C. Pearce

The respondent, a young person, was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm arising from the Danzig Street mass shooting.

The Crown applied under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to have an adult sentence imposed.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the respondent's background and progress in custody, and the societal interest in accountability and public protection.

Finding that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the respondent accountable, the court imposed an adult sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for seven years.

During a trial for second-degree murder and other offences arising from a block party shooting, the Crown brought an application to admit an intercepted statement of a witness for the truth of its contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness, who had previously described the shooting and his subsequent attempt to murder the accused in retaliation, claimed at trial that he had fabricated the story to impress other youths in detention.

The court found that the statement met the criteria for threshold reliability, given the availability of the witness for cross-examination, the video recording of the statement, and substantial corroborative evidence.

The necessity criterion was also met because the witness effectively disavowed his earlier statement.

The application was granted.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert on Toronto street gangs and to opine that the young person was a member of a specific gang.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey frameworks for expert evidence.

The court found that the officer lacked the necessary specialized knowledge, experience, and validated methodology to be qualified as an expert, particularly regarding the identification of specific individuals as gang members.

The application to qualify the officer as an expert was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit three statements made by the young person to police following two separate shooting incidents, including a mass shooting where the young person was a victim.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the statements, arguing they were involuntary due to the young person's medical condition and alleged police oppression, and that the police failed to provide a caution under section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that the young person had an operating mind, was not subjected to threats or oppression, and was interviewed as a victim rather than a suspect or detainee.

All three statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.