T. A. Platana

The applicants, who were facing separate jury trials, brought a pre-trial 'Kokopenace' application challenging the constitutionality of the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll.

They sought a publication ban on the proceedings under s. 648 of the Criminal Code or, alternatively, under the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The court granted a partial publication ban to prevent potential jurors from drawing adverse inferences against the applicants, specifically prohibiting the publication of their identities, the facts of the allegations, and the fact that one applicant had previously brought a similar application.

The accused, charged with murder, sought to relitigate a pre-trial ruling that found his police statement voluntary.

The original trial judge retired before the trial commenced, and the accused argued the new trial judge was not bound by the previous ruling under the Criminal Code.

The court held that the situation was analogous to rulings made by a case management judge or after a mistrial, where previous rulings remain binding unless it is in the interests of justice to relitigate.

Finding no new evidence or change in circumstances, the court dismissed the application and upheld the voluntariness ruling.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for murder and break and enter.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was over 53 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, noting that significant portions were attributable to the applicant's difficulties in retaining counsel of choice and his subsequent challenges to the jury roll.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the applicant's s. 11(b) interests.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, challenged the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll, arguing it violated their ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights due to inadequate inclusion of on-reserve Aboriginal residents.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Kokopenace, focusing on whether the state made reasonable efforts to provide a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate.

The court reviewed the extensive efforts made by the province, including pilot projects, increased questionnaires, and follow-ups, and concluded that the state had met its constitutional obligation.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to terminate spousal support payments to the respondent, which had been paid for 17 years following a 13-year marriage.

The respondent did not appear but provided limited financial disclosure showing she had achieved self-sufficiency with an income of approximately $60,000.

The court found that the respondent's increased income, the length of time since separation, and her self-sufficiency constituted a material change in circumstances.

The motion was granted, and spousal support was ordered terminated effective July 1, 2015, though the applicant's request for retroactive repayment was denied.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion for an order compelling the defendant contractor to comply with a request for information under s. 39(1)(2) of the Construction Lien Act.

The court found that the plaintiff was requesting information about a subcontract to which it was a party, and therefore should already have knowledge of the information sought.

The motion was dismissed.

The Director of the Family Responsibility Office sought a warrant of committal against a support payor for failing to comply with a final default hearing order requiring payment of substantial spousal support arrears and costs.

The arrears exceeded $899,000 at the time of the motion.

The court considered whether the payor had demonstrated a material change in circumstances since the prior default hearing sufficient to explain his non-payment under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act.

The respondent argued inability to pay based on caregiving responsibilities for his elderly mother, alleged issues with court file documentation, unsuccessful attempts to vary support, and a rejected settlement proposal involving his RRSP.

The court rejected these explanations, found no material change in circumstances, and concluded the respondent had wilfully disregarded court orders.

A warrant of committal was granted with intermittent incarceration to encourage compliance with the support obligations.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking leave to cross‑examine the affiant and sub‑affiant on an Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant.

The defence alleged that the ITO relied improperly on confidential informants, lacked sufficient detail regarding their reliability, and contained misleading or inflammatory statements.

The court applied the governing principles from Garofoli and Pires concerning leave to cross‑examine affiants.

It held that the applicant failed to establish a basis that the proposed cross‑examination would likely elicit evidence undermining the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Leave to cross‑examine was therefore denied.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code for the release of seized funds to pay legal expenses in defending multiple drug and property-related charges.

The Crown conceded the accused owned the seized funds and that no other person had a lawful interest in them but argued the accused had “other means” to fund his defence because he had been granted legal aid.

The court held that the existence of a legal aid certificate constitutes “means” available within the meaning of s. 462.34(4), unless the accused demonstrates that the level of funding imperils the right to a fair trial.

Finding no evidentiary basis that the legal aid funding created such a risk, the court concluded the statutory preconditions were not met.

The application for restoration of seized funds for legal expenses was dismissed.

Following execution of a search warrant at a residence, police discovered drugs, digital scales, large quantities of bundled cash exceeding one million dollars, and numerous assets including vehicles and recreational equipment.

The accused was charged with several offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as well as possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering offences under the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on constructive possession and circumstantial evidence demonstrating knowledge and control over the drugs, cash, and property located throughout the residence and garage.

The court rejected defence evidence that another individual owned the drugs and money and accepted expert evidence on drug trafficking practices.

The court concluded the only reasonable inference was that the accused was engaged in mid‑ to high‑level drug trafficking and that the assets were acquired using proceeds of crime.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking to change a prior order for supervised access to permit unsupervised access with the parties’ five children.

The supervised access order had been in place for over two years and arose in part from criminal charges and restrictions on contact with the mother.

The court noted the matter was scheduled for trial within two months and that significant factual disputes remained requiring full evidence.

Emphasizing the best interests of the children and the importance of stability pending trial, the court declined to alter the existing access arrangement.

The motion was dismissed and the parties were directed to proceed to trial.

During a homicide trial, the Crown brought an application under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine a witness on a prior videotaped statement to police after she claimed to have no memory of the events or the statement.

The Crown also sought to admit the statement for the truth of its contents under the principled approach to hearsay.

The court found that despite the lack of an oath and the witness's intoxication, the videotaped nature of the statement and the opportunity for cross-examination provided sufficient threshold reliability.

The statement was admitted into evidence.

Mid-trial, the co-accused obtained new counsel and pled guilty to manslaughter, agreeing to provide a statement and potentially testify against the applicant.

The applicant sought a mistrial, arguing the Crown's acceptance of the plea was a strategic abuse of process to secure testimony and that the new statement constituted late disclosure prejudicing his defence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no abuse of process in the Crown's plea negotiations and concluding that the applicant's ability to cross-examine the co-accused mitigated any prejudice from the late disclosure.

A mistrial was not necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant sought an order for joint custody of the parties' child and a writ of possession for his solely owned residence, which the respondent had refused to vacate following their separation.

The respondent did not attend the uncontested hearing.

The court formalized the status quo joint custody arrangement.

Finding that section 104 of the Courts of Justice Act did not apply to real property, the court relied on its equitable jurisdiction and the tort of trespass to order a writ of possession in favour of the applicant.

The court also ordered the respondent to reimburse the applicant for a utility bill but declined to order occupation rent.

The plaintiffs sought costs for several motions that were either settled or not heard, including an injunction motion, a motion to amend pleadings to add a fraudulent conveyance claim, and a motion for production of documents.

The underlying action involved a dispute over $500,000 in life insurance proceeds.

The court found that the plaintiffs were put to significant time and expense because the defendants initially refused to voluntarily freeze the insurance proceeds, which necessitated the injunction motion.

However, the court also found that the plaintiffs' motion for production of documents was premature as no discoveries had been held.

Balancing these factors and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiffs $33,000 in costs.