Blood alcohol concentration

The applicant was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to section 320.27(2) of the Criminal Code, which permits police officers to demand a breath sample from drivers of motor vehicles without any suspicion of alcohol consumption.

The applicant alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while section 320.27(2) engages section 8 protections, the search and seizure is reasonable and constitutional.

The court also found that any breach of section 9 rights is justified under section 1 of the Charter, and that section 10(b) rights are appropriately suspended during brief roadside sobriety investigations.

The applicant was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood within two hours after ceasing to operate a conveyance, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the lawfulness of the roadside breath demand and alleged breaches of his Charter rights to counsel.

The court found that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to demand a roadside sample based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's dazed appearance, slow and deliberate movements, and apparent hand-eye coordination difficulties following a serious motor vehicle accident.

The court also found no breach of the accused's s. 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated understanding of his rights and provided cogent responses to questioning.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and causing bodily harm, contrary to section 255(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was acquitted on two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of section 255(2.1), arguing it lacks sufficient fault requirement and is overbroad.

The court upheld the constitutionality of the section, finding it contains adequate fault requirements and is not saved by section 1 of the Charter, as it pursues the important objective of deterring drinking and driving and employs proportionate means.

The offender, a fifth-time impaired driving offender, was convicted of impaired operation after driving erratically on Highway 400 at a blood alcohol concentration of 297-285 mgs/100ml (nearly six times the safe driving limit).

The offender nearly caused a collision with a pickup truck.

The Crown sought the maximum summary custodial term of 18 months with a lifetime driving prohibition.

The defence sought the minimum four-month jail term with a 10-year prohibition.

The court imposed 14 months imprisonment followed by three years probation, with a lifetime driving prohibition, finding that while the Crown's submission was within range, some restraint was warranted given the offender's sentencing history and gaps in the record.

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration, breaking and entering with intent to commit mischief, and mischief to property.

The Crown called six witnesses and the defendant testified in his own defence.

The court found that the defendant drove with an impermissibly high blood alcohol concentration and broke into a towing compound by climbing through an unlocked window and disabling the mechanical gate to retrieve his rental car.

However, the court found that the defendant's evidence regarding his intent to retrieve his painkillers and his willingness to restore the gate was credible and not undermined by cross-examination.

The court acquitted the defendant on the breaking and entering and mischief charges due to lack of requisite mens rea, but convicted on the impaired driving charge.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing the death of a five-year-old child and impaired driving causing bodily harm to the child's parents.

The defendant, a 24-year-old first offender with no criminal record, had consumed alcohol at a Toronto nightclub and drove back to Newmarket with little sleep.

He fell asleep at the wheel on Highway 9, crossed into oncoming traffic at excessive speed, and collided head-on with a vehicle carrying the Gomez family.

The collision killed five-year-old Lux Peyton Gomez and seriously injured her parents.

The court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment for the death and four years concurrent for the bodily harm offences, along with a ten-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100ml following a traffic stop.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving observed by a civilian witness, observations by police officers at the roadside and station, and approved breath test results of 297 and 280 mg/100ml.

The accused claimed his driving errors and physical symptoms resulted from medical conditions including post-chemotherapy spasms and medication non-compliance.

The court found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on credible evidence from the civilian witness and police officers, rejecting the accused's medical explanation as not credible.

The court also dismissed Charter applications regarding the timing of the approved instrument demand and the duration of detention.

The accused was found guilty on the impaired driving count, while the "Over 80" count was stayed.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control of an automobile after being found asleep in a parked vehicle at a McDonald's parking lot in Newmarket on August 26, 2018.

The Crown presented evidence of the defendant's impaired state through observations by McDonald's staff, EMS personnel, and police officers.

The defendant testified that she had consumed alcohol only after parking the vehicle and that any impairment was the result of "bolus drinking" occurring after she had ceased to have care and control.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence and found that she was impaired at the time she drove through the McDonald's drive-through and continued to be impaired thereafter.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired care and control.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial occurred after amendments to the Criminal Code regarding drinking and driving offences.

The court found the defendant not guilty of impaired driving due to insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, despite evidence of poor driving and a strong odour of alcohol.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of the over-80 charge, relying on the presumption of accuracy under the new legislation and determining that breath readings were admissible despite a Charter violation regarding the right to counsel.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood).

A police officer conducting a RIDE program sobriety check stopped the defendant's vehicle and, after smelling alcohol, demanded an approved screening device (ASD) test.

The defendant failed the test and was arrested.

At the police station, Intoxilyzer tests revealed blood alcohol levels of 230 mg and 220 mg.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples under the Charter, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion.

The defendant also challenged the Crown's ability to rely on the presumption of identity and the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer tests.

The court dismissed all challenges and found the defendant guilty.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of his parked car in a plaza parking lot at 3:31 am.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued the presumption did not apply because the accused's body was slumped across the front seats, and alternatively, that the presumption was rebutted by evidence of a concrete plan to stay at a friend's residence.

The court found the presumption applied but was rebutted on the balance of probabilities regarding initial intent.

However, the court found the accused presented a realistic risk of danger to the public given his intoxication, possession of car keys, and lack of a reliable alternative plan.

The accused was convicted.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found slumped over the steering wheel of a running vehicle in a parking lot.

The Crown established that the defendant occupied the driver's seat of a running motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defendant's evidence that he did not intend to drive and was merely waiting for a ride was rejected as not credible.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving and stayed the over 80 charge pursuant to R. v. Kienapple.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

Following a blended voir dire and trial, the court found that the officer administering the approved screening device (ASD) did not have objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was in proper working order, as he failed to check the calibration and accuracy check dates despite knowing their importance.

This constituted a violation of the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE program stop, the accused provided breath samples indicating a BAC of 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on the grounds that police breached his Charter right to counsel by failing to inform him of available resources to contact counsel of choice, thereby unconstitutionally channeling him to duty counsel.

The court found a serious Charter breach and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml.

Police observed erratic driving and arrested the accused after observing signs of impairment.

Breath samples taken over two hours after driving showed readings of 204 and 194 mg/100 ml.

The accused testified she consumed approximately eight ounces of gin within 15 minutes prior to apprehension, arguing this "bolus drinking" created reasonable doubt as to her BAC at the time of driving.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation but acquitted her on the over 80 charge, finding that while her BAC exceeded the impairment threshold of 50 mg/100 ml, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it exceeded 80 mg/100 ml at the time of driving.

The defendant was found asleep in his vehicle parked in the middle of a residential street with the engine running.

Police arrested him for impaired care or control and "over 80" (excessive blood alcohol concentration).

The Crown charged him with both offences.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of his breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging police violated his right to counsel by failing to facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

The court found the police breached the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in acquittal on the "over 80" charge.

However, the court convicted on the impaired care or control charge based on the defendant's condition at the scene.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove into a commercial plaza parking lot in Brampton where he was stopped at a fixed-point sobriety check stop.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the detention, the grounds for the approved screening device demand, and the voluntariness of statements made in the breath room.

The court found the detention was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act and common law, the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on bloodshot eyes and odour of alcohol on the breath, and the defendant's statements were voluntary given the multiple cautions provided and the fair manner in which the breath technician conducted the proceedings.

Expert toxicological evidence established the defendant's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operation impaired and operation over 80 following a motor vehicle collision on March 22, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence from paramedics, police officers, a breath technician, and a forensic toxicologist.

The defendant did not call any evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired care or control and impaired over 80, applying the legal test established in R. v. Boudreault regarding the elements of care or control under the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found in the driver's seat of the vehicle after it struck a church, with a blood alcohol concentration significantly exceeding the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the officer's request that he blow on the officer's finger to determine if he had been drinking, arguing it violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown argued the officer took reasonable investigative steps authorized under s. 48 of the Highway Traffic Act and that any Charter violation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court found the officer's conduct was authorized by law, reasonable, and justified, and convicted the defendant.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved the actus reus of the offence through evidence of the accused's erratic driving, a roadside stop, and breathalyzer readings of 147 and 133 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

However, the defence raised evidence of dissociative fugue and dissociative amnesia, supported by expert psychiatric testimony.

The court found that while the accused committed the physical act of driving, a reasonable doubt existed regarding whether the accused possessed the mens rea required for conviction, as the evidence suggested the accused may have been in a dissociative fugue state during the incident and was unaware of his actions.