Drug trafficking

The accused was arrested for possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following surveillance and confidential informant tips.

A search of his vehicle incident to arrest yielded a loaded handgun, ammunition, large quantities of drugs, and cash.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the arrest and searches were lawful, but found a breach of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) due to a delay in notifying the accused of his change in jeopardy after the firearm and drugs were found.

Applying the Grant test, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

On the trial proper, the court found the circumstantial evidence proved the possession offences beyond a reasonable doubt and found the accused guilty of all charges, including resisting arrest.

The accused was arrested at an airport after a search of his suitcase revealed over a kilogram of cocaine.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel due to a failure to hold off questioning and a 7-hour delay in facilitating contact with duty counsel.

The court found that the police breached s. 10(b) by asking a question before counsel was contacted and by the unexplained delay.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the drugs and other evidence under s. 24(2), finding the evidence was reliable, independently discoverable, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicants, charged with drug-related offences, brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at their home.

The Information to Obtain (ITO) relied heavily on tips from two confidential informants.

The applicants argued the ITO lacked reasonable grounds and contained misleading statements.

The court excised certain erroneous statements but found that, based on the totality of the circumstances and the Debot criteria, the remaining information provided sufficient grounds for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant.

The court also held that even if a section 8 Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence seized during the execution of search warrants at his residence and motor vehicle, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The warrants were based on information from a confidential informant and subsequent police surveillance.

Applying the Debot test, the court found the informant's tip was compelling, the source was reliable, and the information was sufficiently corroborated by police observations of suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions.

The court concluded there were reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrants and dismissed the application.

The accused was charged with trafficking drugs and breaching probation after smuggling marijuana, hashish, and fentanyl into a correctional centre by secreting them inside his body.

At trial, the accused conceded the acts but raised the defence of duress, testifying that a gang-affiliated inmate threatened to harm him and his brother if he did not comply.

The court found an air of reality to the duress claim and concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had a safe avenue of escape.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He appealed his convictions, challenging the validity of search warrants executed at two properties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of a garage where he only had a key and permission to store tools, as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court also upheld the validity of the search warrant for his residence, finding that detailed information from a confidential informant, corroborated by police surveillance of hand-to-hand transactions, provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a sentence order directing it to pay a $200 victim surcharge out of $170 seized from the offender upon his arrest for drug trafficking, with the balance forfeited.

The Court of Appeal held that a trial judge cannot order a victim surcharge paid out of funds forfeited as proceeds of crime, as the obligation rests on the offender.

Furthermore, the Court found the trial judge erred by reversing the onus regarding the forfeiture of the remaining $150, as there was no finding beyond a reasonable doubt that it constituted proceeds of crime.

The appeal was allowed, the offender was ordered to pay the $200 surcharge, $20 in buy money was forfeited, and the remaining $150 was returned to the offender.

Following convictions for multiple drug trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, laundering, and weapon offences, the Crown applied for forfeiture of large amounts of cash, vehicles, equipment, scales, a prohibited knife, and ammunition seized during a search.

The court relied on the trial findings, affidavit evidence, and the statutory inference in s. 462.39 of the Criminal Code to conclude on a balance of probabilities that the property had been obtained with proceeds of crime.

The court rejected competing ownership claims as vague, uncertain, and improbable, and found a pattern of nominee ownership with no credible lawful explanation for the assets.

Mandatory and discretionary forfeiture orders were granted for all listed property.

In a pre-trial Charter ruling arising from a motel drug investigation, the court found that the accused were psychologically and arbitrarily detained during a hallway police encounter that escalated into separated questioning, CPIC checks, and pat-down searches.

The court held that ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were breached, and that the accused retained standing to challenge the warrantless entry into the motel room notwithstanding their disavowal of the room during the unconstitutional detention.

Although the hallway statements were voluntary at common law, the pat-down searches and room entry were not constitutionally justified, and exigent circumstances did not apply.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the crack cocaine and related evidence because admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused applied to quash a telewarrant authorizing the search of his apartment in a drug trafficking investigation and sought exclusion of the seized drugs and related paraphernalia.

The court held that the telewarrant was invalid because the ITO contained no statement of the circumstances making it impracticable for the affiant to appear personally before a justice, as required by s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code and s. 11(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

However, the court found the ITO, as amplified, established reasonable grounds to search, and the police acted in good faith despite drafting errors and omissions regarding the confidential informant.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court held the evidence was admissible notwithstanding the s. 8 breach.

The applicant sought review of a detention order pending an extradition hearing arising from United States drug trafficking allegations involving substantial quantities of cocaine and MDMA.

The court applied the deferential extradition bail review standard, requiring demonstration of an error in principle by the application judge.

It held that the judge was entitled to find a serious primary-ground flight risk in light of the strength of the foreign case, the prospect of a very lengthy sentence, the scale of the alleged trafficking operation, and the limits of the proposed surety and monitoring plan.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a large marijuana grow operation discovered on his rural property, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on his silence at arrest and the absence of detail in parts of his testimony when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did err in drawing an adverse inference from the accused’s exercise of his constitutional right to silence and in relying on certain missing details in the testimony.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the Crown’s evidence overwhelmingly established guilt and that the verdict would inevitably have been the same.

The appellant also challenged the forfeiture of 50% of his property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court held the forfeiture was a proper exercise of discretion and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug trafficking and conspiracy charges.

The accused was arrested after police observed a co-accused place a duffle bag containing drugs into the trunk of his car.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding the Crown failed to prove he knew the bag contained drugs.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge erred in applying the Carter test for co-conspirator hearsay and in applying the reasonable doubt standard piecemeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred on the first step of the Carter test, the ambiguous hearsay evidence would not have changed the outcome, and the trial judge properly considered the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for certiorari to quash her committal for trial on drug trafficking charges.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge's conclusion that circumstantial evidence, including cash, drugs, and paraphernalia found in apartments where the appellant resided, as well as drugs found in a car registered in her name, constituted sufficient evidence of knowledge and control to meet the test for committal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of three years' imprisonment for multiple drug and firearms offences, arguing it was unfit after his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm was overturned on a previous appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the combination of drugs and guns is a serious aggravating factor and the three-year sentence remained fit and appropriate to achieve denunciation and deterrence.

The court also upheld the 30-day concurrent sentence for breaching a recognizance condition prohibiting cellphone possession.

The United States sought the extradition of two Aboriginal Canadians to face drug trafficking charges.

The applicants faced significantly harsher sentences in the US than they would in Canada, and the US system does not consider Aboriginal status in sentencing.

The Minister of Justice ordered their surrender, concluding that the Gladue principles were not relevant to their s. 6(1) Charter mobility rights and that surrender would not shock the conscience under s. 7.

The Court of Appeal set aside the surrender orders, holding that the Minister erred in law by failing to properly apply the Gladue principles to the s. 7 analysis and by failing to conduct an independent Cotroni analysis under s. 6(1).

The Court found that surrendering the applicants to face crushing sentences without consideration of their Aboriginal background would violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The appellant appealed his sentence for drug trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred by imposing a sentence beyond the settled range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The Court held that the appellant's extensive criminal record, including five previous convictions for the same offences, and the total absence of mitigating factors justified a sentence beyond the usual range, as sentencing is an individualized process.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a factual error occurred but found it immaterial.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant was a party to possession by consenting to the use of a secret compartment for a joint enterprise to traffic drugs was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a first-time offender addicted to cocaine, pleaded guilty to trafficking after selling $40 of crack cocaine to an undercover officer.

He successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program, leading the Crown and defence to jointly submit an eight-month conditional sentence.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and imposed a six-month jail term, mistakenly finding the appellant was a 'middleman.' On appeal, the Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to apply the high threshold for departing from a joint submission.

The sentence was varied to an eight-month conditional sentence.

The Crown sought to commit multiple co-accused to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry into numerous drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, and criminal organization charges.

The court applied the test for committal, assessing whether there was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit several accused on substantive drug and firearms offences, as well as conspiracy charges.

However, the court discharged certain accused on the criminal organization charges, finding insufficient evidence that they operated as a criminal organization rather than for personal benefit.