Miscarriage of justice

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences based primarily on eyewitness identification by the complainant, who recognized the appellant as a former hotel guest.

The trial judge found the identification was corroborated by the appellant's possession of stolen sunglasses and the presence of a co-conspirator during his arrest.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend the evidence regarding the co-conspirator's presence, this error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The remaining corroborative evidence—the appellant's possession of the stolen sunglasses two days after the robbery—strongly supported the identification.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, pleaded guilty to intimidating a justice system participant and uttering threats.

On appeal, he sought to strike his guilty pleas due to procedural irregularities, including a failure to properly arraign him on one count, the failure to apply the Kienapple principle to stay the threatening count, and an insufficient plea inquiry.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence indicating the appellant was unmedicated and influenced by correctional officers to plead guilty to secure a federal transfer.

The Court allowed the appeal, struck the guilty pleas, and ordered a new trial, finding that maintaining the pleas risked a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible for a prior offence, pleaded guilty to serious assaults committed while in a psychiatric facility.

He was subsequently designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to strike his guilty pleas, arguing he did not understand the potential for an indeterminate sentence and that the judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleas were informed and that the delayed release of the motion judge's reasons did not render them an after-the-fact justification.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.

He argued that the sentencing judge provided insufficient reasons, failed to properly consider treatability at the designation stage, and improperly placed an evidentiary burden on him to prove a reasonable expectation of eventual control in the community.

He also argued that the trial amicus curiae failed to ensure a fair hearing by conceding that he met the dangerous offender criteria.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant patently met the statutory thresholds for the designation based on a pattern of violent sexual assaults.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not impose an improper burden of proof and that the trial amicus curiae's performance did not cause actual prejudice or create an appearance of unfairness amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The moving party, convicted of impaired driving, sought to re-open his application for leave to appeal, arguing that due to an administrative error, the panel was not provided with all the material filed.

The moving party had relied on arguments from factums in two other related applications.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the panel had in fact obtained and reviewed the related factums before determining the original application.

The moving party failed to establish a clear and compelling case that a miscarriage of justice would likely occur absent a re-opening.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that he should have a new trial due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that trial counsel failed to properly perfect a section 11(b) Charter application and failed to inform him of his right to testify on the Charter application.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while trial counsel's failure to file transcripts for the section 11(b) application fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice as the trial judge ultimately allowed the application to proceed.

The court also found that the appellant failed to establish that he was not informed of his right to testify, and even if he had been, it would not have changed the outcome given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to re-open his conviction appeal and set aside the abandonment of his sentence appeal, after his appeal had been dismissed on the merits.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding his statements voluntary, that the appellate court erred in its reasons, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no real concern of a miscarriage of justice to warrant re-opening the conviction appeal, and concluding that the proposed sentence appeal had no prospect of success.

The appellant was convicted of three driving offences after fleeing from police.

The sole issue at trial was identity, which relied heavily on the recognition evidence of a police officer who had prior interactions with the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the extent of the officer's familiarity with the appellant's deceased brother.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while a misapprehension occurred, it was not material and did not play an essential part in the trial judge's reasoning process, as the officer's familiarity was well-established through other significant interactions.

During a jury trial for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm, the defence applied for a mistrial after the Crown disclosed two screenshots mid-trial.

The defence had already aggressively cross-examined key Crown witnesses, suggesting they were lying about the existence of these screenshots because they had not been disclosed.

The court found that the late disclosure significantly prejudiced the accused's right to make full answer and defence, as the defence's tactical approach was based on the non-disclosure.

Concluding that no lesser remedy such as an adjournment or jury instruction would suffice, the court granted the mistrial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for five counts of attempted murder and arson, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He claimed his counsel failed to challenge the voluntariness of his police statement and failed to prepare him for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no factual basis for the claims and concluding that, even if there were, the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five charges arising from a home invasion, including an imitation firearm charge carrying a mandatory minimum sentence.

He appealed to strike his guilty pleas, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the plea to the imitation firearm charge was uninformed because trial counsel failed to advise him of it.

Furthermore, the court found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance on the remaining charges by failing to assess the strength of the Crown's case, review disclosure, or consider potential Charter claims before advising the appellant to plead guilty.

The guilty pleas were struck and a new trial was ordered.

During a murder trial, the defence applied for a mistrial based on alleged misrepresentations and misstatements made by the Crown in its closing address to the jury.

The defence argued that the Crown's comments regarding DNA evidence, witness immunity, and the accused's testimony fatally wounded the trial process.

The court reviewed the eight alleged errors and concluded that while some statements were inaccurate or lacked an evidentiary basis, they did not individually or cumulatively constitute a fatal wounding of the trial process.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the errors could be adequately addressed through limiting instructions to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol content over .08.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's evidence regarding the timing of events, finding him 'non-responsive in cross-examination', which was dispositive to the conviction.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial transcript and found that the appellant was not non-responsive, but rather argumentative and clear in his disagreements with the Crown.

The court concluded that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, which played an essential part in the reasoning process, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother's former lawyer brought a motion to set aside the court's previous findings of incompetence and ineffective counsel.

The mother brought a cross-motion for costs against the former lawyer personally under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules.

The court set aside the finding of incompetence, deferring that issue to the Law Society, but upheld the finding that the lawyer provided inadequate and ineffective counsel by failing to order trial transcripts and failing to bring a motion for access pending appeal.

The court found the lawyer's inaction caused a miscarriage of justice and wasted significant costs.

The lawyer was ordered to personally pay $50,000 to Legal Aid and $50,000 to the mother's new counsel.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for possession of cocaine and breach of recognizance.

He argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to oppose the Crown's application for an NCR assessment order and by failing to withdraw from the case.

He also argued that the application judge erred in making the assessment order.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice or incompetence by trial counsel, and concluding that the assessment order was properly made as the appellant had repeatedly placed his mental state in issue through his bizarre statements in court.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1992 in connection with the death of her stepdaughter, largely based on the pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Decades later, fresh expert evidence unanimously discredited Dr. Smith's findings regarding the cause and mechanism of death.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the original guilty plea was uninformed and the conviction unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) for assault causing bodily harm, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the consequences of an NCR finding and that the trial judge erred by not conducting a plea inquiry.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a plea inquiry for a proceeding that was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court rejected the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, finding trial counsel had properly advised the appellant, and concluded there was ample psychiatric evidence to support the NCR finding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their summary convictions and sentences arising from a group assault and robbery at a massage parlour.

Liang argued his conviction was unreasonable and his sentence unfit; his appeal was dismissed as the verdict was supported by evidence and the sentence was appropriate for a violent group attack.

Loi argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer conceded his liability without instructions.

The court found that Loi's counsel made an unauthorized concession equivalent to a guilty plea, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

Loi's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was found guilty of six counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown subsequently applied to have her found not criminally responsible (NCR).

On the day of the NCR hearing, the self-represented appellant was provided with a lengthy psychiatric report and requested a two-week adjournment to retain counsel.

The trial judge refused the adjournment, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the refusal of the adjournment in these circumstances undermined the appearance of fairness and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

A new trial was ordered.