Julianne A. Parfett

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking retroactive variation of child support, payment of section 7 expenses, termination of spousal support, and changes to custody and access including a week‑on/week‑off regime and decision‑making authority over daycare and education.

The respondent brought a cross‑motion seeking sole custody or, alternatively, final decision‑making authority over daycare and education, variation of child support, and clarification of section 7 expense contributions.

The court determined that the applicant did not meet the 40% threshold required for a shared custody set‑off under s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines and ordered table child support payable by the applicant.

The court accepted the respondent’s expert accounting evidence regarding income and rejected the applicant’s expert report as unreliable.

Joint custody and the existing parenting schedule were maintained, with after‑school care to occur at home with a nanny.

The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal criminal convictions entered following guilty pleas, arguing he was unaware that the convictions would trigger deportation proceedings under immigration law.

Applying the factors governing extensions of time for criminal appeals, the court considered whether the applicant had a bona fide intention to appeal, whether the delay was adequately explained, and whether the proposed appeal had merit.

The court found that the applicant only became aware of the immigration consequences months after the conviction and reasonably formed an intention to appeal once informed of the risk of deportation.

Although the applicant initially benefited from the plea and some factors weighed against relief, the court concluded that the potential deportation consequences and possible issues with the voluntariness and unequivocal nature of the plea raised an arguable appeal.

The extension of time to file a notice of appeal was granted.

The applicant brought a motion seeking to eliminate child support arrears and ongoing support obligations, deny spousal support to the respondent, enforce payment of an equalization amount, compel mortgage disclosure, and dismiss the respondent’s cross‑motion.

The respondent sought enforcement of child support, a stay of the equalization payment due to financial hardship, clarification of earlier costs awards, and spousal support.

The court fixed child support arrears based on prior orders, ordered ongoing offset child support, and directed disclosure of mortgage statements.

Arrears were set off against the equalization payment owed to the applicant.

The court temporarily stayed enforcement of the equalization payment to allow the respondent time to sell the matrimonial home and denied the claim for spousal support.

The court determined the issue of costs following a family law proceeding where the parties were unable to reach agreement.

Under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs.

The applicant was wholly successful and sought recovery of her legal costs.

After considering the factors in Rule 24(11), including the complexity and importance of the issues, counsel’s rates, and time spent, the court concluded that partial indemnity costs were appropriate.

The court reduced the amount claimed after finding that some preparation time appeared excessive and fixed total costs at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following litigation concerning the resignation of a trustee and the mechanism for appointing replacement trustees under a family trust, the court determined the issue of costs.

Competing groups of beneficiaries had disputed whether the court should appoint an institutional trustee or whether the mechanism set out in the testator’s will should govern.

Although one group succeeded on the substantive issue, the court held the cross-application seeking an independent trustee was reasonably necessary to ensure proper administration of the estate.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles governing estate litigation costs, the court concluded that fairness and the importance of the issues justified payment of most parties’ costs from the estate.

The court fixed specific amounts payable to each party.

Two non-parties sought costs following a summary judgment motion brought by the defendant seeking dismissal of part of the plaintiff’s claim relating to subcontractors.

The defendant had initially served the non-parties but abandoned the motion as against them shortly before the hearing.

The non-parties argued they incurred preparation costs due to the defendant’s tactical decision to include them.

The court held that it was not inappropriate for the defendant to join the non-parties at the time and noted that the non-parties did not file responding materials or participate in the motion.

In the circumstances, the court declined to award costs against the defendant.

The accused brought a motion to sever one robbery count from a fourteen-count indictment alleging multiple robberies and attempted robberies of convenience stores over several months.

The defence argued that the later robbery count lacked a sufficient legal and factual nexus to the earlier incidents and that trying all counts together would cause unfair prejudice.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting substantial similarities between the incidents and indicating an intention to rely on similar fact evidence across the counts.

Applying the factors from R. v. Last, the court held that the Crown had a viable similar fact argument and that the similarities among the robberies established a sufficient nexus.

The court concluded that any risk of prejudice could be mitigated through appropriate jury instructions and dismissed the severance application.

The applicant and respondent separated in 2006.

In 2009, the respondent, who suffers from bipolar disorder, drafted a separation agreement using an online template, which both parties signed without legal advice.

The applicant later sought to enforce the agreement, and the respondent sought to set it aside, arguing he lacked mental capacity due to his disorder and substance abuse, and citing a lack of financial disclosure and legal advice.

The court found no material non-disclosure, as the primary assets were known to both parties.

The court also found that the respondent was competent when he drafted the agreement, his vulnerability was not exploited by the applicant, and the agreement was not unconscionable.

The application to set aside the separation agreement was dismissed.

The defendant Crown brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of claims advanced by a general contractor on behalf of subcontractors arising from delays in a federal construction project.

The Crown argued that the subcontractors lacked privity of contract with the owner, that the contractor had not itself suffered damages, and that the claims were barred by limitation periods and lack of contractual notice.

The court held that the contractual scheme contemplated subcontracting and permitted the contractor to pursue delay damages that included sums payable to subcontractors where liability rested with the owner.

The absence of direct contractual privity between subcontractors and the owner was not a bar where the contractor’s contract allowed recovery of such costs and the subcontract conditioned payment on recovery from the owner.

The court concluded that the subcontractor claims raised a reasonable cause of action and that genuine issues required a trial.

Decision on costs following a family law motion concerning clarification of a prior court decision relating to child support.

The successful party sought recovery of litigation expenses, while the opposing party argued each side should bear their own costs.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court reaffirmed the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs and considered factors including the parties’ conduct and the simplicity of the issues.

The court found the moving party’s conduct had contributed to unnecessary litigation by delaying and failing to pay child support obligations.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the successful party.

Following a family law trial involving custody, access, child and spousal support, and property equalization, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The successful party sought recovery of legal costs after obtaining favourable results on most issues.

The court applied the Family Law Rules, including the presumption under Rule 24(1) that a successful party is entitled to costs and considered the impact of settlement offers under Rule 18.

The court found that the moving party’s settlement offers were more favourable than the trial outcome and therefore justified recovery of costs from the date of the offer.

Considering proportionality and the respondent’s financial circumstances, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant sought to resign as trustee of a family trust.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a cross-application to appoint a new independent trustee, arguing that the settlor's children, who intended to appoint themselves as trustees pursuant to the trust agreement, had abused their discretion as directors of the trust's holding company.

The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion that would justify interfering under s. 5(1) of the Trustee Act, and held that the executors could appoint the next trustees pursuant to the trust agreement.

In a first-degree murder prosecution, the Crown brought a Mohan application seeking to qualify a forensic psychiatrist as an expert to give opinion evidence regarding automatism.

The defence argued that the proposed expert’s methodology lacked reliability and that prior judicial criticism of his opinions should preclude qualification.

The court reviewed the admissibility criteria for expert evidence set out in R. v. Mohan, including relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary rule, and proper qualification.

While acknowledging some concerns about the expert’s prior reports and methodology, the court found that he possessed sufficient expertise in forensic psychiatry and that automatism is primarily a legal concept closely related to dissociative states recognized in psychiatry.

The expert was therefore qualified to give opinion evidence in forensic psychiatry, including on the issue of automatism.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to multiple offences including possession of weapons, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a firearm while prohibited, resisting arrest, dangerous driving, impaired driving over 80, and possession of stolen property, along with a trial conviction for the lesser included offence of theft after an acquittal on robbery.

The offences involved the accused stealing property while armed with a loaded rifle, carrying additional weapons, and fleeing police on a stolen ATV while impaired.

The court emphasized aggravating factors including the possession of a loaded firearm while under a weapons prohibition order, dangerous driving toward a police officer, and a significant criminal record.

Limited mitigating factors included guilty pleas and some attempts at rehabilitation for substance abuse.

The court imposed a global custodial sentence and granted partial credit for time spent under strict bail conditions in a residential treatment program.

A preliminary issue arose on a summary judgment motion regarding whether a party could reference the opinion and recommendations of an evaluator retained by the parties during a dispute resolution process connected to a construction project.

The moving party argued that the communications were protected by mediation confidentiality under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that regardless of the label applied to the process, the communications formed part of settlement discussions intended to resolve a litigious dispute and were therefore subject to settlement privilege.

The evaluator’s reports and recommendations, and any related documentation, were found to be privileged and inadmissible.

Portions of an affidavit referencing those materials were ordered struck.

The Crown sought certiorari review of a preliminary inquiry decision that discharged the accused on a charge of first degree murder but committed him to stand trial for second degree murder.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry justice exceeded jurisdiction by failing to consider the whole of the evidence and by rejecting inferences of planning and deliberation.

The reviewing court held that certiorari review is limited to jurisdictional errors and does not permit reconsideration of evidentiary inferences where the preliminary inquiry judge has considered the evidence.

The record showed the preliminary inquiry justice reviewed the evidence and expressly rejected the Crown’s proposed inferences.

Accordingly, no jurisdictional error occurred and the application was dismissed.

The accused was tried on four counts of sexual assault causing bodily harm under s. 272(2) of the Criminal Code and four counts of sexual interference under s. 152.

The complainant, a ten‑year‑old child at the time of the events, provided a videotaped statement admitted pursuant to s. 715 and testified at trial describing repeated sexual assaults by her step‑father during a holiday visit.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of a child witness in accordance with governing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, emphasizing that inconsistencies on peripheral details do not undermine core reliability.

The complainant’s account was supported by corroborative evidence including medical findings of penetrating trauma, DNA evidence, photographs consistent with her descriptions, and testimony concerning behavioural changes and disclosure.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable and concluded the Crown had proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of sexual assault against a child, the court ruled on the admissibility of post-offence conduct evidence.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused’s attempted suicide, statements made to a family member, and subsequent violent acts including a carjacking and homicide to demonstrate consciousness of guilt.

The court held that the attempted suicide and contemporaneous statements were relevant circumstantial evidence capable of supporting an inference of consciousness of guilt when viewed in the context of the confrontation following the allegation.

However, the later carjacking and homicide lacked a logical connection to the alleged sexual assaults and their prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

Those latter events were ruled inadmissible.

The offender was sentenced following a jury conviction on two counts of assault causing bodily harm arising from an unprovoked bar-related attack on two victims.

One victim was rendered unconscious by a single punch and later died, although the offender was convicted only of assault causing bodily harm for the loss of consciousness.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the premeditated nature of the assaults, the vulnerability of the intoxicated victim, and the offender’s lack of remorse.

While youth and the absence of a criminal record at the time of the offence were mitigating factors, the seriousness and moral blameworthiness of the conduct required incarceration.

A custodial sentence of 24 months less a day followed by probation was imposed.

Two companies providing online boating certification courses brought competing applications alleging breach of a settlement agreement that resolved prior trademark litigation.

One party alleged the other breached the agreement by using translated variations of prohibited trademark phrases in website metatags, while the other alleged breach through acceptance of prepaid vouchers issued by it.

The court held that the settlement agreement’s prohibition on using certain phrases extended to translations such as “boat exam” and “boating exam,” and ordered the respondent to cease using them.

However, the court found that a five‑day delay in ceasing to honour prepaid vouchers constituted performance within a reasonable time where the agreement specified no deadline.