Julianne A. Parfett

The appellant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that set aside a default divorce judgment but upheld terms regarding spousal support and the sale of a property.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate a conflicting decision based on differing legal principles, and failed to show good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The court also noted the issues were not of general public importance.

The respondent brought a motion seeking suspension of both spousal and child support pending resolution of family property and financial issues, and an order for the sale of certain properties.

The applicant opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion seeking reinstatement of support, an interim disbursement for a forensic accountant, and the addition of a third party co-owner of certain recreational properties.

The court held that disputes over alleged misuse of company funds, property sales, and household expenses were matters for equalization and financial accounting rather than grounds to suspend support obligations.

The court also found the third-party co-owner should be added to assist in resolving property-related financial issues.

The request to suspend support was dismissed and the parties were ordered to retain an accountant to analyze their financial affairs.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to terminate child support for his two adult children.

He argued that his income had decreased, that the children refused to have a relationship with him, and that the motion judge breached procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no breach of natural justice, no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no material change in financial circumstances, and no error in relying on a psychologist's report which concluded the father's own abusive behaviour caused the estrangement.

The applicant children’s aid society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding concerning a young child.

The society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection due to risks of physical and emotional harm arising from the father’s long history of aggressive, threatening, and unstable behaviour, including threats against the mother, authorities, and others.

Expert psychiatric evidence raised concerns regarding personality disorders and the father’s inability to comply with authority or accept limits.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring trial and that summary judgment was appropriate under the Family Law Rules, applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The child was found to be in need of protection, sole custody was granted to the mother, and the father’s access was terminated.

The Crown applied under s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code to retain a seized laptop hard drive for further investigation, while the respondent sought its return, alleging a warrantless seizure in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

The police had seized the laptop from the respondent as he left a residence that was subject to a search warrant for child pornography.

The court found the arrest was unlawful and the seizure warrantless, but held the seizure was reasonable due to exigent circumstances, specifically the imminent risk of evidence destruction.

The court granted a 12-month extension for the detention of the hard drive, finding the investigation complex due to the ongoing efforts to decrypt the 26-digit alphanumeric password.

The Crown appealed two summary conviction decisions declining to impose the mandatory victim surcharge after relying on an earlier Ontario Court of Justice decision finding the provision unconstitutional.

The appeal turned on whether the Ontario Court of Justice could effectively apply that prior ruling without giving the Crown meaningful opportunity to make submissions on the constitutional issue.

The court held that although formal notice need not be required in every recurring case, the Crown must still receive sufficient opportunity to argue the validity of the legislation.

Because that procedural fairness requirement was not met, the waivers were set aside and the matters were remitted for a proper hearing.

The accused was tried on child pornography offences arising from files found on a LimeWire-enabled computer in a shared residence.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework, rejected the accused's evidence that his roommate was the true user, and found on circumstantial and forensic evidence that the accused was the sole user of the computer and had constructive possession of the files.

However, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew, or was wilfully blind to the fact, that LimeWire was a file-sharing program that made files available to others.

Convictions were entered on two possession counts, the accessing count was dismissed, and the accused was acquitted on making child pornography available.

On a family law motion to change a final order, the applicant sought joint custody, an expanded parenting schedule, and corresponding child support changes.

Applying the best interests of the child test under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the parties were unable to co-parent and ordered that the respondent retain sole custody and final decision-making authority.

The court declined to alter the existing schedule immediately, but prospectively ordered a week on/week off shared parenting arrangement beginning in May 2015 in light of expected changes to the respondent’s employment circumstances.

Child support remained unchanged until May 1, 2015, after which offset guideline support would apply, and section 7 expenses were to be shared proportionately to income.

The offender, a former teacher, was convicted of historical sexual offences (indecent assault, gross indecency, buggery) against two of his former students.

At sentencing, the Crown sought to admit extrinsic evidence of similar discreditable conduct involving other students, which the court admitted for the limited purpose of assessing the offender's character.

The court found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the serious breach of trust and the aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, along with ancillary orders including a weapons prohibition and a SOIRA order.

The respondents sought costs following the dismissal of the applicant's judicial review application.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the litigation was duplicative, vexatious, and involved unfounded allegations of bias.

The applicant argued for modest costs to accommodate access to justice.

The Divisional Court agreed with the respondents, finding the judicial review replicated previous litigation and was entirely unfounded.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $15,000 to the Swan respondents and $8,088.46 to the University of Western Ontario.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to limit the Crown’s ability to cross‑examine him on his criminal record if he testified.

The defence requested that assault convictions be excluded and robbery convictions be characterized as thefts.

The court reviewed the principles governing the admissibility of prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and the balancing framework from R. v. Corbett.

Given the defence’s extensive reliance on the complainant’s criminal record, the relevance of the accused’s record to credibility, and the need to avoid presenting a distorted picture to the jury, the court declined to edit the record.

The accused’s criminal record was therefore admissible in full, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

Following a family law motion concerning custody, child support, and spousal support, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The court applied Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, noting that success on the motion was divided but the respondent was slightly more successful.

The court considered settlement offers, expert report expenses related to income determination, and the reasonableness of legal fees.

The court held that the applicant should bear the full cost of the respondent’s expert report but discounted some legal fees due to duplication caused by a change of counsel.

Costs were fixed with partial indemnity legal fees and disbursements included.

The Town of Oakville sought judicial review of an Ontario Municipal Board decision that permitted a temporary change of use for two commercial properties to be farmed, providing a tax benefit.

The temporary change expired before the hearing, and the respondents did not appear.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the application, finding the matter moot and noting that deciding a case with broad policy implications without adversarial submissions would breach procedural fairness.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding child support and section 7 expenses for two disabled children.

The Divisional Court found the application judge erred in concluding the older child, who resided full-time in a care facility, had withdrawn from parental control and was not a child of the marriage.

The court also found the judge misapprehended the evidence regarding respite care subsidies for the younger child.

The matter was remitted to the application judge to recalculate the section 7 expenses and arrears.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her discrimination complaint against her university and an arbitrator.

The applicant alleged that the arbitrator's report, which found her harassment allegations unfounded, was discriminatory and that the arbitrator lost adjudicative immunity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it to be a duplicative and meritless attempt to relitigate previous findings, and upheld the HRTO's conclusions on reasonable prospect and adjudicative immunity.

The tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating their tenancy and evicting them for committing an illegal act (breach of zoning by-law).

The Divisional Court found the Board erred by reversing the onus of proof regarding the zoning issue when there was no evidence the cabin was in the prohibited zone.

Furthermore, the Board erred in law by failing to dismiss the eviction application under s. 83(3) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court found the eviction application was brought because the tenants had successfully enforced their legal rights to resist an illegal rent increase, which mandates refusal of the eviction regardless of the landlord's good or bad faith.

The appeal was allowed and the eviction application dismissed.

The defendant physician sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment on the basis that the claim against him was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The underlying malpractice action concerned a stroke allegedly resulting from negligent emergency room treatment and subsequent consultation with a neurologist.

The motions judge had concluded that the summary judgment motion was premature due to uncertainty surrounding expert evidence relevant to discoverability of the claim.

On the leave motion, the court held that the earlier judge properly understood and applied the principles governing summary judgment and discoverability, including those articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch and Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court found no conflicting legal test and no serious reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, and therefore declined to grant leave to appeal.

During a jury trial for historical sexual assault involving a teacher and two former students, the court made four evidentiary rulings.

The court ordered the disclosure of unedited psychologist notes to the defence since the witness would use them to refresh his memory.

The court allowed the Crown to adduce some, but not all, evidence of uncharged discreditable conduct to complete the narrative of the relationship.

The court permitted a retired psychologist to testify based on past recollection recorded to explain the complainant's actions.

Finally, the court allowed the Crown to call the complainant's wife to rebut an implicit allegation of recent fabrication arising from the defence's cross-examination regarding the complainant's deteriorating memory.

On a voir dire in a sexual assault prosecution, the Crown sought admission of two videotaped police interviews with the accused.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to inducements, oppression, police persistence despite repeated assertions of the right to silence, and attempts to undermine counsel’s advice.

Applying the confessions rule from R. v. Oickle and related jurisprudence, the court assessed threats or inducements, oppression, and the accused’s ability to exercise a meaningful choice to speak.

Although certain police tactics raised concerns, including repeated questioning after assertions of silence and comments undermining counsel, the court found no nexus between those tactics and the accused’s decision to speak.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that both statements were voluntary and admissible.

During a jury trial for historical sexual assault involving two complainants, the Crown sought to admit the evidence of each complainant as similar fact evidence on the counts relating to the other.

Applying the framework from R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighed its potential prejudicial effect.

Although certain similarities existed, including allegations of sexual acts occurring after the accused provided alcohol and took students to private residences, the court found significant dissimilarities in the nature of the interactions and the presence or absence of grooming behaviour.

The court also noted the fifteen‑year gap between the allegations.

These differences undermined any meaningful unity between the incidents.

The court concluded that the probative value did not outweigh the potential prejudice and refused to admit the evidence as similar fact evidence.