Julianne A. Parfett

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused to police during a missing person investigation that later became a first-degree murder case.

The court found the first statement inadmissible because the police officer's notes were inadequate to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The second statement, which was video-recorded, was ruled admissible because the accused attended the police station voluntarily, the interaction was conversational, and the police did not yet have reasonable grounds to suspect the accused of a crime, meaning no caution was required.

The accused, jointly charged with first degree murder in the death of his wife, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Crown's theory was that the accused set the stage for his co-accused, with whom he was having an affair, to carry out the killing.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence regarding motive, planning and deliberation, and post-offence conduct.

The court concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence was capable of supporting the inferences sought by the Crown and dismissed the motion.

The defence counsel for Gurpreet Ronald sought to prohibit her former counsel, Mr. Bruce Engel, from testifying for the Crown, asserting solicitor-client privilege.

The court examined the validity of two waivers of privilege: a verbal waiver given on August 6, 2014, and a written waiver given on August 21, 2014, after consultation with independent counsel.

The court found the verbal waiver invalid due to the lack of independent legal advice but upheld the written waiver as valid and irrevocable, as the information had already been disclosed.

The court also clarified the scope of solicitor-client privilege, ruling that it covered communications between Ms. Ronald and Mr. Engel but not the content of Mr. Engel's subsequent conversation with co-accused Mr. Gill.

The application to prohibit testimony was dismissed.

The court issued two rulings during a murder trial.

First, it rejected the defence's argument that if one co-accused was acquitted, the other must also be acquitted based on conspiracy law, clarifying that the old common law rule for conspirators is no longer valid and, in any event, the accused were charged with murder, not conspiracy.

Second, the court denied the request to leave second-degree murder as an included offence to the jury, finding no air of reality in the evidence to support a conclusion of intentional but spontaneous killing, given the pre-meditated actions of the assailant.

The accused, Gurpreet Ronald and Bhupinderpal Gill, charged with first-degree murder, sought to edit their voluntary exculpatory statements given to police.

The Crown alleged the accused acted in concert to kill the victim.

The court reviewed legal principles for editing voluntary statements, emphasizing the balance between relevance, prejudicial effect, and the right to a fair trial in a joint proceeding.

The judge ruled that segments where the officer commented on the accused's credibility, advised them to tell the truth, or expressed opinions on co-accused's guilt should be excised as they are not probative and are prejudicial.

The accused sought an order permitting challenges for cause of prospective jurors based on race, religion, pre-trial publicity, marital infidelity, and employment bias.

The court permitted challenges for cause on the grounds of race, religion (by agreement), and pre-trial publicity, finding a realistic potential for bias that might prevent jurors from being impartial despite judicial instructions.

However, the court denied challenges for cause based on marital infidelity and employment bias, as the applicants failed to demonstrate widespread community bias or that potential jurors would be incapable of setting aside such biases.

The accused, jointly charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to sit with their counsel at trial rather than in the prisoner's dock.

The court reviewed the divided judicial approaches to this issue, including the Kaufman Commission's recommendation and the Ontario Court of Appeal's guidance in *R. v. Lalande*.

Despite the accused presenting no particular security risks and being in custody, the application was dismissed.

The court found that practical courtroom limitations prevented the accused from being adequately visible to the jury and witnesses from the counsel table, and that any potential stigma associated with the prisoner's dock could be addressed through jury instructions.

The accused, Gurpreet Ronald, applied for severance of her charges from those of her co-accused, Bhupinderpal Gill, in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown alleged a conspiracy between the co-accused to kill Mr. Gill's wife.

Ms. Ronald sought severance due to the potential admission of evidence regarding her prior discreditable conduct, which Mr. Gill intended to use to raise reasonable doubt about his involvement.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding that the potential prejudice from the prior conduct evidence was low given the strong direct and circumstantial evidence linking Ms. Ronald to the death.

The court also determined that any potential prejudice could be mitigated by appropriate limiting jury instructions, affirming the presumption that juries follow judicial directions.

The defendants sought clarification of a trial decision regarding the quantum of overtime payable to the plaintiff, arguing that business closures and vacations should reduce the amount.

They also asked the court to revisit a finding regarding a fraudulent withdrawal of cheques.

Applying Rule 59.06(1), the court held it could only correct accidental slips or omissions.

The court found no evidence to support reducing overtime for business closures or family vacations, as the plaintiff was not cross-examined on these points.

However, the court corrected its original decision to exclude overtime for two specific vacation periods taken by the plaintiff.

The court declined to change its finding on the fraudulent cheques, noting the timeline of the cheques supported the original conclusion.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit hearsay statements of the deceased and evidence of prior discreditable conduct of the accused.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and the test for prior discreditable conduct, assessing relevance, necessity, reliability, and prejudicial effect.

Certain hearsay statements regarding the deceased's state of mind and marital unhappiness were admitted, as were some instances of the male accused's controlling behaviour.

However, vague allegations of physical abuse and a statement about visiting family were deemed unreliable and inadmissible.

The applicant, Gurpreet Ronald, sought a finding that a General Warrant issued under s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code breached s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that evidence obtained from it should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The motion alleged material non-disclosure and misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) the warrant, specifically regarding attempts to obtain DNA and the seizure of garbage.

The court found no material non-disclosure or misinformation, concluding that the information before the issuing justice was sufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Consequently, the court found no breach of s. 8 of the Charter and upheld the warrant's validity.

This decision addresses a dispute over costs following a successful motion.

The Applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the Respondent requested that costs be reserved to the trial judge.

Applying Rule 57.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles from *Intercontinental Forest Products SA v. Rugo* and *Rogers Cable TV Ltd. v. 373041Ontario Ltd.*, the court found that a trial was a virtual certainty and that the Applicant would not be substantially prejudiced by a delay.

Consequently, the court reserved the award of costs, including the basis of indemnity, to the trial judge.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by two accused, Gurpreet Ronald and Bhupinderpal Gill, who were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

The defence disputed the voluntariness of specific videotaped interviews, arguing that the accused were suspects who should have been cautioned earlier or that the interviews were conducted oppressively.

The court applied the R. v. Oickle test for voluntariness, considering promises, threats, inducements, lack of operating mind, oppressive atmosphere, and police trickery, with a focus on oppression and the timing of suspect status.

The court found that the police did not have sufficient information to consider the accused as suspects requiring caution during their initial interviews and that the later interview of Gill, while forceful, was not oppressive.

All disputed statements were found to be voluntary and admissible.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, defence counsel for co-accused Bhupinderpal Gill brought a motion to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct by Gurpreet Ronald, specifically four incidents where she brandished a kitchen knife during domestic disputes with her husband.

Gill's defence was that Ronald acted alone and the killing was spontaneous, not planned.

Ronald's counsel argued the evidence was irrelevant, not probative, and highly prejudicial.

The Crown argued for modest probative value but admission.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of planning and deliberation, but not to the identity of the killer (as Gill's non-involvement was conceded).

The court balanced probative value against prejudicial effect, finding the risk of moral prejudice low and reasoning prejudice manageable with a limiting instruction.

The application was granted, admitting the evidence solely on the issue of planning and deliberation.

The plaintiff worked as a live-in caregiver and housekeeper for the defendants, who were her sister and brother-in-law, for nine years.

After her employment ended, she sued for unpaid wages, overtime, unauthorized withdrawals from her bank account, and wrongful dismissal.

The court found that the limitation period did not bar her claims due to fraudulent concealment and her inability to discover the underpayments.

The court determined she was dismissed without cause, awarded 10 months' reasonable notice, ordered repayment of unauthorized withdrawals made under a power of attorney, and found she was entitled to overtime pay for working 58 hours per week.

Claims for punitive damages and a higher oral contract salary were dismissed.

The moving party, operator of an annual wine and food festival, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the responding party convention centre from licensing its venue to other parties during the first two weekends of November in 2016 and 2017.

The parties had failed to conclude a licensing agreement for 2016 due to a dispute over unpaid invoices from the 2015 event.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any increased costs or reduced revenues from holding the festival at an alternative venue would be compensable in damages.

The balance of convenience also favoured the responding party, who had already booked other events for the disputed dates.

The parties were unable to reach an agreement on costs following an application for leave to appeal an interim order.

The applicant in the main action was the successful respondent on the leave application.

Applying the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, and considering the factors under Rule 24(11), the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $2,700 to the successful party.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of a general warrant that led to the collection of her DNA.

The applicant argued that the police failed to disclose opportunities to collect cast-off DNA without a warrant, which undermined the precondition that the warrant was in the best interests of the administration of justice.

The court applied the Garofoli test and granted leave, finding that cross-examination on the availability of cast-off DNA was necessary to ensure the applicant's right to make full answer and defence.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion requesting that the trial judge disqualify herself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant argued that comments made by the judge during the applicant's bail hearing and in the reasons for decision demonstrated negative conclusions about the applicant's character.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the comments were made in the context of assessing the evidence for the bail hearing and did not demonstrate a predisposition or prejudgment of the critical issues for the upcoming jury trial.

The applicant corporation sought to discontinue its claim against the defendant lessor.

The defendant by counterclaim, Ms. Gala, opposed the discontinuance and brought a cross-motion for leave to continue the action in the applicant's name under the Business Corporations Act.

The court found that Ms. Gala was neither a director nor a 'deemed director' of the applicant, and therefore lacked standing to initiate or continue the action on its behalf.

The applicant was granted leave to discontinue the action, and the cross-motion was dismissed.