proceeds of crime

The appellant, Carolyn Burden, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000 and her five-year sentence, which included restitution and forfeiture orders.

She argued her guilty plea was uninformed and the sentence unduly harsh, particularly regarding the imposition of both a forfeiture order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding her plea informed and voluntary.

However, it granted leave to appeal sentence, setting aside the forfeiture order and reducing the fine in lieu of forfeiture to account for prior restitution payments, clarifying that only one such order (forfeiture or fine in lieu) can be imposed and that restitution should reduce the fine.

Travelers Insurance Company of Canada appealed the dismissal of part of its subrogated claim for payment from proceeds of crime forfeited to the Crown.

The core issue was whether Travelers had an interest in the forfeited property by way of a constructive trust due to the Crown's erroneous failure to include Travelers' subrogated claim (Xpertdoc) in the initial restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's erroneous omissions, combined with the near certainty that restitution would have been made, amounted to unjust enrichment, supporting a constructive trust in Travelers' favour.

The appeal was allowed, and Travelers was granted relief from forfeiture for the full amount of the Xpertdoc claim.

The appellant appealed convictions for drug and proceeds of crime charges, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding a s. 8 Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant.

The appeal focused on counsel's failure to challenge the accuracy of GPS tracking data relied upon by police and counsel's agreement to allow the Crown to introduce amplification evidence from the affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from counsel's tactical decisions and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that there were sufficient grounds for the search warrant.

The defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime following the execution of a search warrant at his residence.

Police surveillance observed activities consistent with drug trafficking.

A search of the defendant's apartment revealed a significant quantity of methamphetamine (98.3 grams), drug paraphernalia (scales, baggies with residue), a drug debt list, and cash.

The defendant denied knowledge and possession, attributing the items to a transient roommate.

The court rejected the defendant's testimony as incredible, finding that the circumstantial evidence, including items in plain view and the drug debt list linked to him and his associates, proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Police executed a search warrant using a "hard entry" at the defendant's home, seizing cocaine, phenacetin, and cash.

The defendant applied to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing violations of s. 8 (unreasonable search and seizure due to hard entry) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found a serious s. 8 breach due to the officer's lack of understanding of the knock-and-announce rule and arbitrary decision-making.

The s. 10(b) breach was not found.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court excluded the evidence, leading to the defendant's acquittal on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appellant, David Griffith, appealed his convictions for possession for the purposes of trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained in breach of his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)).

The trial judge found breaches but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the *Grant* analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the *Grant* analysis, specifically regarding the lawfulness of the pat-down search incident to investigative detention and the application of discoverability.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

Michael Bennett and Dylan Griggs were found guilty after trial of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered the serious nature of the drugs, the profit motive, the large quantities involved, and the fact that both were first offenders without drug dependence issues.

Credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions (house arrest, curfew) was factored into the sentences.

Bennett was sentenced to a total of five years in penitentiary, and Griggs was sentenced to a total of eleven years in penitentiary.

Automatic weapons prohibitions, DNA orders, and victim surcharges were also imposed, and seized cash and offence-related property were ordered forfeited.

The defendant, Jean Auclair, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and possession of proceeds obtained by crime.

The charges arose after nurses found drugs and cash in his shorts while he was in the ICU for a suspected overdose.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging unreasonable search and seizure by nurses (as state actors/agents) and police.

The court found that nurses were not state actors or police agents, and their search was reasonable for medical purposes.

The police seizure was found to engage s. 8 but was justified under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code.

Even if there were Charter breaches, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found Auclair guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, but not guilty of the included offence of simple possession due to the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act (CDSA s. 4.1(2)).

The Crown applied for forfeiture of cash found on Mr. Breton's property, alleging it was proceeds of crime under sections 462.43 and 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony regarding drug trafficking patterns and currency bundling.

The court found that the large sums of cash found buried in the garage, along with cocaine and digital scales, were proceeds of crime, dismissing alternative explanations like a repair business or lottery winnings.

However, cash found in the house vents was not forfeited due to reasonable doubt regarding its origin.

The appellant, Leonidas Economopoulos, appealed his convictions for drug offences and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that the affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for his home and car was insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge had found the affidavit sufficient, despite noted deficiencies, to conclude there were reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to his review and agreeing that the affidavit met the legal test for ex parte authorizations, as articulated in R. v. Araujo.

The Court also rejected the argument that the trial judge improperly used cross-examination evidence to amplify the grounds for identification.

The appeal was dismissed.

This ex parte application by the Durham Regional Police Service sought a general warrant under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code and an assistance order under s. 487.02 of the Criminal Code.

The application aimed to compel a third-party online cryptocurrency exchange to facilitate the recovery of suspected proceeds of crime for victim compensation in a fraud investigation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a general warrant was not appropriate as other provisions, specifically a restraint order under s. 462.33 of the Criminal Code, could have authorized the procedure.

The court also held that the general warrant provision is intended for obtaining information, not for seizing property for future compensation, and that the proposed procedure would constitute an abuse of process.

The court emphasized the need for Parliament to address legislative gaps concerning cryptocurrency crimes.

The accused, Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, were jointly charged with multiple offences including possession of proceeds of crime, possession of cocaine and marijuana for trafficking, and various firearm offences.

They were found asleep in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay containing large amounts of cash, drugs, and firearms.

The defence argued lack of possession and knowledge, with Puentes-Reed claiming he was intoxicated and inadvertently brought to the residence.

The court rejected the defence's explanations, finding them incredible and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the nature of the "safe house" operation.

Both accused were found guilty on all remaining charges, as the Crown proved constructive possession and knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached upon arrest.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's factual finding regarding the appellant's response to the police's offer of counsel ("I will at some point").

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that this statement did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel, consistent with established jurisprudence.

As a result, no Charter breach occurred, and the issue of excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was not considered.

The appeal was dismissed.

Winston Walters pleaded guilty to five offences, including two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, and breach of a release order.

The prosecution sought a global sentence of eight years, while the offender requested time served (credited as three years) with potential probation or a conditional sentence.

The court considered the circumstances of the offences, the offender's background, pre-trial detention conditions, and established sentencing ranges for drug and firearm offences.

The court rejected the defence's argument that anti-Black racism mitigated the offender's blameworthiness due to a lack of specific evidence connecting systemic racism to his criminality.

The judge imposed a global sentence of eight years, comprising three years for the gun offence (credited as time served plus one day) and five years consecutive for the drug offences, with concurrent sentences for proceeds of crime and breach of bail.

The accused, Christopher Janisse, faced an eight-count indictment for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The trial proceeded on a written statement of facts.

Janisse conceded guilt on two counts of possession of cocaine for trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found him not guilty of two counts of trafficking cocaine, determining that the circumstantial evidence, while suspicious, did not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found Janisse guilty of a third trafficking count and two counts of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for trafficking, concluding that the totality of circumstantial evidence established his knowledge and control of a drug stash house and the large quantities of drugs found.

The final judgment was guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, and not guilty on counts 4 and 5.

Oliver Kwafo was tried on charges of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue was whether Mr. Kwafo had knowledge of the drugs found hidden in his vehicle.

Despite suspicious circumstances, the Crown failed to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to a key police witness's inability to recall crucial details about the discovery of the drugs.

Consequently, Mr. Kwafo was found not guilty on all three counts.

Karen Cady was found guilty of fraud and possession of forged documents.

The Crown applied for forfeiture of proceeds of crime and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court ordered forfeiture of real property and a motor vehicle, but exercised its discretion under s. 462.41 of the Criminal Code to return a portion of the sale proceeds to innocent third-party secured creditors, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and TD Auto Finance (Canada) Inc., to satisfy their legitimate interests.

A fine in lieu of forfeiture of $928,063.61 was imposed on Cady for the remaining proceeds of crime, with an 8-year payment period and a 4-year default imprisonment term.

The appellant, Sakia Mojadiddi, appealed her sentence for fraud over $5,000, specifically challenging the amount of the fine in lieu of forfeiture.

She argued the trial judge failed to account for payments made to victims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming that the purpose of a fine in lieu of forfeiture is to deprive the offender of proceeds of crime, not restitutionary, and therefore payments made by co-accused or from commingled victim funds do not reduce the fine amount.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of section 18.1 of the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, regarding court approval of settlements in forfeiture proceedings.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought approval for a settlement with an interested party (Rosa Norwood) for a payment from seized property proceeds, without a prior judicial determination that the property was tainted by unlawful activity.

The appellants (Michael Norwood's Estate and 947014 Ontario Inc.) argued this was an error.

The Court of Appeal held that a "settlement in relation to a proceeding under this Act" must relate to in rem property interests, which necessitates a prior finding that the property is proceeds or instruments of unlawful activity.

The court found the motion judge erred in approving the settlement without such a finding, as it purported to settle in rem interests of others without their rights being displaced.

The appeal was allowed, and the settlement approval order was set aside.

Marcus Gil pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of fentanyl (276.2 grams), its proximity to a children's daycare, and the offender's criminal history and breach of probation.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, expressed remorse, young age (22), and strong family support.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives due to the ongoing opioid crisis and the destructive effects of fentanyl.

A total sentence of eight and a half years imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in six years and ten months to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearm prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.