Sean Peter Bawden

The plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction to enforce non-solicitation and confidentiality agreements against a former shareholder, alleging breach of contract and misuse of confidential information.

The court dismissed the injunction motion, finding insufficient evidence of irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favored the defendants.

The court noted that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate actual breach or imminent harm, and that the requested relief was an overreach that would unfairly impact the defendant's livelihood.

The plaintiffs sought an urgent motion for an interim injunction against a former owner for alleged breach of a non-solicitation agreement.

The court, having found urgency, held a case conference to establish a timetable for the motion, emphasizing the need for a full record and encouraging settlement.

A schedule for serving motion records, responding affidavits, cross-examinations, and filing materials was set, with the motion for interim injunction returnable on June 15, 2023.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion by The Canada Soccer Association Incorporated (Canada Soccer) for an interim stay of an arbitral award and a cross-motion by Association de Soccer de Brossard (ASB) to enforce the award.

The court had previously dismissed Canada Soccer's motion and granted ASB's cross-motion.

In this endorsement, ASB sought substantial indemnity costs, while Canada Soccer argued for its own costs due to alleged bad faith by ASB or deferral of costs to the application judge.

The court found no evidence of bad faith by ASB and declined to defer costs.

It awarded ASB partial indemnity costs up to the date of its Rule 49.10 offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, totaling $65,367.25, to be paid within 30 days.

The defendants were successful in setting aside an ex-parte Mareva injunction after their marital situation changed, eliminating the risk of them fleeing the jurisdiction.

The defendants sought costs as the successful party, while the plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded due to the defendants' conduct complicating the litigation.

The court applied Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the defendants unnecessarily complicated the matter by litigating the sale of the matrimonial home.

Furthermore, the injunction was set aside due to changed circumstances, not any failure by the plaintiff.

The court ordered that no costs be awarded to either party.

A real estate investment management company appealed a trial judge's decision finding that it had repudiated its contract with a real estate broker and his operating company.

The trial judge found that the company had recruited the broker to undertake higher-value transactions in Ottawa but then repudiated the agreement by unilaterally imposing a $10 million ceiling on transactions and reserving transactions above that amount exclusively to its National Retail Investment Group.

The appellate court upheld the repudiation finding, holding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test and made no palpable and overriding error.

The respondents cross-appealed the costs award, and the appellate court granted leave and allowed the cross-appeal, increasing costs from $40,000 to $111,288 based on the rule 49.10(1) offer to settle.

The plaintiffs, a commercial real estate broker and his company, brought an action against the defendant brokerage firm seeking a declaration that their independent contractor agreement was terminated without cause, thereby forgiving a $225,000 loan.

The defendant counterclaimed for repayment of the loan, alleging the plaintiff terminated the agreement or was terminated for default.

The court rectified the agreement to include a mistakenly omitted provision regarding the plaintiff's leadership role and analyzed the interpretation of the plaintiff's role as the Ottawa Practice Lead for investments, finding that no strict $10 million ceiling was placed on the plaintiff's transactions.

An application for wrongful dismissal where the enforceability of a termination clause limiting notice to Employment Standards Act minimums was at issue, along with the effect of an erroneous initial termination and subsequent re-hiring.

The court found the termination clause enforceable, supported by consideration.

It ruled that the initial termination was effective, but the employee's immediate re-hiring occurred under the same contractual terms.

The applicant was awarded seven weeks' notice under the ESA, plus benefits and mobile phone costs, significantly less than the nine months' common law notice sought.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application.

He alleged his former employer, the Ottawa Catholic School Board, failed to accommodate his return to work from a medical leave by improperly requiring him to attend an independent medical examination (IME).

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably concluded that the employer had a bona fide reason to question the treating physician's medical information and was justified in requesting an IME.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's refusal to admit post-application evidence regarding the accommodation process.

The applicant, a child with autism and secondary disabilities, alleged discrimination in the provision of services after being discharged from an intensive behavioural intervention program.

The respondents, Kinark Child and Family Services and the Ministry of Children and Youth Services, requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed the application against the Ministry, finding no allegations of specific acts that disadvantaged the applicant on the basis of disability.

However, the Tribunal denied Kinark's request to dismiss, as the applicant alleged the testing used for discharge failed to accommodate her secondary disabilities, which required a hearing on the merits to resolve.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs following their successful motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The defendant, Mr. Cabezas, argued that costs should be reserved for the trial judge or significantly reduced.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered costs in the cause.

The decision emphasized that it is generally preferable to reserve costs for interlocutory injunctions to the trial judge, given the absence of a final determination of rights and the plaintiff's undertaking as to damages.

Conflicting positions on factual complexity and proportionality also made it difficult to fix costs at this stage.

The Plaintiffs, Accreditation Canada International and Accreditation Canada, brought a motion to extend and vary an interlocutory injunction against former employees, José Luis Cabezas Guerra and Bieu (Marty) Van Huynh, and their company, Efficiency on Health Services Canada Inc. The Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and confidence due to the Defendants' use of confidential information and solicitation of clients under misleading trade names.

The court applied the R.J.R. Macdonald test for injunctions, finding a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the Plaintiffs.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was granted.

The plaintiff employee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking determination of the reasonable notice period following termination without cause.

The employer had provided two weeks’ pay pursuant to a termination clause that both parties agreed was unenforceable.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court considered the employee’s age, short service of approximately 51 weeks, technical qualifications, management-level responsibilities, and mitigation efforts.

The court also evaluated the availability of comparable employment within the regional IT labour market.

Balancing these factors, the court determined that a reasonable notice period was four months and granted summary judgment for the employee.

The applicant sought judicial review of a tribunal decision denying accreditation as an accredited farm organization under the Farm Registration and Farm Organizations Funding Act, 1993.

The tribunal had concluded the applicant lacked standing because it did not actively represent farmers in Ontario and failed certain accreditation criteria under O. Reg. 723/93.

The court held the tribunal’s interpretation of the standing provision in s. 4(1) of the Act was unreasonable and improperly introduced additional criteria not prescribed in the legislation or regulation.

The tribunal’s focus on the applicant’s affiliation with a national organization and organizational structure was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

The court concluded the applicant met the prescribed criteria and that the tribunal had no discretion to deny accreditation once those criteria were satisfied.

The National Farmers Union - Ontario (NFU-O) applied to the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal for accreditation as a farm organization under the Farm Registration and Farm Organizations Funding Act.

The Tribunal found that the NFU-O did not have standing to apply because it did not represent farmers in the province, but rather acted as a passive legal conduit for the federally incorporated National Farmers Union (NFU) to access stable funding.

The Tribunal also found that, even if the NFU-O had standing, it failed to meet the prescribed criteria for accreditation.

The application was dismissed.

The National Farmers Union - Ontario (NFU-O) applied to the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal for accreditation as a farm organization under the Farm Registration and Farm Organizations Funding Act, 1993.

The Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs appeared in support of the application.

Due to the urgent need to finalize annual farming business registration forms, the Tribunal released its decision without reasons.

The Tribunal dismissed the NFU-O's application for accreditation, with written reasons to follow.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that the insurer wrongfully denied disability benefits under a mortgage insurance policy.

The central issue was whether the insurance coverage commenced when the borrower signed the loan offer or only when the mortgage was executed and the loan advanced.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation and reviewing the entire contractual scheme, the court held that coverage began on the later date when the mortgage was executed and the loan advanced.

Because the plaintiff became disabled before that date, she was not entitled to disability benefits under the policy.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision, arguing a trial was required for its claim that the respondent intentionally interfered with its economic relations with a tenant through the tort of nuisance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant suffered damages as a result of the respondent's conduct, particularly regarding lease renewals.