R. v. Ronald, 2016 ONSC 4649
CITATION: R. v. Ronald, 2016 ONSC 4649
COURT FILE NO.: CR14-2310
DATE: 2016/07/18
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
Gurpreet Ronald and Bhupinderpal Gill
Defendants
COUNSEL:
Brian Holowka and Jason Neubauer, for the Crown
Michael Smith and Jessica Abou-Eid, for the Defendant, Gurpreet Ronald
James Harbic and Robert Harbic, for the Defendant Bhupinderpal Gill
HEARD: June 24, 2016
Ruling RE motion for directed verdict
Parfett J.
[1] Defence counsel for Bhupinderpal Gill applies for a directed verdict of acquittal on the basis there is no evidence upon which a reasonably instructed jury could convict his client.
Background
[2] Bhupinderpal Gill and his co-accused, Gurpreet Ronald are jointly charged with the first degree murder of Mr. Gill’s wife, Jagtar Gill.
[3] On January 29, 2014, Jagtar Gill was found dead in her residence in Barrhaven, Ontario. She had been bludgeoned, stabbed and her throat cut. Mr. Gill was not in the house when his wife was killed. During the investigation, the police learned that Mr. Gill and Ms. Ronald, both OC Transpo bus drivers, had been carrying on a long-standing affair. They also discovered that Ms. Ronald had left her DNA at the scene in the form of blood found on a piece of a Nitrile glove left at the scene. Her blood was found in other places in the Gill residence.
[4] As set out in detail below, other information received led the police to believe that Mr. Gill had assisted Ms. Ronald to kill his wife.
Issue
[5] The issue on this motion is a simple one: is there sufficient evidence before this jury such that they could, if properly instructed, convict?
Legal Principles
[6] The test for a directed verdict is the same as the test for committal for trial after a preliminary inquiry.[^1] The test is set out in United States of America v. Shephard,[^2] and is as follows: “whether or not there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty”.[^3] Stated in another fashion the question is whether “there is admissible evidence which could, if it were believed, result in a conviction.”
[7] The Supreme Court emphasised in R. v. Charemski,[^4] that “the Crown must adduce some evidence of culpability for every essential element of the crime for which the Crown has the evidential burden”. Failure to do so will require the trial judge to direct a verdict of acquittal. This is a low threshold, and will be satisfied by a scintilla of evidence.[^5]
Drawing inferences
[8] The process of drawing inferences involves deriving “conclusions based on the uniformity of prior human experience”.[^6] A reasonable inference need not be a likely or probable inference: “Difficult inferences to draw may still nonetheless be reasonable”.[^7]
[9] While the judge must draw the inferences most favourable to the Crown, the judge must not engage in speculation. As Justice Ducharme notes in Munoz, “[a]ny inferences relied upon by the judge to commit the accused must be both: (1) reasonably based on the evidence heard… and (2) reasonable. Such inferences cannot be based on speculation, no matter how seemingly reasonable.”[^8] If the primary facts are not supported by the evidence, or the conclusion cannot be reasonably or logically drawn from these facts, then drawing the requested inference would be speculation.[^9]
[10] Where there is an inferential gap, it can only be properly overcome by evidence. For example, in United States of America v. Huynh, the Court of Appeal found that while drug trafficking came readily to mind as a possible source for the funds in question, the lack of any evidence linking the funds to trafficking left an inferential gap. Without evidence, bridging this gap would be an exercise of speculation.[^10]
[11] After the fact conduct of an accused can support an inference that the accused was involved in the alleged offence, but can only be considered by the jury to determine the level of culpability if they provide a reasonable inference as to the nature of that participation or the accused’s state of mind at the relevant time.[^11] The judge will need to make the determination on the facts that have been presented.
Analysis
[12] The Crown’s theory is that Mr. Gill set the stage for Ms. Ronald to carry out the killing of Jagtar Gill. Consequently, there are two key areas of the Crown’s case: motive and planning and deliberation.
Motive
[13] It is conceded by both parties that they had had a long-standing relationship. The evidence presented by the Crown in relation to motive is:
- Susanne Shields testified that in April 2012 Mr. Gill told her he hated his wife and would do anything to be with Ms. Ronald;
- Ms. Shields also indicated that Mr. Gill told her divorce was not an option for him;
- Ms. Shields stated that Mr. Gill did not treat his wife with respect;
- Scott Fewer testified that he observed that Mr. Gill did not treat his wife very well; and
- Barbara Reynolds indicated that Jagtar Gill had said her marriage was unhappy and that divorce was also not an option for her as she did not want to hurt her children.
[14] Some of this information is dated. Mr. Gill stated to police that the relationship with Ms. Ronald was over as of the fall of 2013. He also stated he had become aware that Ms. Ronald was seeing another man. However, there is other evidence suggesting the relationship was still ongoing into January 2014. Scott Fewer testified that the relationship was ongoing as late as October 2013 and he saw no diminution in the warmth between the two accused. The evidence of the second affair overlaps the time period when Mr. Gill stated his affair with Ms. Ronald was still ongoing. Finally, the frequency of calls between Mr. Gill and Ms. Ronald – as much as ten calls a day – does not change between September 2013 and January 2014.
Planning and Deliberation
[15] Crown called evidence in relation to planning and deliberation. It is as follows:
- The weight-lifting bar used in the killing was owned and used exclusively by Mr. Gill. He knew where it was kept and stated to police it was always in the basement. He indicated in his last statement to police that he stored the bar with the weights on it. The four stoppers and two weights had all been removed and there is no evidence of blood on the stoppers or weights;
- Evidence of two lengthy phone calls between Mr. Gill and Ms. Ronald on January 9^th^ – the day Jagtar Gill’s surgery date was fixed. Also a second very lengthy call on January 10^th^, 2014;
- Jagtar Gill was left alone in the house. Mr. Gill persuaded his daughter, Dilpreet to come with him despite her desire to stay with her mother;
- The front door was left unlocked;
- Jagtar Gill was in a highly vulnerable physical condition after surgery on the previous day;
- Mr. Gill drove past Ms. Ronald’s home immediately after leaving his home. Ms. Ronald was standing at the window. A phone call from Ms. Ronald to Mr. Gill followed shortly afterwards;
- There are two other calls to Mr. Gill from Ms. Ronald made just before 12:52pm when Ms. Ronald attends at the Sobey’s store; and
- Ms. Ronald goes to the Sobey’s store, meets Mr. Gill there, and there is a short, private conversation between them.
Post Offence Conduct
[16] Finally, Crown presented evidence of post offence conduct that they allege is evidence of Mr. Gill’s involvement. It is:
- Mr. Gill removed two knives and the weight-lifting bar from the vicinity of the scene before the first responders arrived on scene;
- Mr. Gill cleaned the knives;
- Mr. Gill did not tell the police in the first interview that he moved the knives or the bar;
- Mr. Gill did not tell police in his second interview that he removed the weight-lifting bar from the scene and hid it in the basement;
- Mr. Gill ultimately disposed of the bar;
- Mr. Gill only reluctantly told police about moving the bar in his third statement; and
- Mr. Gill did not tell police about his affair with Ms. Ronald until the third interview. He was counselled to tell the police about the affair by Scott Fewer the day after his wife’s death;
[17] There is other evidence presented by the Crown that could have some bearing on the issue of Mr. Gill’s involvement in his wife’s death. It is:
- The frequency of calls between Mr. Gill and Ms. Ronald diminishes significantly after January 29^th^, 2014;
- However, Mr. Gill continues to visit Ms. Ronald’s house;
- Ms. Ronald calls Mr. Gill immediately after receiving a note on her windshield saying ‘killer’ and also after receiving information she has to provide a blood sample to police. Police planted the note and planned the call in order to observe the reaction of the accused;
- The second person Ms. Ronald asks her lawyer to call after her arrest is Mr. Gill. She did not tell the lawyer Mr. Gill was the husband of the deceased; and
- Mr. Gill makes a call to a family member, in which he tells them Ms. Ronald has been arrested. He does not express astonishment; he does indicate that there is no reason to ‘panic’ yet.
Conclusion
[18] In my view, many of these items of evidence are individually capable of supporting inferences of ‘non-guilt’. However, at this stage of the process the issue is whether these items of evidence are capable of supporting the inferences sought by the Crown. They are. The second issue is whether in that case, the cumulative effect of the evidence is such that there is some evidence of Mr. Gill’s involvement in the killing of his wife. There is. Consequently, the motion for directed verdict is dismissed.
Madam Justice Julianne Parfett
Released: July 18, 2016
CITATION: R. v. Ronald, 2016 ONSC 4649
COURT FILE NO.: CR14-2310
DATE: 2016/07/18
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
Gurpreet Ronald and Bhupinderpal Gill
Defendants
Ruling re Motion for directed verdict
Parfett J.
Released: July 18, 2016
[^1]: R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 828, at para. 21. [^2]: [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1067. [^3]: at p. 1080. [^4]: [1998] 1 S.C.R. 679, at para. 3. [^5]: See e.g. R. v. Hickey, 2007 ONCA 845, at para. 5. [^6]: Munoz, at para. 23. [^7]: Dwyer, at para. 4; see also R. v. Katwaru (2001), 52 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.), at para. 40. [^8]: Munoz, at para. 22. [^9]: at paras 26-28. [^10]: (2005), 202 O.A.C. 198, at para. 7. [^11]: Figueroa, supra. Note 11 at paras. 35-37, 49.