Blood alcohol concentration

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

A concerned citizen reported erratic driving, and the accused was arrested after failing a screening device test.

The Crown's case on the over 80 charge failed because the first breath sample was not taken as soon as practicable; the officer delayed the testing by 24 minutes to facilitate the accused's contact with duty counsel despite the accused's express declination of that right.

The impaired operation charge succeeded based on the constellation of observations by both the citizen witness and the arresting officer, establishing impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defence raised multiple Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(b), and 11(c).

The trial judge dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable grounds to make the roadside breath demand based on observations of physical indicia of impairment, that the demand was made forthwith, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The appellant was convicted at trial of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death, and was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment and whether the operation constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent operator.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were rooted in adequate evidentiary foundation and entitled to deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the six-year term fell within the appropriate range for similar offences.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100ml following a collision with a stopped vehicle.

The Crown proved the impaired operation charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on extensive evidence of physical and mental impairment, including the circumstances of the collision, the accused's unsteady gait, disorientation, emotional instability, and extreme intoxication observed by police officers.

However, the Crown failed to prove the over 80 charge because the breath tests were conducted outside the two-hour statutory window, and the court declined to take judicial notice of toxicology calculations to bridge the gap.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (Count 1) and impaired driving (Count 2).

The Crown's case was based on observations of erratic driving by civilian witnesses, police observations of indicia of impairment, and breath test results showing 170 mg/100 ml and 160 mg/100 ml.

The court dismissed Count 1 because the Crown failed to prove that the breath samples were received directly into the approved instrument as required by s. 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant guilty on Count 2 based on the cumulative circumstantial evidence of impairment, including the protracted period of dangerous driving, physical indicia of intoxication, and the defendant's demeanor and confusion.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration (over 80 mgs per 100 mls of blood).

The Crown relied on civilian witness testimony, police evidence, and an agreed statement of fact.

The court acquitted the accused of dangerous operation due to reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the driver observed by the civilian witness, as the passenger's evidence contradicted the Crown's theory of the route taken.

The court convicted the accused of the over 80 charge, finding that the police complied with the statutory requirement that breath sample testing be carried out "as soon as practicable," despite language barriers requiring interpretation assistance.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath sample evidence alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) relating to investigative detention at the hospital and the Over 80 charge was dismissed.

The trial proceeded on the impaired driving charge.

The court found that civilian witnesses provided credible evidence of the accident, the accused's identity as the driver, and indicia of impairment including stumbling, smell of alcohol, and unresponsiveness.

The court concluded that reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and that the Crown proved all essential elements of impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conviction was entered.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and operate over 80 following an incident on November 3, 2013.

The Crown established that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and that his blood alcohol concentration substantially exceeded the legal limit of 80 mg/100mL.

The defence conceded these facts but argued the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea, claiming he was disabled through no fault of his own from appreciating that he was impaired or that his BAC exceeded the legal limit due to an interaction between Tylenol 3 medication and alcohol.

The court rejected this defence, finding that the defendant's impairment resulted from voluntary consumption of alcohol and that he knew or ought to have known of the risks.

The court convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown's case relied on civilian witness testimony of erratic driving, police observations of impairment, and breath sample results of 185 mg and 176 mg.

The defence advanced a "last drink" argument under section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, claiming the accused consumed minimal alcohol before driving and substantial alcohol after arriving home.

The trial judge rejected the defence evidence as incredible and fabricated, finding the accused had consumed substantial alcohol prior to driving.

The court found the statutory presumptions of identity were not rebutted and convicted on both charges.

The applicant brought a motion for an order declaring a mistrial due to ineffective assistance of counsel following her conviction on charges of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The court examined whether counsel's conduct fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance and whether such conduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The court found that while certain trial strategy decisions were reasonable, critical failures in file preparation and transfer, inadequate disclosure of key evidence to trial counsel, and insufficient preparation for cross-examination of expert witnesses fell below the standard of care.

The court determined that the reliability of the verdict was called into question and declared a mistrial.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and while having an excessive blood alcohol concentration after being found asleep behind the wheel of his parked car in an underground garage at the Rogers Centre.

The Crown conceded that the statutory presumption of care or control was rebutted.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual care or control of the vehicle.

The court applied the analytical framework from R. v. Boudreault and found that while certain factors favored the Crown, the totality of circumstances—including that the vehicle was parked as the defendant's intended destination for sleeping, was not running, was in a fully reclined position, and the defendant had no reason to drive until after completing his next work shift—did not establish a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol after failing a screening test at a RIDE checkpoint in Brampton.

The trial raised two issues: whether the police properly relied on the screening test result to justify a breath demand, and whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court found that the officer reasonably administered the screening test and that the accused was provided with sufficient information and reasonable opportunity to exercise his rights to counsel.

The accused failed to be reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights by not informing police that he had a specific lawyer he wished to contact.

The court found the accused guilty of driving with excess blood alcohol.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused was found in a vehicle stuck in snow in a private driveway with signs of impairment.

The defence conceded that all technical requirements of both charges were met and raised the defence of necessity, arguing the accused drove while impaired to locate and assist an intoxicated co-worker who had left the cabin in cold weather.

The court found no air of reality to the necessity defence, as there was no imminent peril, reasonable alternatives existed (such as walking), and the harm of impaired driving outweighed any speculative harm to the co-worker.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown sought to rely on the presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged whether the Crown had proven two prerequisites: that the samples were taken as soon as practicable, and that the first sample was taken within two hours of the offence.

The court found the samples were taken as soon as practicable but held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first sample was taken within the two-hour requirement due to insufficient evidence regarding the consistency of timepieces used.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, following a rear-end collision in Toronto.

The Crown relied on breath test results and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence advanced Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of the breath demand, the adequacy of the right to counsel advisement, and the reliability of the expert evidence.

The court found the breath demand lawful, admitted the breath test evidence despite a s. 10(b) breach, and convicted the defendant on both charges based on the expert evidence establishing impairment and excessive BAC at the time of driving.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision on Wharncliffe Road North in London, Ontario.

The Crown's case relied on breath sample results and observations of the accused's behaviour at the scene and at the police station.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the timing prerequisites necessary to rely on the statutory presumptions of accuracy and identity under the Criminal Code, and therefore dismissed the over .80 count.

On the impairment count, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting inconsistencies in witness accounts, the accused's apparent ability to understand instructions, and the plausible explanation of weather and road conditions for the collision.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results taken outside the two-hour statutory presumption period, requiring expert toxicological evidence to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The central issue was whether the accused engaged in "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of large quantities of alcohol shortly before driving), which would render the expert's extrapolation unreliable.

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his drinking pattern as incredible and evasive, finding no credible evidence of bolus drinking.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicologist's expert opinion that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 130 and 175 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit contrary to s.253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised seven Charter violations including arbitrary stop and detention, failure to inform of reasons for detention, failure to advise of right to counsel, illegal pat-down search, lack of reasonable suspicion for ASD demand, and denial of counsel of choice.

The court found no Charter breaches and admitted the breath test evidence.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proved the accused had consumed seven beers and had a projected BAC of 160 mgs/100ml or higher.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control when police found him parked in a lot by a baseball field with the engine running, keys in the ignition, and music playing.

The court found the accused occupied the driver's seat, the engine was running, and he failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he intended to walk home, finding his continued occupation of the driver's seat inconsistent with that claim.

Both counts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath samples taken at the detachment to establish the offence.

The sole issue at trial was whether the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code to invoke the presumption of identity.

The defence challenged an unexplained 28-minute delay between the first and second breath samples.

The court found that the entire chain of events from the time of the offence to the taking of the first sample was reasonable, and that the Crown was not required to provide a detailed explanation for every minute of custody.

The court convicted the accused.