John Struthers

The accused applied to exclude evidence of 18 kilograms of cocaine, 7 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, and over $200,000 in cash seized during a drug trafficking investigation.

They alleged multiple Charter violations, including unreasonable search of a condominium parking garage, arbitrary arrest, warrantless entry into a dwelling, and denial of the right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not violate sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, as the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage and the police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to a failure to hold off questioning and a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude evidence obtained from a general warrant and a subsequent search warrant.

The general warrant authorized covert entries into a condominium unit suspected to be a fentanyl stash house.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained unconstitutionally obtained video surveillance evidence and misleading exaggerations about the accused's pattern of behaviour.

After excising the problematic portions, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the general warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the police conduct was serious and the impact on the accused's privacy was high, warranting the exclusion of the seized evidence under s. 24(2).

The offender, a police officer, was sentenced for multiple offences including breach of trust, unauthorized use of a computer, possession of a firearm obtained by crime, and trafficking by offer.

The offences involved accessing confidential police databases for unauthorized purposes, planning to rob a fictional drug warehouse, stealing a police shotgun, and offering to traffic cocaine.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the severe breach of public trust.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 7.5 years imprisonment.

The accused, a police officer, was found guilty of multiple offences including unauthorized use of a computer, breach of trust, possessing a stolen firearm, and drug trafficking following an undercover police corruption investigation.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings, arguing he was entrapped by undercover officers and that the investigation amounted to an abuse of process.

The court found that the accused was entrapped into committing theft and uttering forged documents relating to a fabricated confidential informant report, as the police induced the offences without reasonable suspicion, and stayed those counts.

However, the court dismissed the entrapment application for the remaining offences, finding that reasonable suspicion existed and the accused was not induced, but rather created his own opportunities to commit the crimes.

The court also declined to grant a general stay for abuse of process.

The accused, a police officer, was targeted in an undercover corruption investigation.

He was charged with 14 offences arising from his interactions with an undercover officer posing as his partner and another undercover officer posing as a mid-level organized crime figure.

The court found the accused guilty of theft and uttering forged documents for keeping money intended for a fictitious confidential informant and forging the receipt.

He was also found guilty of unauthorized use of a computer and breach of trust for running licence plates for personal reasons and to assist the undercover drug dealer.

The accused was found guilty of possessing a firearm obtained by crime and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose after he stole a police shotgun in preparation for robbing a drug warehouse.

However, he was acquitted of attempted robbery because his extensive planning had not progressed beyond mere preparation.

He was also convicted of trafficking cocaine by offer and trafficking steroids to the undercover officer.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit expert evidence regarding street gangs, specifically the rivalry between 'C3' and the 'Scarlettwood Crips'.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert to provide context and establish motive for the seemingly random shooting of an unarmed man.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial and the officer was not properly qualified.

The court allowed the application, finding the evidence was logically relevant to motive, necessary to assist the jury in understanding the context of the shooting, and that the officer was qualified.

The court ruled that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to specific exclusions of certain highly prejudicial videos and appropriate jury instructions.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case to reduce the charge to second-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence of the accused waiting at a restaurant, conducting reconnaissance, ambushing the victim in a washroom, and fleeing together with the murder weapon provided a prima facie case upon which a reasonable jury could find planning and deliberation.

The Crown applied to admit discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence consisted of video surveillance showing the accused in possession of a long-barrelled firearm at a motel the day before the homicide.

The court found that the evidence was highly probative of the accused's possession, concealment, and familiarity with the weapon, which was relevant to the issues of intention, planning, and deliberation.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the video admissible.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, as well as possession of proceeds of crime, following the execution of a search warrant at a residence.

The accused was found in the kitchen, but no contraband was found on his person.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including an expired license plate renewal form, to establish constructive possession.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused resided at the home or had knowledge and control of the drugs and currency.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of marihuana and MDMA, following a police search of an apartment.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including police surveillance of the accused entering the building and their presence in the apartment when the search warrant was executed.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and found that the evidence reasonably supported inferences other than guilt, specifically that the accused lacked knowledge and control of the drugs.

Both accused were acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of uttering threats entered in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He argued that the trial judge misapplied the third branch of the W. (D.) credibility framework and effectively reversed the burden of proof by treating the case as a credibility contest and by improperly favouring police evidence.

The court held that the trial judge’s reasons, read as a whole, demonstrated an understanding and proper application of the W. (D.) analysis and that the judge was entitled to prefer the officers’ testimony.

Minor inconsistencies in the officers’ evidence were not material, and credibility findings were owed deference.

The appellate court found no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of the evidence.

Following a prior release order modifying bail conditions for multiple accused, the court was advised of a change in circumstances requiring further modification of the recognizances.

The court accepted that the proposed adjustments were necessary in the public interest despite limited disclosure of the underlying circumstances.

The conditions were amended to require each accused to inform the officer in charge of the address at which they would reside with their sureties and to remain amenable to household rules.

For one accused, an existing condition in the recognizance was vacated and replaced with the new residency condition, and a geographic restriction requiring the accused to remain in Ontario was removed.

The court also ordered that the addresses of the sureties not be publicly disclosed absent further court order.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s order granting judicial interim release to three accused charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences.

The Crown argued that the justice erred in assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10).

The reviewing judge held that although the case involved serious allegations including possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers, a silencer, and drugs, the justice of the peace did not commit an error in law or principle.

The strength of the prosecution’s case was uncertain due to potential Charter issues concerning warrantless access to a safe and evidentiary concerns linking some accused to the seized items.

The Crown’s request to substitute detention orders was dismissed, though several release conditions were modified to address inconsistencies and strengthen supervision.

The Crown appealed an acquittal arising from impaired driving charges where the trial judge found the arrest was premature due to insufficient reasonable and probable grounds.

The appellate court held that the trial judge erred in law by applying an overly stringent standard when assessing whether the officer had objective grounds for arrest and a breath demand.

The court further held that the trial judge failed to conduct the required Charter s. 24(2) analysis after finding a potential Charter breach.

The right to counsel under s. 10(b) was a live issue and required proper consideration, particularly regarding the accused’s request to contact counsel of choice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was stopped by police for a by-law infraction at a transit station, which escalated into an arrest and search incident to arrest after an officer observed him moving a bag of drugs.

The accused brought a Charter motion alleging violations of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights, arguing the police fabricated the grounds for arrest.

The court dismissed the Charter motion, finding the officer's account credible and that reasonable grounds existed for the arrest.

The accused was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and not guilty of possession of proceeds of crime.