Blood alcohol concentration

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood).

A police officer conducting a RIDE program sobriety check stopped the defendant's vehicle and, after smelling alcohol, demanded an approved screening device (ASD) test.

The defendant failed the test and was arrested.

At the police station, Intoxilyzer tests revealed blood alcohol levels of 230 mg and 220 mg.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples under the Charter, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion.

The defendant also challenged the Crown's ability to rely on the presumption of identity and the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer tests.

The court dismissed all challenges and found the defendant guilty.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of his parked car in a plaza parking lot at 3:31 am.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued the presumption did not apply because the accused's body was slumped across the front seats, and alternatively, that the presumption was rebutted by evidence of a concrete plan to stay at a friend's residence.

The court found the presumption applied but was rebutted on the balance of probabilities regarding initial intent.

However, the court found the accused presented a realistic risk of danger to the public given his intoxication, possession of car keys, and lack of a reliable alternative plan.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death to two individuals (a mother and her five-year-old daughter), impaired driving causing bodily harm to a six-year-old child, dangerous driving causing death to both victims, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and possession of cannabis resin.

A head-on collision occurred on Highway 401 when the defendant's truck drifted across the median into oncoming traffic while travelling at 120 km/h in a 100 km/h zone.

The defendant had a blood-alcohol concentration between 60-96 mg per 100 mL of blood at the time of the collision.

The court imposed a joint submission of 8 years imprisonment, finding it appropriate given the aggravating circumstances including the defendant's extensive driving record (22 prior speeding convictions), excessive speed, aggressive driving behaviour, and the devastating impact on the victims' family.

The defendant was found asleep in his vehicle parked in the middle of a residential street with the engine running.

Police arrested him for impaired care or control and "over 80" (excessive blood alcohol concentration).

The Crown charged him with both offences.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of his breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging police violated his right to counsel by failing to facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

The court found the police breached the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in acquittal on the "over 80" charge.

However, the court convicted on the impaired care or control charge based on the defendant's condition at the scene.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown presented evidence of breath test readings of 160 mgs alcohol per 100 ml blood and 150 mgs alcohol per 100 ml blood.

The defence raised two issues: first, whether the Daylight Savings Time adjustment on the morning of the events affected the admissibility of the certificate as evidence, and second, whether the defendant's Charter section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure was breached.

The court found that the DST adjustment was properly accounted for and that the officer had reasonable grounds to demand an approved screening device sample.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired operation causing bodily harm, dangerous operation causing bodily harm, and impaired operation following a serious motor vehicle collision that resulted in life-threatening injuries to passengers.

The Crown's case relied on expert toxicology evidence establishing a projected blood alcohol concentration of 66-96 mgs/100ml at the time of driving, the manner of driving, and accident reconstruction evidence.

The defence argued that the absence of physical indicia of impairment created reasonable doubt.

The court found that the accused's driving demonstrated mental impairment consistent with alcohol consumption, including failure to perceive the need to slow speed and failure to react to wet road conditions.

The court convicted on all three counts.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge acquitted on both counts, finding the Crown could not prove impairment and could not rely on the presumption of identity in s. 258(1)(c) to establish the blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The Crown sought to rely on the included offence of care or control over 80, but the trial judge rejected this, holding that s. 258(1)(c) applied only to the charged offence.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the acquittals on fairness grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the included offence issue, holding that the presumption of identity applies to included offences and that it is not unfair to convict on an included offence arising from the same facts as the charged offence.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a single-vehicle collision on November 21, 2015.

The Crown's case relied on breath analysis results and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised Charter challenges regarding the admissibility of pre-arrest statements, the validity of the breath demand, and the right to counsel.

The court found no Charter breaches and admitted all evidence.

The accused was convicted on both counts based on breath readings showing a blood alcohol concentration of 88 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and expert evidence establishing impairment.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, the Crown relied on an unsigned certificate of a qualified technician to establish the accused's blood alcohol concentration pursuant to section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code.

The court determined that while a signature is typically required, the lack of a signature does not foreclose reliance on the certificate provided that the conditions set out in section 258(1)(g) have been established.

The court found that the certificate identified the qualified technician, was provided by him after administering breath tests, and was corroborated by a signed test record.

The accused was found guilty on the count of driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit and acquitted on the impaired driving count.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, arising from a collision on Highway 144 in October 2013.

The Crown proved the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by alcohol through evidence of the accident circumstances, observations of impairment, and breath test results of 201 and 203 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the Intoxilizer 8000C device through expert evidence regarding historical maintenance records and COBRA data.

The court rejected the defence expert's evidence as lacking proper foundation and logical relevance, finding it did not meet the threshold for admissibility.

The court convicted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was pulled over at 3:11 AM on June 4, 2013, after failing an approved screening device test.

He provided breath samples at 4:20 AM and 4:42 AM showing readings of 160 and 150 mg of alcohol per 100 mL of blood respectively.

The accused challenged the validity of the approved instrument demand under s. 24(2) of the Charter and argued that the statutory presumptions of identity under s. 258(1)(c) and (d.1) had been rebutted by evidence of "bolus drinking" (rapid consumption of alcohol immediately before being pulled over).

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand and that the presumptions had not been rebutted.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether evidence of a failed approved screening device test, without evidence of device calibration, was sufficient to justify an arrest.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the failed screening device result, even absent explicit testimony regarding calibration.

The court distinguished between cases where the device's functioning was "on the table" due to contradictory evidence and cases where the evidence was silent on the issue.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and registered a fail on a roadside approved screening device.

Following arrest and transport to the OPP Detachment, breath samples were taken approximately 76 minutes after the alleged offence, registering 150 and 130 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the Crown's reliance on the statutory presumption of identity under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), arguing that cumulative police delays in transporting the accused and administering the breath tests rendered the samples not "taken as soon as practicable." The court found that the police acted reasonably throughout and that the presumption of identity applied.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's breath samples were taken outside the two-hour window required for statutory presumptions to apply.

The defence advanced a Carter defence based on the accused's testimony regarding his alcohol consumption, supported by expert toxicology evidence suggesting his BAC would have been below the legal limit.

The court rejected the defence evidence as unreliable and inconsistent with the expert evidence regarding the accuracy of the breathalyzer readings.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a motor vehicle collision on February 8, 2009.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing readings of 174 and 175 mg/100 mL of blood, along with observations of impairment by police officers and a civilian witness.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath testing instrument, arguing that inadequate maintenance and an unknown number of calibration checks prior to testing raised reasonable doubt.

The defence also presented expert evidence suggesting the accused's alcohol consumption was inconsistent with the breath test results.

The court found the breath testing instrument was functioning and operated properly at the time of testing and rejected the defence arguments regarding maintenance and calibration checks.

The court also found the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on the totality of evidence, including the failure to stop at a stop sign, observations of impairment, and the reliable breath test results.

The defendant was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the officer's request that he blow on the officer's finger to determine if he had been drinking, arguing it violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown argued the officer took reasonable investigative steps authorized under s. 48 of the Highway Traffic Act and that any Charter violation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court found the officer's conduct was authorized by law, reasonable, and justified, and convicted the defendant.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having an excessive concentration of alcohol in her blood while in care or control of a motor vehicle.

The accused did not dispute that her ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired and that her blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the accused was in care or control of the vehicle at the time of observation.

The court applied the test from R. v. Boudreault and found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused created a realistic risk of danger and was therefore in care or control of the vehicle.

The court convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The accused conceded his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the statutory limit but challenged the lawfulness of his detention, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The court found that the accused was not detained when the officer knocked on his vehicle window, as there was no significant physical or psychological restraint at that point.

The detention crystallized only when the officer directed the accused to exit the vehicle, at which point the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on observations of impairment.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the accused was found guilty of the Over 80 charge.

The impaired driving charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown relied on two breath test results taken at 11:10 p.m. (146 mg/100 mL) and 11:38 p.m. (144 mg/100 mL).

The defence challenged the admissibility of the second test, arguing it was not administered as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found that the 28-minute interval between tests, with 13 minutes unexplained beyond the mandatory 15-minute minimum, breached the statutory requirement.

The Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving the test was taken as soon as practicable, and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case relied on the accused's involvement in a motor vehicle collision with a police officer's vehicle, physical observations of impairment, and a toxicology report projecting the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the incident.

The defence challenged the reliability of the toxicology report's assumptions, particularly regarding the timing of the incident and the possibility of bolus drinking.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the essential factual underpinnings of the toxicology report beyond a reasonable doubt and that the physical evidence of impairment was insufficient to meet the threshold for conviction.

Both charges were dismissed.