Blood alcohol concentration

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the impaired operation count was dismissed.

The central issue was whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breath demand following a positive approved screening device result, particularly in light of evidence of an open beer can found in the vehicle after the screening device test was administered.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on multiple indicia of impairment and that the presence of the beer can did not constitute credible evidence of recent consumption sufficient to undermine the reliability of the screening device result.

The accused was convicted.

The accused was charged with impaired operation causing bodily harm, dangerous operation causing bodily harm, and impaired operation following a serious motor vehicle collision that resulted in life-threatening injuries to passengers.

The Crown's case relied on expert toxicology evidence establishing a projected blood alcohol concentration of 66-96 mgs/100ml at the time of driving, the manner of driving, and accident reconstruction evidence.

The defence argued that the absence of physical indicia of impairment created reasonable doubt.

The court found that the accused's driving demonstrated mental impairment consistent with alcohol consumption, including failure to perceive the need to slow speed and failure to react to wet road conditions.

The court convicted on all three counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death and two offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

On November 24, 2016, the 23-year-old accused, while extremely intoxicated with a blood-alcohol concentration between 185-240 mg/100mL, drove a rental SUV at 188 km/h through a red light in a 60 km/h residential zone and struck a stationary vehicle, killing the 60-year-old driver.

The accused also fraudulently obtained a work permit and attempted to establish a business while on a student visa.

The court imposed a sentence of six years for impaired driving causing death, plus one year consecutive for the immigration offence under section 122, and one year concurrent for the offence under section 127, with a 10-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol concentration.

Following a trial, the court dismissed Charter applications regarding the right to counsel and the lawfulness of the screening test process.

The accused was found guilty of driving with an illegal blood alcohol concentration of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, which was 50 milligrams over the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of a $1,200 fine plus a $360 victim surcharge (total $1,560) payable within one year, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court noted the accused's youth, education, lack of criminal record, and strong family support as mitigating factors, but emphasized the seriousness of the offense and the high blood alcohol reading.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of her truck in a ditch with the engine running and her hands on the steering wheel.

The accused claimed she entered the vehicle only to charge her cell phone after waiting approximately six hours for a friend to help extract the vehicle from the ditch.

The court found the accused's account lacked credibility and determined that she failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court also found that even if the presumption had been rebutted, the Crown proved actual care and control beyond a reasonable doubt based on the realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

The trial focused primarily on whether the defendant's Charter rights were violated and whether the breath test results should be excluded from evidence.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, alleging lack of reasonable suspicion, and argued that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel at various stages of the investigation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand the screening device, that the defendant was properly informed of his rights to counsel, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a collision on Highway 144 in October 2013.

The Crown proved the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol through evidence of the accident circumstances, observations of impairment, and breath test results of 201 and 203 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the Intoxilizer 8000C device through expert evidence regarding historical maintenance records and COBRA data.

The court rejected the defence expert's evidence as lacking proper foundation and logical relevance, finding it did not meet the threshold for admissibility.

The court convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, arising from a collision on May 18, 2015, in Ottawa.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 168 mg% and 165 mg% at the time of testing, expert toxicological evidence regarding scientific impairment at 50 mg%, and police observations of alleged signs of impairment.

The defence raised the "last drink" doctrine, arguing the accused consumed alcohol approximately 13 minutes before driving, and challenged the applicability of general scientific impairment evidence to the specific accused.

The court found the accused not guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was pulled over at 3:11 AM on June 4, 2013, after failing an approved screening device test.

He provided breath samples at 4:20 AM and 4:42 AM showing readings of 160 and 150 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood respectively.

The accused challenged the validity of the approved instrument demand under s. 24(2) of the Charter and argued that the statutory presumptions of identity under s. 258(1)(c) and (d.1) had been rebutted by evidence of "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of alcohol immediately before being pulled over).

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand and that the presumptions had not been rebutted.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was found sleeping in his parked car at a fast food restaurant in Mississauga with a blood alcohol concentration of 180 mg/100ml.

He was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The Crown and defence agreed that the defendant was arbitrarily detained for approximately 4.5 to 7 hours after the investigation was complete.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle based on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which the defendant failed to rebut.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's section 9 Charter rights regarding arbitrary detention but declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a reduced sentence as the appropriate remedy.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and registered a fail on a roadside approved screening device.

Following arrest and transport to the OPP Detachment, breath samples were taken approximately 76 minutes after the alleged offence, registering 150 and 130 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the Crown's reliance on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), arguing that cumulative police delays in transporting the accused and administering the breath tests rendered the samples not "taken as soon as practicable." The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout and that the presumption of identity applied.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation while impaired by alcohol, and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the seizure of blood samples obtained for medical purposes.

The court found that continuity of the blood samples was established and that no Charter breach occurred.

However, the court determined that the Crown failed to prove the "no bolus drinking" assumption underlying the toxicologist's read-back opinions, rendering those opinions inadmissible.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired and over-80 charges but convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm based on evidence of excessive speeding on a residential street, loss of control, and collision with a tree.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle on December 31, 2013.

The vehicle had mounted a snowbank after the accused swerved to avoid a collision.

When police arrived, the accused was found in the driver's seat with keys in the ignition.

The court examined whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle despite it being immobilized on the snowbank, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable as required by law.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood, impaired driving, and dangerous driving.

The Crown relied on expert toxicology evidence to establish the over 80 charge.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the assumption of no significant consumption of alcohol immediately prior to or during the time of driving.

The court found the over 80 charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt but acquitted on the impaired driving and dangerous driving charges due to insufficient evidence of impairment of ability to operate the vehicle and lack of proof of a marked departure from the standard of care.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to Section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue was whether the "forthwith" requirement in Section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was met.

The Crown argued that the requirement was satisfied despite a nine-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the making of the breath demand.

The court found that the delay was reasonably necessary due to legitimate safety concerns arising from the simultaneous stop of two vehicles and the officer's need to address an unknown second party.

The court upheld the validity of the breath sample and found the accused guilty of the over 80 charge.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100ml.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, challenging the validity of the Approved Screening Device demand and seeking exclusion of breath readings.

The court found that the officer had articulable cause to investigate the accused based on common law powers, that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on the totality of circumstances, and that the ASD demand was validly made forthwith.

The court dismissed the Charter application, admitted the breath evidence, and found the accused guilty of the "over 80" offence while acquitting on the impaired care or control charge due to insufficient evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml following a traffic stop in Arnprior, Ontario on March 7, 2012.

The Crown relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour window, requiring expert evidence from the Centre of Forensic Science to establish the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The key issue was whether the accused engaged in bolus drinking (consumption of large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving) within fifteen minutes of being stopped.

The trial judge rejected the defence witness's testimony regarding shots of tequila consumed just before departure, finding her evidence fabricated and unreliable.

The court applied the common sense inference that normal people do not consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving and found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that no bolus drinking occurred.

The accused was convicted of Over 80 and the Impaired charge was stayed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at trial.

The central issue was whether the Crown established that the arresting officer gave a demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code at the roadside.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that such a demand was made.

Without proof of the demand, the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption in section 258(1)(c) to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on the accused's involvement in a motor vehicle collision with a police officer's vehicle, physical observations of impairment, and a toxicology report projecting the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident.

The defence challenged the reliability of the toxicology report's assumptions, particularly regarding the timing of the incident and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the essential factual underpinnings of the toxicology report beyond a reasonable doubt and that the physical evidence of impairment was insufficient to meet the threshold for conviction.

Both charges were dismissed.