Joseph F. Kenkel

The accused was convicted of three counts of failing to comply with probation contrary to s. 733.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought an 8-month custodial sentence with 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The defence sought a time-served sentence followed by probation with 1.5:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The court imposed a 90-day custodial sentence on counts 4 and 5 concurrent, with a further 90 days on count 6 consecutive, followed by a 2-year probation term.

The court credited 71 days of pre-trial custody as 107 days pursuant to R. v. Summers.

The sentence emphasized the need for the accused to comply with court orders given his pattern of non-compliance, while also recognizing rehabilitation as a relevant sentencing principle.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit ("Over 80") after failing a roadside screening device test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results from an approved instrument to establish the accused's blood alcohol level.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the Crown failed to prove the breath demand was made "as soon as practicable" as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, thereby depriving the Crown of the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c).

The court dismissed the motion, holding that while the demand was delayed, the failure to comply with the timing requirement in section 254(3) does not render the breath test evidence inadmissible or deprive the Crown of the section 258 presumptions in the absence of a Charter application.

Media representatives applied for a copy of the Agreed Statement of Facts filed in support of guilty pleas by the accused.

The court granted the application and ordered that the Agreed Statement of Facts be provided to the media.

However, the court reminded all parties that a publication ban under s.539 of the Criminal Code applies to all common evidence heard at the preliminary hearing and continues until all parties have been discharged or completed trial, as two co-accuseds remained in ongoing preliminary hearings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so contrary to section 549(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused had been convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample in 2011 and was subject to driving restrictions including an ignition interlock requirement under the Highway Traffic Act.

The accused operated a dump truck without the required interlock device installed.

The defence conceded the Crown proved the actus reus but argued the Crown had not proven mens rea, claiming the accused was unaware of the interlock requirement over a year after his conviction.

The court found the Crown proved the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a finding of guilt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to s. 121 of the Highway Traffic Act on two grounds: (1) that he was deprived of the opportunity to make submissions or cross-examine regarding the officer's use of notes to refresh memory, and (2) that the Justice of the Peace erred in amending the speed stated in the certificate of offence to conform with trial evidence.

The court found that while the Justice of the Peace should have asked the appellant whether he wished to make submissions regarding the notes, this procedural error did not impact trial fairness.

The court also found that the amendment was properly granted under s. 34(4) of the Provincial Offences Act, as the appellant had received notice and was offered an adjournment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown applied for an adjournment of a trial for aggravated assault due to the non-attendance of the complainant, who had travelled to the Dominican Republic prior to the trial date.

The defence opposed the adjournment.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the complainant was a central witness to the case, that the Crown had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to serve the subpoena, and that there was a reasonable prospect of procuring the complainant's attendance upon her return to Canada.

The court emphasized the strong public interest in proceeding with trials on the merits in cases involving serious personal injury.

An appeal from a conviction for failing to comply with a property standards order issued pursuant to the Building Code Act.

The appellant raised four Charter grounds on appeal: trial within a reasonable time (s.11(b)), disclosure and trial fairness (s.7), cruel and unusual punishment (s.12), and equality under the law (s.15).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was primarily attributable to the appellant's own requests for adjournments and irrelevant disclosure, that disclosure was adequate, that s.12 did not apply to a conviction appeal, and that the mere fact that other bylaw violations existed did not engage s.15 equality rights.

The accused was charged with marijuana production and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

At trial, the defence sought leave to cross-examine the affiant on the search warrant to challenge its sub-facial validity.

The defence proposed questioning on five points: the specifics of observations made in April 2013, the tip from a confidential human source, the significance of Hydro readings, the significance of FLIR observations, and the absence of confirming observations on the day of arrest.

The court applied the test from R. v. Pires and found that the defence had not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination on four of the five points would assist in determining the material issue.

However, the court granted leave to cross-examine on the FLIR observation point, finding a reasonable likelihood that such cross-examination would be relevant to the material issue of whether there was a basis for the issuing justice to be satisfied there were reasonable grounds to issue the warrant.

The accused challenged the validity of a search warrant issued to search a residence suspected of containing a marijuana grow operation.

The defence argued that a nine-day gap between the last observation and the date of arrest rendered the warrant invalid and constituted a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli review and found that the Information to Obtain contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuance of the warrant, including direct observations of marijuana odour, FLIR thermal imaging showing heat anomalies, hydro consumption records indicating unusual usage patterns, and absence of occupancy indicators.

The court dismissed the application, finding the warrant was lawfully issued.

The accused was charged with seven counts of criminal harassment and failing to comply with court orders relating to unwanted contact with his former spouse.

The Crown alleged harassment through text messages and phone calls on September 26, 2012, followed by breaches of no-contact orders through emails sent under false names on October 9, 2012, collect calls from jail between October 18-25, 2012, and a letter sent on November 21, 2012.

The accused represented himself at trial and denied most allegations.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and the accused's testimony unreliable, convicting on six of seven counts.

The accused was convicted of six counts: criminal harassment, failure to comply with bail conditions (three counts), and disobey court order (two counts).

The offences arose from the accused's persistent attempts to contact his former partner following their separation, including threats of suicide and confrontation with police.

Despite police intervention, court orders, and incarceration, the accused continued to violate no-contact provisions through collect calls and letters.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 79 days (after credit for pre-trial custody) followed by two years of probation with strict conditions including no contact with the victim, a 200-metre exclusion zone, weapons prohibition, and mandatory counselling.

The accused was charged with three criminal offences related to a fire caused by an explosion of heated isopropyl alcohol during cannabis oil production in his condominium apartment, and four drug offences related to the production and possession of cannabis resin.

The court found the accused guilty of recklessly causing damage to property knowing it was occupied by others under section 433(a) of the Criminal Code.

On the drug charges, the court found the accused guilty of production of cannabis resin but acquitted him of possession for the purpose of trafficking, finding instead that his explanation regarding personal medicinal use was reasonably possible.

The court convicted the accused of simple possession of cannabis resin and simple possession of marijuana.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit after driving through a RIDE checkstop without stopping.

The defence challenged whether the investigating officer had reasonable grounds for arrest and demand, whether the accused's right to counsel was breached, and whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found reasonable grounds for the demand based on the accused's dangerous driving behaviour and observations of impairment indicators.

No breach of the right to counsel was found.

The court found the Crown proved the blood alcohol charge beyond a reasonable doubt but dismissed the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused pleaded guilty to assaulting her 10-year-old son.

The assault occurred while the accused was under the influence of alcohol and resulted in the child sustaining a nosebleed.

The accused had a prior finding of guilt for assaulting her mother.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with two years of probation, including conditions requiring continued counselling for alcoholism, parenting counselling, no contact with the complainant except as authorized by Children's Aid Society, and a five-year firearms prohibition.

The court rejected an absolute discharge despite joint submissions, finding that denunciation and deterrence were necessary given the domestic violence context and the involvement of a child.

The accused was charged with four counts of assault and one count of uttering a threat to cause death in relation to his former wife.

The court dismissed all assault counts by agreement of counsel.

The court also dismissed the uttering a threat charge, finding that the complainant's evidence was vague and lacked essential detail regarding the exact wording of the alleged threat.

The court noted the accused was highly intoxicated at the time and found the complainant had a potential motive to exaggerate her account in order to have the accused removed from the house.

All charges were dismissed as not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The accused had a significant prior record of drinking and driving offences spanning multiple decades.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 12 months.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence to be served in the community followed by 18 months of probation, with strict conditions including a nine-month curfew, electronic monitoring, abstinence from alcohol counselling, prohibition on operating a motor vehicle, and a lifetime driving prohibition.

The court found that mitigating factors, including a 17-year gap in the accused's record, successful employment, participation in counselling, and the accused's care for a dying brother, warranted a conditional sentence rather than incarceration.

The accused was charged with two counts of defrauding the Government of Canada contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused operated a business called Fiscal Arbitrators that prepared false income tax returns for numerous clients, charging fees plus a percentage of fraudulently obtained refunds.

A second count alleged similar fraud in relation to the accused's own personal tax returns.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented evidence from ten civilian witnesses whose tax returns had been prepared by Fiscal Arbitrators, as well as testimony from the lead investigator from the Canada Revenue Agency.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused to stand trial on both counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to human trafficking under section 279.01 of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved the confinement and sexual exploitation of a 15-year-old girl in foster care, whom the accused compelled to work as a prostitute for financial gain.

The accused, aged 23 with a prior criminal record including robbery convictions, had been in custody since November 21, 2012.

Both Crown and defence counsel jointly submitted that a 5-year sentence was appropriate.

The court imposed a 5-year sentence with credit for time served at a 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in approximately 33.9 months remaining to be served.

Additional orders included a 20-year SOIRA order, a lifetime section 109 prohibition order, and a DNA order.

A youth charged with armed robbery, forcible confinement, and bail violations sought release pending trial.

The Crown argued the accused posed a risk to public safety and had demonstrated inability to comply with bail conditions.

The defence proposed release to the accused's mother with assistance from his sisters, offering house arrest if necessary.

The court found that while the charges were serious and the accused had breached previous bail conditions, detention was not justified on tertiary grounds.

However, detention was necessary on secondary grounds unless strict house arrest conditions could be enforced.

The court granted release on recognizance with the mother as primary surety and both sisters as co-sureties, subject to strict house arrest conditions and prohibitions on contact with associates and attendance at specified locations.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.

The central issue at trial was whether the officer's reliance on an approved screening device (ASD) test result was objectively reasonable, given the defence argument that the officer should have waited 15 minutes before conducting the test to rule out mouth alcohol.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the ASD test and reasonable grounds for the approved instrument tests.

The defence failed to prove a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The breath tests confirmed blood alcohol levels over 80 milligrams, and the accused was found guilty.