation with counsel was recorded.

The court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a police response to a parking lot in Wasaga Beach.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 140 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence raised three issues: whether the detention following breath sampling was arbitrary, whether the accused's right to counsel was violated, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found the samples were taken as soon as practicable and that no violation of the right to counsel occurred.

However, the court found an arbitrary detention breach under section 9 of the Charter, as the police decision to detain was based solely on blood alcohol readings without considering other relevant circumstances.

Nevertheless, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was modest and made in good faith.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with driving over 80 mg/100 mL of blood alcohol.

During a RIDE spot-check, the accused was directed to a secondary investigation area without explanation, and subsequently arrested after failing a screening test.

The accused sought to contact his counsel of choice but was ultimately directed to duty counsel instead.

The court found two Charter breaches: (1) a violation of section 10(a) for failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention when directed to the secondary area, and (2) a violation of section 10(b) for failure to adequately facilitate access to counsel of choice.

The court found that the Toronto Police Service's institutional practice of controlling access to counsel and channeling accused persons to duty counsel, combined with inadequate resources and efforts to locate private counsel, resulted in the accused being denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice from counsel of his choice.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the police violated the defendant's Charter right to counsel under section 10(b) by failing to facilitate access to private counsel and instead defaulting to duty counsel.

The defendant also challenged whether the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter breach, as the defendant was asked if he had a specific lawyer and clearly declined, subsequently agreeing to speak with duty counsel.

The court also found the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with driving over 80 following an encounter with police in a shopping centre parking lot at approximately 12:45 am.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the detention and the legality of the procedures that followed, arguing that the defendant was subjected to arbitrary detention in violation of section 9 of the Charter and that the breath testing was unreasonable under section 8.

The court found that the defendant was not detained at the initial moment of police contact, or alternatively, that any detention was grounded in reasonable suspicion and therefore not arbitrary.

The court also held that even if arbitrary detention had occurred, it would be authorized by the common law.

The defendant was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A sergeant responded to a radio call about a possible impaired driver at an LCBO store and followed the accused's vehicle into an underground parking garage of an apartment building without attempting to stop him first.

The court found that the sergeant breached the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) by: (1) following the accused into the underground parking garage without legal authority or exigent circumstances; (2) delaying the administration of the approved screening device demand beyond the "forthwith" requirement of section 254(2) of the Criminal Code; and (3) failing to provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The evidence of the breath samples was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and oxycodone following a vehicle stop and search.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the accused's section 10(b) rights were breached (failure to inform of right to counsel immediately upon investigative detention), the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court determined that the investigative detention was justified on reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in drug trafficking, the search was lawful as a protective pat-down search based on safety concerns, and the brief delay in providing rights to counsel was reasonable given officer safety considerations.

The accused was arrested for driving with excess alcohol after failing an approved screening device.

Following arrest, he provided his lawyer's name and two phone numbers to the arresting officer.

The officer attempted to contact the lawyer but was unsuccessful, and subsequently called duty counsel instead.

The accused spoke to duty counsel for approximately four minutes.

The central issue was whether the accused's right to consult with counsel of choice under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was violated.

The court found that the officer's evidence regarding her attempts to contact the accused's lawyer was unreliable and that the accused was effectively denied the right to consult with counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breathalyzer results and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a RIDE program stop.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on insufficient indicia of impairment.

Additionally, the court found two Charter breaches: the accused was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, and he was denied his right to counsel of choice when the officer failed to facilitate contact with his own lawyer and instead directed him to duty counsel.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2).

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath sample analysis results and observations made by police officers, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The court found no arbitrary detention under section 9, no violation of the right to be informed of reasons for detention under section 10(a), and no unlawful search under section 8.

The court upheld the officer's reasonable and probable grounds for making the breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including speeding, failure to pull over immediately, slurred speech, red glassy eyes, odour of alcohol, and the accused's unusual utterance.

The application was dismissed.