Susan Sack

A case conference was held to address multiple related actions.

On consent, the claims against Shahzad Siddiqui and Borden Ladner Gervais LLP were dismissed with prejudice and without costs.

The court directed counsel to confer regarding the potential release of individual defendants and established a timetable for scheduling upcoming dispositive motions.

A case conference was held to manage multiple related proceedings.

Counsel for the plaintiffs indicated a recommendation for the plaintiffs to agree to dismissals without costs in most cases, except potentially the claim against Grant Thornton LLP Canada, which requires leave to proceed.

The court directed that a new class action issued by one of the plaintiffs be case managed together with the existing matters.

Counsel were directed to advise on dismissals or agree on a timetable for dispositive motions by a specified date.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment, the defendants sought costs on a full indemnity basis, citing the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct and late withdrawal of serious allegations.

The plaintiff argued that full indemnity costs were not justified and challenged the time spent by the defendants.

The court found that the defendants' offer to settle, which proposed dismissing the action without costs, was a valid compromise.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence, breach of Charter rights, and defamation arising from his suspension from practice.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants exceeded their statutory authority by demanding client files without reasonable suspicion on a file-by-file basis.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff's claims constituted an impermissible collateral attack on unappealed Law Society Tribunal proceedings, and that the defendants were protected by statutory immunity under s. 9 of the Law Society Act as there was no evidence of bad faith.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the applicant wife brought a motion to compel further production of documents and answers to undertakings from the respondent husband and his father, alleging they conspired to conceal the husband's income and assets.

The court dismissed the request for pre-2012 documents as irrelevant to the conspiracy claim.

However, the court ordered the mass production of post-2012 emails, finding the respondents' search terms too limited, and ordered the production of certain solicitor-client files, finding the father had waived privilege by relying on a specific privileged communication to defend against the conspiracy claim.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother's former lawyer brought a motion to set aside the court's previous findings of incompetence and ineffective counsel.

The mother brought a cross-motion for costs against the former lawyer personally under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules.

The court set aside the finding of incompetence, deferring that issue to the Law Society, but upheld the finding that the lawyer provided inadequate and ineffective counsel by failing to order trial transcripts and failing to bring a motion for access pending appeal.

The court found the lawyer's inaction caused a miscarriage of justice and wasted significant costs.

The lawyer was ordered to personally pay $50,000 to Legal Aid and $50,000 to the mother's new counsel.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother's former lawyer brought a motion to set aside the court's previous findings of incompetence and ineffective counsel.

The mother brought a cross-motion for costs against the former lawyer personally under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules.

The court set aside the finding of incompetence, deferring that issue to the Law Society, but upheld the finding that the lawyer provided inadequate and ineffective counsel by failing to order trial transcripts and failing to bring a motion for access pending appeal.

The court found the lawyer's inaction caused a miscarriage of justice and wasted significant costs.

The lawyer was ordered to personally pay $50,000 to Legal Aid and $50,000 to the mother's new counsel.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The plaintiff sustained injuries, including blurred vision, but returned to work and did not seek further treatment until his condition worsened over a year later.

The court applied the discoverability principle, noting that an expert ophthalmologist could not have determined the permanence of the eye injury within the first year.

The court found the plaintiff's claim was issued within the two-year limitation period and dismissed the defendants' motion.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking interim joint custody and an access schedule in accordance with a s. 30 assessment report by Dr. Butkowsky.

The applicant father opposed, arguing the report's recommendations should not be implemented before trial and that the 14-year-old son wished to reside primarily with him.

The court found no 'exceptional circumstances' requiring immediate implementation of the report's recommendations, but considered the assessor's observational evidence.

The court ordered that the son reside primarily with the father but have regular weekend access with the mother, overriding the son's stated preference based on his observed comfort with her.

The father was also ordered to pay child support, spousal support, and his proportionate share of the assessment report costs.

Following the withdrawal of a spousal support application, the estate trustees of the deceased respondent sought a costs order jointly and severally against the applicant and her former lawyer.

The trustees alleged the proceeding was frivolous and vexatious and argued the lawyer had acted in conflict of interest and improperly initiated litigation despite knowing the claim had no chance of success.

The court considered Rules 12(3) and 24(9) of the Family Law Rules and the principles governing personal costs orders against counsel.

The court held the support claim was not clearly devoid of merit because statutory provisions permit setting aside domestic contracts in cases of unconscionability or lack of disclosure.

As the lawyer had acted on instructions and did not run up costs or abuse the court’s process, no personal costs order was warranted.

In an estate dispute between siblings, the estate trustee moved to dismiss an application requiring an accounting of estate assets on the basis of delay.

The delay resulted largely from the applicant’s former lawyer, who had misled the client and failed to advance the proceeding while suffering from severe personal and mental health issues.

The court held that the delay was adequately explained, the applicant intended to pursue the claim, and the moving party had also failed to take steps to advance the matter or his own related motion regarding a purported will.

The court further found no non-compensable prejudice resulting from the delay.

Exercising its discretion, the court declined to dismiss the application.

Following a motion in a civil proceeding, the defendants sought costs against the self‑represented plaintiff.

The plaintiff did not provide submissions on the issue of costs.

The court considered the defendants’ submissions and concluded that an award of costs was fair and reasonable.

Each defendant was awarded $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The court also dispensed with the requirement that the defendants obtain the plaintiff’s approval of the form and content of the dismissal and costs order.

The moving party sought an adjournment of his motion to set aside consent orders previously made in complex estate litigation.

The respondents opposed the adjournment, arguing prejudice and delay in the sale of an estate property.

The court refused to adjourn the portions of the motion relating to the dismissal of claims against former counsel and the removal of the Estate Trustee During Litigation, finding no merit to those claims and emphasizing the need to enforce court orders.

The court granted an adjournment for the remaining issues regarding the consent orders but ordered the moving party to personally pay the ongoing expenses of the estate property and awarded costs of $54,490 to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

At a contested status hearing, the self-represented plaintiff was required to show cause why her professional negligence action against her former lawyers should not be dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14(13).

The court applied the conjunctive test from Khan, finding the plaintiff provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay due to ongoing matrimonial appeals, financial constraints, and medical issues.

The court also found the defendants would not suffer actual prejudice, rejecting the argument that potential harm to professional reputation constitutes prejudice in this context.

The action was allowed to proceed subject to a timetable order.