R. Sheppard

The appellant was convicted of three driving offences after fleeing from police.

The sole issue at trial was identity, which relied heavily on the recognition evidence of a police officer who had prior interactions with the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the extent of the officer's familiarity with the appellant's deceased brother.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while a misapprehension occurred, it was not material and did not play an essential part in the trial judge's reasoning process, as the officer's familiarity was well-established through other significant interactions.

The offender was convicted of entering into an arrangement with an undercover police officer to commit sexual interference with a person under 16 years of age.

He challenged the constitutionality of the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate.

The court reviewed the gravity of the offence, the offender's high moral blameworthiness, and mitigating factors including his lack of a prior record and genuine remorse.

The court determined that a fit and proper sentence range was 9 to 12 months, concluding that the one-year mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate and therefore constitutional.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed following guilty pleas to three counts of break and enter with intent, misleading police, and failing to attend court.

The sentencing judge imposed consecutive four‑month sentences on the break and enter counts, resulting in a global custodial sentence of 13½ months.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was excessive and offended the principles of parity and totality, particularly compared to a co‑accused who received a significantly shorter sentence.

The appeal court held that while the use of consecutive sentences did not amount to an error in principle or a demonstrably unfit sentence, the sentencing judge relied on incorrect information about the co‑accused’s sentence.

To correct the resulting disparity, the court allowed the appeal and reduced the total sentence.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple assaults and uttering threats arising from a domestic relationship.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly assessed credibility, and relied on impermissible propensity reasoning.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no reversible error in the credibility analysis and upheld the convictions on the later counts.

However, the court held that several counts were statute‑barred because the Crown elected to proceed summarily more than six months after the alleged offences without clear, informed, and unequivocal consent from the accused under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

Those convictions were quashed as a nullity, and the matter of sentence on the remaining counts was remitted to the trial judge for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding that the police officer had objectively reasonable grounds to support a breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's findings of fact, which included erratic driving, a strong smell of alcohol, glassy eyes, and an admission of drinking.

The court held that these facts were sufficient to objectively support the officer's subjective belief of impairment, and dismissed the appeal.