Blood alcohol concentration

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg after a late-night collision involving a lamp post and parked vehicles.

The accused argued that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable, alleging a section 8 Charter violation, and that the indicia of impairment could be attributed to other factors.

The court found that the timeline of events, including necessary safety and translation tasks, justified the delay in taking the breath samples.

The court also found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol based on multiple indicia of impairment.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg after a single-vehicle accident.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing her admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under s. 199 of the Highway Traffic Act and should be excluded under s. 7, and that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest her, breaching ss. 8 and 9.

The court dismissed the Charter applications, finding the statements were voluntary and not a compelled report, and that the officer had objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest.

The court also found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver.

Findings of guilt were entered on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a conveyance with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

A police officer investigated the accused in a remote parking lot and delayed informing him of the reason for his detention and his right to counsel due to officer safety concerns.

The court found a violation of the accused's section 10(a) Charter rights, but no violations of sections 8, 9, or 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2).

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level over 80 mgs.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the Intoxilyzer results under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the court found the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by treating the appellant's acquittal on the companion impaired driving charge as an alternative remedy.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the appeal court concluded the s. 10(b) breach was minor and had minimal impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests.

Given the high reliability and importance of the breath samples, the evidence was admissible.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code, and with having consumed alcohol in such quantity that the concentration in her blood exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b).

Following a serious single-vehicle collision, the accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial proceeded on a blended voir dire basis.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the chain of continuity of the blood sample and that the toxicologist's opinion was undermined by discrepancies in the time the blood was drawn.

The court also found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, as the observed signs of impairment could be attributed to trauma and injuries from the collision.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to a Charter voir dire, erred in the analysis of the right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b), and improperly accepted expert toxicology evidence.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s minor misquotation of the appellant’s testimony did not amount to a material misapprehension of evidence and did not taint the credibility findings.

The court further found no error in the conclusion that police were not required to clarify whether the accused wished to contact private counsel when he merely requested a lawyer and was connected with duty counsel.

The expert evidence on projected blood alcohol concentration was properly admitted and relied upon, and the trial judge reasonably rejected hypothetical bolus drinking scenarios.

The conviction was upheld.

In this impaired driving jury trial, the court determined whether the accused's bolus drinking theory had an air of reality sufficient to be left with the jury.

Both Crown and defence toxicologists agreed on the blood alcohol calculations and on the quantity and timing of alcohol that would have been required for the theory to operate.

Even taking the accused's and supporting witness's evidence at its highest, the factual record could not support the necessary recent consumption.

The court held that leaving bolus drinking with the jury would be confusing and unsupported by the evidence, and instructed the jury not to consider it if they accepted the toxicology evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown's case relied on observations by the arresting officer of suspicious driving and parking, physical indicators of impairment, and breath test results.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand and the timing of breath samples.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand based on the totality of circumstances, the samples were taken as soon as practicable, and the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The applicant appealed a summary conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit, contrary to s. 253 of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the trial resulted in a miscarriage of justice and that the evidence did not establish care and control or an intention to operate the vehicle.

The appeal court held that the trial judge made supported credibility findings and had an evidentiary basis to accept the police officer’s testimony that the accused was seated in the driver’s seat with the key in the ignition and the engine running.

Applying the realistic risk of danger test from R. v. Boudreault, the court found no error in the trial judge’s conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration after failing a roadside screening test.

The defendant's BAC readings were more than twice the legal limit.

The defence argued that the arresting officer's seven-minute delay in making the approved screening device demand violated the defendant's Charter section 8 rights to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the delay did breach the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, rendering the searches and seizures unreasonable.

However, applying the section 24(2) analysis from R. v. Grant, the court determined that the evidence should be admitted as the balance of factors favoured admission.

The defendant was convicted.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code arising from a collision on Highway 401.

The trial judge relied on a combination of breathalyzer readings below the legal limit and expert toxicology evidence indicating likely impairment, together with findings about the manner of the collision.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to breathalyzer readings, expert opinion, and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court held that while the trial judge did not err in evaluating the collision or the breathalyzer and expert evidence, the analysis of bolus drinking was flawed because it focused improperly on large consumption while driving and involved speculation about the location of a bottle of alcohol in the vehicle.

Given the central role of this reasoning to the finding of guilt, the conviction could not stand.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proved the accused had consumed seven beers and had a projected BAC of 160 mgs/100ml or higher.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control when police found him parked in a lot by a baseball field with the engine running, keys in the ignition, and music playing.

The court found the accused occupied the driver's seat, the engine was running, and he failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he intended to walk home, finding his continued occupation of the driver's seat inconsistent with that claim.

Both counts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 mg per 100 mL, contrary to the Criminal Code.

The conviction arose after police responded to an anonymous tip, observed the appellant returning from a beer store to his truck with the keys in his possession, and later obtained breath samples well above the legal limit.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding care and control and that his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were violated.

The appeal court held that the trial judge reasonably inferred an intentional course of conduct creating a realistic risk the vehicle would be put in motion and that no unlawful detention or improper grounds for the breath demand were established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under the Criminal Code.

The appeal argued that the Crown failed to establish that the accused understood the breath demand made by the arresting officer, a prerequisite for the admission of breath test evidence.

The court held that while evidence established that a demand was made and complied with, there was no evidence that the accused understood the nature of the demand.

Without evidence satisfying the informational component required for lawful breath demands, the statutory preconditions for admitting the breath certificate were not met.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence were set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and care or control with excess blood alcohol following a minor motor vehicle accident on March 23, 2012.

The Crown relied on expert toxicological evidence regarding blood alcohol concentrations and observations of impairment indicators by police officers.

The court found the expert opinion regarding impairment in the general population did not necessarily apply to the individual accused and that the Crown's evidence of impairment was insufficient.

The impaired charge was dismissed.

However, the court found the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" within the meaning of the Criminal Code, allowing reliance on the presumption of identity.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 mg charge based on the lower breath sample reading of 103 mg.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle accident on January 15, 2011.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The court found that police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breathalyzer demand, that the accused's right to counsel was properly respected, and that the Crown proved impairment and the blood alcohol readings beyond a reasonable doubt.

The over 80 charge was stayed on the basis of the Kienapple principle, with conviction entered on the impaired operation charge.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the defence relied on the defence of necessity, asserting that the accused drove to assist his wife at the hospital.

The appellate court reviewed the governing principles for summary conviction appeals and the legal test for necessity established in Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The court held that the trial judge correctly stated the law and reasonably found that the elements of necessity—imminent peril, lack of reasonable alternatives, and proportionality—were not established.

Finding no error of law, palpable and overriding error of fact, or miscarriage of justice, the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The accused drove to a hospital following an ambulance after his wife suffered a serious leg injury at their rural residence.

The accused raised the common-law defence of necessity.

The court found that the defence failed on all three elements: there was no imminent peril once paramedics took charge of the wife's care, reasonable alternatives were available to the accused, and the harm of impaired driving outweighed the potential benefit of the accused's presence at the hospital.

The court found the accused guilty.

The plaintiff sought payment of a $100,000 accidental death benefit under a group life insurance policy after the insured died in a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer paid the basic life benefit but relied on an exclusion denying coverage where an accident occurs while the insured operates a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 ml.

Expert evidence was called regarding the reliability of post‑mortem toxicology testing and the insured’s blood alcohol level at the time of death.

The court accepted the reliability of the femoral blood sample analysis showing a concentration of 211 mg/100 ml and held the insurer met its burden of proving the exclusion on a balance of probabilities.

The court further held the exclusion did not require proof that alcohol caused the accident, only that the accident occurred while the insured’s BAC exceeded the specified level.

The appellants were charged with driving 'over 80' after failing breathalyzer tests.

At trial, they adduced expert 'straddle evidence' indicating that, based on their drinking patterns and average alcohol elimination rates, their blood alcohol concentrations could have been either above or below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that straddle evidence does not rebut the statutory presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, as it merely confirms the accused consumed enough alcohol to reach a level exceeding 80 mg and does not tend to show the concentration was below the legal limit.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions/orders for new trials were upheld.