Jeff A. Marshman

The appellant sought to reduce a global nine-year sentence for armed robbery-related offences by relying on fresh evidence of pre-sentence custody lockdowns and triple bunking.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but held that harsh-custody mitigation required evidence of actual impact, which was not provided.

Applying the governing approach to custody conditions as a mitigating factor within overall fitness analysis, the panel found no error in principle and no demonstrable unfitness.

Given the appellant’s extensive robbery record, parole status at the time of the offences, and the already low-end fit sentence for armed robbery, a reduction would have made the sentence unfit.

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a child complainant’s hearsay disclosures and related audio recordings.

The court held the trial judge properly applied the principled hearsay framework on necessity and threshold reliability, including evidence of potential trauma if the complainant testified and corroborative forensic evidence.

The court rejected arguments alleging judicial bias and improper treatment of the appellant’s exculpatory account, finding no evidentiary foundation for intervention.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged an Ontario Review Board disposition under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

Following a material change in living circumstances and concession that practical utility of the appeal had dissipated pending the next annual review, the court dismissed the appeal.

On a criminal appeal from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the appellant challenged an order staying proceedings.

The Supreme Court heard the appeal and delivered oral judgment the same day.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the stay order, and remitted the matter for trial.

Reasons were stated to follow.

The appellants, David Hui and Musab Saboon, appealed their convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder of Lee Chiodo, as well as Hui's sentence for kidnapping.

Both were convicted after a trial by judge alone and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis of Marshall Hardy-Fox, a Vetrovec witness whose evidence was key to the convictions.

The appellants also argued the trial judge failed to apply the proper legal test for assessing credibility and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of Hardy-Fox's evidence, proper application of the credibility test, and adequate reasons.

The court also dismissed Hui's sentence appeal based on the parity principle.

The appellant appealed a 9-year global sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that he did not receive adequate credit for presentence custody given the hardship endured.

Although the trial judge accepted the appellant's account of hardship and granted 3:1 credit, duty counsel submitted that the trial judge may have misapprehended the appellant's primary submission for a time-served sentence.

The appellate court found no error warranting interference, noting that the trial judge provided significant credit for hardship and properly rejected the time-served submission based on the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The appellant appealed a custodial sentence of two years less a day imposed for aggravated assault.

The assault arose from a parking lot altercation where the appellant stabbed the victim with a screwdriver, causing life-threatening injuries to the chest.

The appellant sought to vary the sentence to a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence regarding his aggressive bladder cancer diagnosis and ongoing medical treatment requirements.

The sentencing judge had specifically crafted the custodial sentence to ensure access to adequate healthcare facilities.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's medical needs were being adequately addressed within the correctional facility and through arrangements with local health facilities, and that the sentencing judge had not erred in principle or imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence.

Appeal from conviction for sexual assault and related offences.

The sole ground of appeal concerned an unsuccessful application to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay.

After accounting for defence delay, the trial judge found net delay of over 18 months and identified two exceptional circumstances, including pandemic-related backlog.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to articulate how pandemic delay specifically impacted the case and by speaking in generalities.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's reasoning, finding it was open to her to rely on her familiarity with the jurisdiction and the pandemic delay it was experiencing, and that she was not required to assign the delay to a particular period of time.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching entered on November 22, 2023.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury to disregard Crown closing submissions regarding the absence of the complainant's mother's testimony about witnessing the alleged incidents.

The appellant argued that the Crown's submission was improper because the mother had told police she witnessed an incident that was not testified to at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown properly based its submission on evidence actually led at trial and that defence counsel's failure to cross-examine the mother about her police statement was a tactical decision.

The appellant, Errol Francis, appealed the sentence imposed for sexual assault.

The only issue on appeal was whether the sentencing judge erred by not considering that a conditional sentence order would have preserved the appellant’s right to appeal under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal found that, although defence counsel misstated the law, the sentencing judge’s reasons made clear that a conditional sentence would have been unfit given the seriousness of the case.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an application judge's order staying drug trafficking proceedings against the respondents due to a breach of their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the Crown argued the delay was justified by the complexity of the multi-accused project investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown failed to meet its burden to show the case was sufficiently complex to justify the delay, particularly since the respondents were not participating in a lengthy pre-trial application that complicated other related prosecutions.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing during an altercation.

At trial, he relied on self-defence and the partial defence of provocation.

During deliberations, the jury asked several questions seeking clarification on the elements of provocation, specifically the meaning of 'sudden' and 'sufficient'.

The trial judge's answers failed to adequately clarify the issues and amounted to misdirection regarding what conduct had to be sudden.

The Court of Appeal found the answers deficient, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his domestic partner and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit, based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued for a further sentence reduction due to harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the sentence was based on a joint submission by experienced counsel and was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault relating to two complainants at a house party.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and provided insufficient reasons for her factual conclusions regarding his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, available on the record, and supported by clear reasons.

The appellant, convicted by a jury on three counts of sexual assault, appealed his convictions.

He argued that the trial judge erred in the jury charge by improperly expressing opinions, overemphasizing the Crown's theory, and instructing on vitiation of consent through abuse of authority.

He also contended that the verdict on one count was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge fair and balanced, and the verdict reasonable, particularly in light of the similar fact evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for concluding that he intended to kill the deceased or cause serious bodily harm likely to cause death.

The appellant conceded guilt for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, when read as a whole, sufficiently explained the finding of intent based on the brutality of the beating, even without explicitly addressing an alternative theory raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellant, N.A., appealed a one-year custodial sentence for historical sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by concluding that a mandatory minimum sentence applied, which incorrectly precluded a conditional sentence.

Despite this conceded error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the numerous aggravating factors, including the victim's youth, the severe impact of the crime, the breach of a position of trust, and the appellant's victim-blaming, justified the sentence.

The court concluded that the case did not fall into the rare category where a conditional sentence would be appropriate for this type of crime, even with the legal error.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for past offences, appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention at a forensic mental health facility with community privileges, rather than granting his request for a conditional discharge.

The Board denied the conditional discharge due to public safety concerns, emphasizing the need for swift intervention in case of mental state decompensation, despite the appellant's recent stability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable.

The court deferred to the Board's expert opinion, supported by the appellant's psychiatrist, that a detention order was necessary to ensure public protection by allowing intervention before the criteria for involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act were met, which conditional discharge mechanisms might not adequately provide.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed his conviction on two grounds: improper cross-examination by the Crown regarding blood spatter evidence and improper cross-examination regarding a gun.

The Court of Appeal found no error or unfairness in the first ground, ruling that the Crown was entitled to challenge the appellant's version of events with contradictory reliable evidence.

Regarding the second ground, while the Crown conceded the questions should not have been asked, the court found no trial unfairness given the brevity of the exchange, the lack of objection from defence counsel, and proper jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed convictions for various criminal offences, arguing that he was entrapped by police.

The trial judge had previously found him guilty of 11 counts, staying 3 on entrapment grounds, and convicting on 8.

The appeal specifically challenged 5 of the remaining 8 convictions, alleging errors in the trial judge's analysis of both the "opportunity" and "inducement" branches of the entrapment test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's application of entrapment law, including her assessment of police conduct and the appellant's independent actions in committing the offences.