P. Lindsay

In this criminal trial for refusing to provide a breath sample after a collision, the accused sought Charter remedies including exclusion of evidence and a stay under ss. 24(2) and 24(1).

The court held that the roadside detention, handcuffing, and force used by police were reasonable in the circumstances, and found no breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), or 12.

The court also found no breach of s. 10(b), confirming that immediate compliance with a lawful ASD demand does not trigger prior access to counsel.

In the alternative, the court held any potential s. 10(b) breach was minimal and would not justify exclusion under the Grant framework.

The Crown brought an application to remove the defendant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defendant and a co-accused were jointly charged with terrorism-related offences.

The counsel of record had previously represented or consulted with the co-accused, the defendant's family members, and potential witnesses in related matters.

The court found a realistic and significant risk of a future conflict of interest that could impair the counsel's duty of loyalty and effective assistance.

The application was granted, and the counsel was removed from the record.

The offender, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of failing to stop after an accident under s. 320.16(1) of the Criminal Code.

He had collided with a motorcyclist, causing the motorcyclist to suffer severe injuries resulting in the amputation of his leg.

The offender was acquitted of impaired and dangerous driving charges.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a non-custodial or conditional sentence.

The court found that the offender's status as a police officer and his failure to summon help were aggravating factors, but noted he was a first offender with strong community support who would likely lose his job.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence, a 30-month driving prohibition, a DNA order, and a $200 victim surcharge.

The accused, an off-duty police officer, was involved in a motor vehicle collision where his SUV crossed the centre line and struck an oncoming motorcycle, causing the rider to lose his leg.

The accused drove nearly four kilometres away from the scene before stopping and did not call 911.

At trial, the court acquitted the accused of impaired driving causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, finding the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and failed to rule out a sudden tire blowout or mechanical failure.

However, the court convicted the accused of failing to stop after an accident, rejecting the defence that a concussion rendered his actions non-volitional or negated his intent to flee.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving after fleeing the scene of a serious motor vehicle collision.

The police failed to make a breath demand at the roadside and subsequently failed to advise the accused of his increased jeopardy when they learned the victim had suffered life-altering injuries.

The breath technician made a delayed breath demand at the station without providing the accused a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the cumulative impact of the breaches on the accused's protected interests warranted the exclusion of the breath test results under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding impairment by alcohol, relying on the toxicologist's evidence, and dismissing his Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The Superior Court of Justice found no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her Charter rulings, concluding that the appellant was not detained prior to arrest and that the breath demand was made as soon as practicable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'over 80 care or control' after his vehicle went into a ditch and he was found in the driver's seat waiting for a tow truck.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, but failed to properly consider whether the appellant had rebutted the presumption by exiting and re-entering the vehicle with a change of intention.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge erred in law by basing the conviction on an un-rebutted presumption while simultaneously analyzing the risk of danger as if the presumption had been rebutted.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample at trial.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The accused argued the verdicts were inconsistent and the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the synergistic effects of Ativan and alcohol.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by finding the accused lacked the mens rea for impaired driving due to the unanticipated effects of combining alcohol and prescription medication.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no inconsistency in the verdicts, no material misapprehension of evidence, and holding that the presumption of voluntariness for impaired driving can be rebutted where impairment results from the unforeseeable combined effect of alcohol and drugs.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit following a RIDE stop.

The trial judge excluded breath test results under s.24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of ss.8 and 9 because the officer had not personally self-tested the approved screening device before administering the roadside test.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the officer lacked reasonable grounds and that a self-test of the device was not a legal requirement.

The appellate court further held that the trial judge misapplied the framework in R. v. Grant when excluding reliable breath evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the breath test evidence admitted, and a conviction entered with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application to exclude breath sample evidence.

The appellant contended the trial judge gave insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding the officers' reasonable grounds for the breath demand, and erred in the section 24(2) analysis.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officers had reasonable grounds based on the appellant's driving, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code arising from a collision on Highway 401.

The trial judge relied on a combination of breathalyzer readings below the legal limit and expert toxicology evidence indicating likely impairment, together with findings about the manner of the collision.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to breathalyzer readings, expert opinion, and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court held that while the trial judge did not err in evaluating the collision or the breathalyzer and expert evidence, the analysis of bolus drinking was flawed because it focused improperly on large consumption while driving and involved speculation about the location of a bottle of alcohol in the vehicle.

Given the central role of this reasoning to the finding of guilt, the conviction could not stand.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved roadside screening device during a Ride Program stop.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning the appellant’s attempts to provide a breath sample and improperly rejected the appellant’s explanation for failing to provide a sufficient sample.

The appellant also alleged breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms relating to his detention and a strip search conducted prior to being lodged in cells overnight.

The court held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and was entitled to draw reasonable inferences regarding the appellant’s conduct.

The court further found that the detention was not arbitrary and that the strip search was justified on the individualized circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.