Julianne A. Parfett

The respondent brought a motion to determine which intermediate school the parties' eldest child should attend.

The parties shared custody and lived in different catchment areas.

The respondent preferred a public school closer to her home, while the applicant preferred a Catholic school closer to his home.

The court applied the best interests of the child test, considering factors such as the child's moderate preference for the Catholic school, the schools' resources for the child's dyslexia, and the logistical challenges of the commute.

The court ordered the child to attend the Catholic school, placing weight on the child's consistent preference and the applicant's willingness to assist with transportation.

The defendants were successful in setting aside an ex-parte Mareva injunction after their marital situation changed, eliminating the risk of them fleeing the jurisdiction.

The defendants sought costs as the successful party, while the plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded due to the defendants' conduct complicating the litigation.

The court applied Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the defendants unnecessarily complicated the matter by litigating the sale of the matrimonial home.

Furthermore, the injunction was set aside due to changed circumstances, not any failure by the plaintiff.

The court ordered that no costs be awarded to either party.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge failed to recognize that video evidence of the incident had been modified.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the video's reliability and appropriately relied on the victim's testimony while rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The court concluded that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary care and custody order to place a child with his biological father, J.W., under an interim supervision order.

The child's parents, K.T. and E.M., sought the child's return to K.T.'s care under an interim supervision order.

The court found the child was at risk of emotional harm due to exposure to adult conflict between the parents.

However, given that the parents were now living separately, the court determined that the child could be adequately protected by an interim supervision order returning the child to K.T.'s care, with terms reflecting the Society's notice of motion.

The Society's request for placement with J.W. was dismissed, and the child was returned to the mother, K.T., under supervision.

The applicant, Tamara Lich, sought to review a bail review decision, alleging errors of law in the imposed release conditions.

The Crown argued the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to review a decision of another SCJ judge.

The court examined the interpretation of sections 520 and 521 of the Criminal Code, distinguishing between reviews based on material change in circumstances and those based on errors of law.

Relying on Ontario precedent (R. v. Saracino and R. v. Durrani) over Saskatchewan precedent (R. v. Smith), the court found that the Superior Court of Justice does have jurisdiction to review a bail decision made by another judge of the same court, regardless of whether the previous decision affirmed or vacated the justice's order, and whether the grounds for review are a change in circumstances or an error of law.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment for roofing work.

The defendant alleged deficiencies in the work and withheld payment, citing contractual provisions allowing for such holdbacks.

The court found that despite some credibility issues with the defendant's assertions, there remained a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the existence and cost of the alleged deficiencies.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The applicant, Hydro One Networks Inc., sought a declaration of a permanent easement over a portion of the respondent's land to access its existing transmission line easement, based on claims of prescriptive easement or lost modern grant.

The respondent disputed the continuous use and asserted that Hydro One had sought permission.

The court dismissed the application, finding that Hydro One failed to prove its use was "as of right" due to evidence of seeking permission, and that its infrequent use (once a year at most) did not meet the "continuous" requirement for a prescriptive easement.

The defendant, Carleton University, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process or, alternatively, to strike the amended statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff's action stemmed from dissatisfaction with the university's investigation and ruling regarding sexual misconduct complaints against him.

The court found that the greater part of the plaintiff's claim constituted an abuse of process, being an attempt to collaterally attack the university's internal disciplinary decision, which should properly be challenged via judicial review.

However, the court also identified potential legitimate claims of negligence related to post-decision actions by the university.

Consequently, the court struck the plaintiff's amended statement of claim but granted him leave to file a new amended statement of claim focusing solely on the alleged post-decision negligence.

The plaintiff father brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (CAS) for negligence, Charter breaches, and misfeasance in public office, alleging improper conduct during child protection and adoption proceedings that occurred while he was facing a murder charge for which he was ultimately acquitted.

The CAS moved to strike the action.

The court granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process as a collateral attack on valid Family Court orders.

The court also held that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the CAS owes a duty of care only to the children, not the parents, and the Charter and misfeasance claims were bound to fail.

The plaintiff, a sub-lessee, sought damages for overpayment of water usage charges from the defendant landlord, alleging breach of lease, unjust enrichment, or negligence due to a malfunctioning remote water meter.

The court dismissed the action, finding it statute-barred as the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to pursue a claim more than two years before filing.

Additionally, the court found no privity of contract between the sub-lessee plaintiff and the landlord defendant, and noted the plaintiff failed to utilize the lease's dispute resolution clause.

During a criminal trial for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact, the court ruled on whether the partial defence of provocation should be put to the jury and whether directed verdicts of acquittal should be entered for the accessory charges.

The court found an air of reality to the provocation defence, noting evidence that the deceased may have fired first.

The court dismissed the application for a directed verdict on accessory after the fact to a firearms offence, but granted a directed verdict of acquittal for accessory after the fact to murder, as the victim was not yet dead when the assistance was provided.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for defamation, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and that the statements were protected by qualified privilege.

The plaintiff, a construction superintendent, alleged that a vendor performance management report detailing problems with his work was defamatory and had been posted on the MERX database.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that because the report may have been published on MERX to an unknown number of subscribers, it was not possible at this stage to determine if the defence of qualified privilege applied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg%.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the breathalyzer technician had formed his own reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer demand, and that he was arbitrarily detained between his arrest and the breathalyzer demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence regarding the technician's grounds and concluding that the detention was lawful under s. 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code to secure evidence.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert witness on outlaw motorcycle gangs, specifically the Hells Angels and Red Devils, in a trial where the accused allegedly attempted to forcibly remove a victim's gang-related tattoo.

The defence opposed the qualification, arguing the evidence was unnecessary, unreliable, and the officer lacked proper qualifications.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and found the officer was properly qualified based on her extensive experience.

The court ruled her evidence on gang structure and culture was necessary, but excluded her proposed testimony interpreting text messages and her evidence on tattoo removal practices that relied on inherently suspect hearsay.

The appellant, a driving instructor, appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a guilty plea, arguing the plea was not voluntary or unequivocal because he did not understand the charges due to language difficulties.

The court heard fresh evidence from the appellant, his friend who acted as an interpreter, and his former trial counsel.

The court rejected the appellant's evidence, finding that he understood the allegations and the consequences of his plea, and that his plea was both voluntary and unequivocal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial decision granting the respondent sole custody of their child, permitting relocation to Quebec, and dismissing his quantum meruit claim for a basement renovation.

The appellant also brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence regarding post-trial access disputes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer test.

The appeal was also dismissed as the appellant failed to identify any error in principle or palpable and overriding error by the trial judge.

The court noted it lacked jurisdiction over the quantum meruit claim as it exceeded $50,000, but declined to transfer it to the Court of Appeal due to the absence of any identified error.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal, and the defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract.

The dispute arose after the plaintiff issued an ultimatum regarding her husband's pay and subsequently participated in organizing a work stoppage, demanding changes to her employment duties.

The court found that while the plaintiff did not clearly resign, her actions constituted a repudiation of her employment contract, justifying the end of her employment.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The defendant's counterclaim for wrongful resignation was also dismissed, as the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff's departure caused the alleged financial losses.

The applicant hotel sought a declaration from the Superior Court of Justice that it was eligible for electricity rebates under the Ontario Rebate for Electricity Consumers Act 2016 and the Ontario Fair Hydro Plan Act.

The respondent local electricity distribution company brought a motion to stay the proceedings, arguing the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Energy Board.

The court granted the motion and stayed the application, finding that the substance of the dispute involved enforceable provisions under the Ontario Energy Board Act, granting the Board exclusive jurisdiction.

The accused, an animal rights activist, was charged with breaking and entering a mink farm with intent to commit mischief.

He admitted to trespassing and surreptitiously videotaping the animals to publicize their living conditions, but denied intending to commit mischief.

The Crown argued that the videotaping and subsequent publication of the farmer's personal information constituted mischief.

The court found that the surreptitious videotaping of a commercial property did not interfere with the lawful use of the property and caused no harm to the animals.

The accused was acquitted as the Crown failed to prove the intent to commit mischief.

The applicant mother brought a motion to determine whether the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over custody and access of the parties' child, who had been living in India with his paternal grandparents since 2018.

The court found that because the parties were pursuing a divorce and both resided in Ontario, the Divorce Act superseded the Children's Law Reform Act, granting the court jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the court found that under the CLRA, the child's last habitual residence was with his parents in Ontario, also giving the court jurisdiction.