Jill M. Copeland

York University and York University Development Corporation (YUDC) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decision denying their request for reconsideration of an order requiring the production of certain records.

The applicants argued the Adjudicator erred in finding the records were under the control of York University pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and in her approach to the reconsideration threshold.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding the Adjudicator reasonably applied the two-part control test from National Defence and reasonably placed the onus on the applicants to establish grounds for reconsideration.

The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from an order dismissing her motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The court determined that an order dismissing a summary judgment motion is interlocutory, meaning leave to appeal is required under section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

As no leave was obtained, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The moving party brought a motion to adduce six items of additional evidence in her application for judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD).

The underlying application concerned the OIPRD's review of a police conduct complaint regarding an allegedly unlawful arrest for criminal harassment.

The Divisional Court applied the Keeprite principles for admitting new evidence on judicial review.

The court allowed the motion in part, admitting two documents that were potentially relevant to the issues on review, while excluding four documents that were either irrelevant or already in the record.

The appellant contractor appealed a summary judgment decision enforcing a stipulated remedy in a mediated settlement agreement.

The settlement required the appellant to remediate construction deficiencies by a deadline, failing which $30,000 held in court would be forfeited to the respondent.

The motion judge found the appellant failed to remediate the deficiencies and declined to grant relief from forfeiture.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's characterization of the clause as a forfeiture rather than a penalty, nor in her conclusion that enforcing the forfeiture was not unconscionable.

The mother appealed an interim order that temporarily varied a final parenting schedule to a week-about arrangement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to apply the stringent test required for an interim variation of a final parenting order.

The motion judge improperly conflated the best interests of the child analysis with the requirement to find compelling or exceptional circumstances to disturb the status quo on an interim basis.

The interim variation was set aside and the father's motion was dismissed.

The applicant, a member of the College of Audiologists and Speech-Language Pathologists of Ontario, sought judicial review to quash the appointment of investigators who were investigating her failure to pay legal costs to the College.

The applicant argued the College lacked jurisdiction as inability to pay cannot constitute professional misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that absent exceptional circumstances, administrative processes should run their full course before judicial intervention.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenant had accumulated approximately $45,000 in rent arrears and failed to perfect her appeal.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was devoid of merit as it did not raise a question of law and was an abuse of process brought solely for delay.

The landlord's motion to quash was granted, and the tenant's cross-motion for an extension of time was dismissed.

The moving party sought to review an order of a single Divisional Court judge that dismissed her request for interim relief to be restored to leased premises pending her appeal.

The Landlord and Tenant Board had previously found she was not a tenant.

The Divisional Court panel held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test for interim relief, made no palpable and overriding error of fact, and reasonably balanced the interests of the parties by expediting the appeal and prohibiting the landlord from re-leasing the premises.

The motion to review was dismissed.

The moving party sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order to the Divisional Court.

The moving party had mistakenly filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeal, believing the order was final.

The court applied the test for extending time, finding that the moving party had a bona fide intention to appeal, adequately explained the delay, and that the respondent suffered no prejudice.

The court also found the proposed appeal had some merit, meeting the low threshold required.

The motion to extend time was granted.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which determined that the current value assessment of a landfill site should exclude the value of a facility used to generate electricity from landfill gas.

The appellants argued the facility was a commercial activity, not used exclusively for landfilling activities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the generation of electricity from landfill gas is an environmental control activity required by the site's environmental compliance approval, and thus falls within the definition of landfilling activities under O. Reg. 282/98.

The appellant appealed a decision of an Associate Judge dismissing her motion to extend the time to file a statement of claim and serve an amended notice of action in a medical negligence case.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Judge's conclusions that the appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the respondents would suffer prejudice if the extension were granted.

The court declined to decide whether intentional delay by a plaintiff is determinative, as the other findings were sufficient to dispose of the appeal.

The appellants appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision directing the Registrar to revoke their motor vehicle dealer registrations.

The tribunal found the appellants engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct, including falsifying bills of sale and failing to disclose accident damage, and knowingly provided a false statement on a renewal application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the liability findings and concluding that the penalty of revocation was not clearly unfit given the pattern of manipulating unsophisticated consumers.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 4, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive.

The accused, charged with murder, was released on bail.

A mandatory publication ban under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing.

Following misleading public comments by politicians and the police chief, the accused brought an application to partially lift the publication ban on the bail reasons to counterbalance the misinformation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 517 does not permit partial bans, and while the court has common law jurisdiction to vary the ban, doing so would likely cause more harm than good.

The court held that the accused's fair trial rights would be adequately protected by existing safeguards, including the passage of time, challenge for cause, and jury instructions.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000.

The defendants and plaintiffs both brought motions for leave to appeal an order regarding the admissibility of evidence in a civil contempt proceeding.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on four issues concerning the application of sections 7 and 13 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to evidence compelled pursuant to a Mareva order and undertakings.

The court directed that the defendant be the appellant and the plaintiffs be the cross-appellants.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating her tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The tenant argued that the notice of termination was invalid because it was signed by the landlord's property manager, and that section 43(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act requires an agent to be licensed by the Law Society of Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's interpretation that the Act does not define 'agent' and does not require an agent signing a notice of termination to be licensed to provide legal services.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating her tenancy for rent arrears.

At the hearing, the tenant sought to raise maintenance issues under s. 82(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act but provided only four days' notice instead of the required five.

The tenant argued that because the fifth day prior to the hearing fell on a Sunday, the time to serve notice was extended to Monday.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the holiday extension rule did not apply because the notice requirement was to serve 'at least' five days prior, meaning nothing expired on the Sunday.

The Board's discretionary refusal to hear the issues was upheld.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of two pre-trial motions brought by the accused, Barrington Brooks: one alleging abuse of process under the Charter and the other alleging infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court, exercising its case management powers, summarily dismissed both motions.

For the abuse of process motion, the court found no reasonable prospect of success as the allegations were not capable of constituting abuse in the current proceeding and lacked evidentiary support.

For the s. 11(b) motion, the court calculated the net delay, attributing significant periods to defence delay (due to discharging counsel) and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic), concluding that the total delay fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling and was not otherwise unreasonable.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after police observed him pull a handgun from his satchel during a takedown.

The accused fled through a schoolyard and was arrested shortly after without the firearm.

A loaded handgun was found the next morning in the schoolyard along the accused's flight path.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible and found that the circumstantial evidence, combined with the officers' observations, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed and discarded the firearm.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.