Impaired driving

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under Section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that on December 31, 2017, the accused failed to provide a suitable breath sample into an approved screening device after multiple attempts.

The defence argued the accused attempted to provide a sample and lacked the requisite mens rea.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately and intentionally refused or failed to provide a sample.

The court acquitted the accused, finding reasonable doubt regarding her understanding of the demand and her intention to comply, particularly given language barriers and deficient police notes.

The accused was charged with five offences arising from a motor vehicle collision on June 29, 2017: impaired operation, operation with blood alcohol over 80 mg/100 mL, dangerous operation, and two counts of breach of probation.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The trial was conducted as a blended voir dire and trial.

The court heard evidence from three Crown witnesses and received expert toxicology evidence by affidavit.

The defence filed an affidavit regarding lawyer contact procedures.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation and dangerous operation, but acquitted on the over 80 charge due to uncertainty regarding the timing of the accident and concerns about bolus drinking assumptions in the expert evidence.

The breach of probation charges were to be resolved separately.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results on the basis of alleged Charter violations under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no breach of section 8 or 9 rights, as the initial police conversation was lawful and the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol.

The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as police made diligent efforts to facilitate the accused's right to counsel of choice and provided adequate information regarding legal rights.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code following a roadside sobriety check.

The defendant claimed he used the word "prefer" rather than "refuse" and believed he had the right to decline the roadside test based on legal advice received in the United States.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that he unequivocally refused to comply with a lawful demand and that his conduct constituted a refusal regardless of the specific words used.

The court rejected the defendant's credibility and accepted the officer's evidence as reliable and truthful.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging that sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were breached by the conduct of the arresting officers, such that all statements and breath samples should be excluded.

The defence ultimately conceded the 10(a) issue and proceeded only on the 10(b) claim, arguing that the officers failed to account for the accused's language difficulties when explaining his right to counsel.

The court found that the officers took appropriate steps to ensure the accused understood his rights, including arranging for a Farsi-speaking officer to translate, and that the accused was afforded a meaningful exercise of his right to counsel.

The Charter application was dismissed and the breath samples were admitted as evidence.

A conviction was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates from April 2016 to September 2017.

The accused was found asleep in the passenger seat of a parked vehicle with a flat tire.

Police arrested him and demanded a breath sample, which he refused.

The accused argued he was not in care or control because he was a passenger, and that he had a reasonable excuse for refusing the breath sample due to health concerns.

The court found the accused not guilty of impaired care or control but guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused was charged with driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and possession of cannabis resin contrary to s. 4(1) of the Controlled Goods and Substances Act.

On the impaired driving charge, the Crown relied on breath samples showing readings of 149 and 120 mg/100ml, which after truncation became 140 and 120 mg/100ml.

The defence argued that the 29 milligram difference between the raw readings raised a reasonable doubt about the instrument's proper functioning and that a third test should have been administered.

The court found no evidence tending to show malfunction or improper operation and convicted on the impaired charge.

On the possession charge, the accused claimed innocent possession, asserting he took the cannabis to prevent his son from seeing it and intended to destroy it.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the accused's testimony regarding how he knew the person who brought the drugs and rejected the innocent possession defence, convicting on the possession charge.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The trial judge heard Charter and voluntariness voir dires on a blended basis.

The defence alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, ultimately proceeding only with the section 10(b) right to counsel argument.

The defence also challenged the voluntariness of statements made to police.

The trial judge found that all statements were voluntary but that the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) was violated because police failed to wait a reasonable time for the defendant's second counsel of choice to call back before proceeding with breath testing.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The trial addressed two Charter issues: whether the police breached the accused's rights under section 10(b) by failing to provide an interpreter or Polish-speaking officer, and whether the police breached section 8 rights by making an illegal demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated sufficient understanding of English and his rights to counsel.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 8 rights because the officer failed to provide direct evidence of forming a reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body while driving, as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision on Highway 403.

The defendant, who was impaired with a blood alcohol concentration of 110 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, drove westbound in the eastbound lanes on two 400-series highways for several kilometres before colliding head-on with the victim's vehicle.

One person was killed and another seriously injured.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment for the death charge and two years concurrent for the bodily harm charge, along with an eight-year driving prohibition and a ten-year firearms prohibition.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol in excess of the legal limit on December 1, 2013.

The Crown sought to prove the blood alcohol content through hospital records and expert evidence.

The court admitted the hospital records as business records under section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act and found the blood alcohol analysis reliable and admissible.

However, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The accused was acquitted on the basis of identity despite the blood alcohol content being well over the legal limit.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle stop on November 3, 2013 in Cambridge, Ontario.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8 and 7 of the Charter based on: (1) the failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable; and (2) the failure to videotape the second breath sample.

The court dismissed both Charter applications, finding that the police acted reasonably in the circumstances and that any failure to preserve the video evidence did not constitute unacceptable negligence.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts based on the totality of evidence including civilian witness observations of impaired driving, police observations at the scene, and toxicology evidence.

The accused was charged with care and control while being over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved that breath samples were received directly into an approved instrument as required by section 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The qualified technician testified that the accused provided breath samples into the instrument, but did not explicitly testify that the samples were received directly into the instrument.

The court found that the evidence was insufficient to establish this critical requirement beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused, holding that judicial notice cannot be used to supply this proof and that the liberty interest of the accused requires strict interpretation of the statutory requirement.

The accused was stopped for erratic driving and subsequently subjected to an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand for suspected impaired driving.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches: failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention (s. 10(a)), failure to provide the ASD demand "forthwith" (s. 254(2)(b)), resulting in failure to advise of the right to counsel without delay (s. 10(b) informational breach), unlawful detention and search (s. 8 and 9), and failure to facilitate a realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the ASD test (s. 10(b) implementational breach).

The trial judge excluded the breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from an incident on February 5, 2012.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of section 8 rights, contending that the officer lacked a warrant to enter the accused's property and that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand breath samples.

The court rejected both Charter arguments, finding that the officer was lawfully present under the common law implied invitation to knock and that the officer had sufficient grounds for arrest based on observations of impairment.

The court admitted the breath sample evidence and convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, dangerous driving, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a serious driving incident on July 18, 2012.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged violations of sections 7, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found breaches of the Charter regarding the timing of the breath demand and the provision of rights to counsel, but declined to exclude any evidence.

The court found that the accused's extreme intoxication rendered any Charter breaches of negligible effect on his actual interests, and that the police acted in good faith throughout.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision on June 23, 2011.

The Crown relied on breath samples showing readings of 170 and 160 mg/100 mL, officer observations of impairment, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence challenged the timing of the accident and the reliability of impairment indicators.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the exact time of the accident, preventing reliance on the statutory presumption.

The court also found conflicting evidence regarding impairment, with some officers and the victim not observing signs of impairment despite high blood alcohol readings.

The court rejected a purely scientific definition of impairment in favour of traditional legal indicators.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and impaired operation of a motor vehicle after driving eastbound in the westbound lanes of Highway 407 while heavily impaired by alcohol, causing multiple drivers to take evasive action to avoid head-on collisions.

The accused, a Fire Chief with no criminal record, had blood alcohol readings of 225 and 209 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown sought 14-30 days jail, a two-year driving prohibition, and 12 months probation.

The defence sought a non-custodial sentence with fines, community service, and an 18-month driving prohibition.

The court imposed fines totalling $4,025 (including victim surcharge), an 18-month driving prohibition, 18 months probation with alcohol counselling and abstinence conditions, and 100 hours community service.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of the right to counsel and the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.

The defence argued that the accused was not advised of her right to consult French-speaking duty counsel and that breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter breach, as the accused understood her rights in both French and English, indicated no language preference, and did not voice concerns about understanding duty counsel.

The court also found that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, with police acting reasonably throughout the detention and testing process.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused brought an application to stay the proceeding pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for an alleged breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The charge was laid on October 26, 2010, and the trial date was set for March 28, 2012, representing a delay of approximately 17 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

The court found that the operative delay was 8 months (6 months institutional delay plus 2 months Crown delay), which fell within the acceptable guideline of 8-10 months.

The application was dismissed.