57 total
Sentence appeal dismissed; 9-year global sentence for aggravated assault upheld as fit.
The appellant appealed his global sentence of 9 years (8 years for aggravated assault) less 3 years credit for pre-trial custody.
He argued the sentencing judge erred by inappropriately balancing his mistreatment in pre-trial custody against the severe injuries inflicted on the victim.
The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge's comments were unfortunate, he did not err in principle in exercising his discretion to assess the appropriate credit for pre-trial custody.
The sentence was fit and within the range for the offences committed.
Appeal allowed and new trial ordered due to trial judge's erroneous adverse credibility finding.
The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in finding his evidence not credible.
The trial judge's primary reason for rejecting the appellant's credibility was a finding that the appellant deliberately failed to disclose his complete criminal record.
The Court of Appeal found this was not a fair basis for rejecting the evidence, as the incomplete record was due to an inadvertent error by both Crown and defence counsel, and the appellant readily admitted the missing convictions during cross-examination.
The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.
Assault conviction quashed as not an included offence of conspiracy; unlawful confinement conviction and sentence upheld.
The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his 18-month concurrent sentences and a $400 restitution order.
The Court of Appeal quashed the assault conviction, agreeing with the Crown that assault is not an included offence of conspiracy to commit assault.
The court upheld the unlawful confinement conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings regarding coercion.
The 18-month sentence for unlawful confinement was upheld given the appellant's criminal record and role as ringleader, but the $400 restitution order was set aside because the trial judge failed to inquire into the appellant's ability to pay.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge properly contrasted trial testimony with false statement at scene, not silence.
The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used his silence as a basis for disbelieving his evidence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on silence, but rather contrasted the appellant's trial testimony with a false story he provided at the scene of the accident.
Sentences for youthful aboriginal offenders involved in a home invasion reduced on appeal.
The appellants, two youthful aboriginal offenders, were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.
On appeal, they argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the Gladue principles and erred in treating the sentencing range for home invasions as a mandatory minimum.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding the trial judge gave insufficient weight to restorative justice objectives and the recommendations of a sentencing circle.
The court varied Jacko's sentence to two years less a day conditional, given his extraordinary rehabilitative efforts, and varied Manitowabi's sentence to two years less a day in jail followed by probation.
Acquittal overturned; scraping ice off a running car with intent to drive constitutes care or control.
The respondent was acquitted at trial of having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.
The trial judge found that the respondent had started his car with a remote starter, was scraping ice off the window, had the keys in his pocket, and intended to drive away, but concluded there was no present danger because he had not entered the vehicle.
The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the acquittal.
The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact compelled the legal conclusion that the respondent was in care or control, as his conduct created an obvious risk of danger.
Stay of proceedings for police officers set aside; 56-month delay justified by case complexity.
The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay serious charges against six police officers due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.
The trial judge had attributed the 56-month delay primarily to the Crown's failure to make timely disclosure.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal for five of the officers, finding the trial judge erred in attributing the delay to disclosure issues rather than the inherent time requirements of a highly complex case.
A new trial was ordered for those five officers.
However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the sixth officer, finding the delay in his much simpler case was unreasonable because the Crown unnecessarily insisted his trial follow the complex trial of his co-accused.
Appeal allowed and conviction restored; trial judge reasonably found risk of danger from vehicle in ditch.
The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.
The trial judge had found that there was a risk of danger because the respondent might continue her journey once her vehicle was pulled from the ditch.
The Court of Appeal held that this finding was open to the trial judge on the evidence and that the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge erred in interfering with it.
The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence were restored.
Leave to appeal denied as the rebuttal of a presumption is a question of mixed fact and law.
The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision upholding the respondent's acquittal.
The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the question of whether a presumption was rebutted is one of mixed fact and law, and based on the trial judge's findings of fact, the appeal did not raise a pure question of law.
Appeal from conviction for causing unnecessary suffering to a dog dismissed.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for causing unnecessary suffering to a dog by choking it.
He argued that he was merely defending himself from unnecessary force.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was an evidentiary basis for the trial judge to reject the self-defence claim and conclude the appellant caused unnecessary suffering.
Sentence appeal allowed; 90-day intermittent sentence reduced to 20 days due to trial judge's error regarding mandatory minimums.
The appellant appealed her sentence of 90 days intermittent, probation, and a five-year driving prohibition for an impaired driving offence.
The trial judge had imposed the 90-day sentence under the mistaken belief that the appellant had two prior qualifying convictions, making 90 days the mandatory minimum.
The Crown acknowledged that the actual mandatory minimum was 14 days but argued the 90-day sentence should be sustained.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the appellant's compliance with strict bail conditions for four years, and reduced the custodial sentence to 20 days intermittent.
Appeal dismissed; appellant found to be in care and control of vehicle after crashing.
The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the summary conviction appeal judge erred in upholding the trial judge's finding that he was in care and control of his vehicle after crashing into a stone gate post.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law.
The trial judge properly concluded the appellant retained care and control based on his proximity to the vehicle, possession of the keys, declared intention to continue driving, and repeated attempts to extricate the vehicle.
Sentence appeal allowed; sentence reduced to time served.
The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal only in respect of the sentence, reducing it to time served, and ordered the section 110 order to remain.
Appeal dismissed; Court of Appeal correctly found no consent to sexual intercourse under the Criminal Code.
The appellant was acquitted at trial on two counts of sexual assault.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the acquittals and entered convictions, finding that on the admitted facts and factual findings of the trial judge, consent to sexual intercourse within the meaning of s. 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code was not given.
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion and dismissed the appeal.
Evidence that an accused's blood alcohol concentration straddled the legal limit cannot rebut the presumption of identity.
The appellant was convicted of driving over 80 after registering breathalyzer readings of 229 and 235.
At trial, the defence adduced a toxicologist's report estimating the appellant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the offence was between 0 and 95 milligrams, depending on his elimination rate.
The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court rejected this as evidence to the contrary.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the amended s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, evidence must show the blood alcohol level was below the legal limit, and evidence that merely straddles the limit is insufficient to rebut the presumption of identity.
Sentence appeal allowed and custodial sentence reduced to time served based on joint submission.
The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.
The Court of Appeal found that the sentence proposed in the joint submission was not out of the range and would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the appellant's age, record, and role in the offence.
The appeal was allowed, and the custodial sentence was reduced to time served, with the probation order remaining in place.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge properly inferred police officer was a qualified breathalyzer technician.
The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown failed to explicitly establish that the police officer who administered the breath test was a qualified technician.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to infer the officer's designation from her testimony, her official capacity, and the certificate she produced, which created a rebuttable presumption that was not challenged.
Unlawful confinement convictions quashed; sexual assault conviction and dangerous offender designation upheld.
The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.
He argued the trial judge erred by admitting out-of-court statements from a child witness, misdirecting the jury on unanimity, and refusing a mistrial.
The Court of Appeal found the child's statements were improperly admitted as the Crown failed to establish necessity, leading to the quashing of the unlawful confinement convictions.
However, the sexual assault conviction was upheld by applying the curative proviso.
The court dismissed the appeal regarding jury unanimity and the dangerous offender designation, affirming the indeterminate sentence.
Sentence appeal dismissed as the sentence was fit and free from error in principle.
The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.
The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was entirely fit in the circumstances.
Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.
Crown sentence appeal dismissed as re-incarceration was not in the interests of justice given rehabilitation.
The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was unfit.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged the sentence was at the bottom end of the range but noted the trial judge had valid reasons for it.
Even assuming the sentence was unfit, the Court held it was not in the interests of justice to re-incarcerate the respondent, citing a very positive post-sentence report, the respondent's youthfulness, and the importance of rehabilitation.
The sentence appeal was dismissed.