Jeff A. Marshman

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for concluding that he intended to kill the deceased or cause serious bodily harm likely to cause death.

The appellant conceded guilt for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, when read as a whole, sufficiently explained the finding of intent based on the brutality of the beating, even without explicitly addressing an alternative theory raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellant, N.A., appealed a one-year custodial sentence for historical sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by concluding that a mandatory minimum sentence applied, which incorrectly precluded a conditional sentence.

Despite this conceded error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the numerous aggravating factors, including the victim's youth, the severe impact of the crime, the breach of a position of trust, and the appellant's victim-blaming, justified the sentence.

The court concluded that the case did not fall into the rare category where a conditional sentence would be appropriate for this type of crime, even with the legal error.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for past offences, appealed a disposition by the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention at a forensic mental health facility with community privileges, rather than granting his request for a conditional discharge.

The Board denied the conditional discharge due to public safety concerns, emphasizing the need for swift intervention in case of mental state decompensation, despite the appellant's recent stability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable.

The court deferred to the Board's expert opinion, supported by the appellant's psychiatrist, that a detention order was necessary to ensure public protection by allowing intervention before the criteria for involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act were met, which conditional discharge mechanisms might not adequately provide.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder for attempted murder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's conditional discharge order.

The Board found he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety, rejecting his treating physician's low-risk assessment due to insufficient factual grounding and limited self-reports.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Board did not abdicate its inquisitorial role and its decision was reasonable and supported by the record.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed his conviction on two grounds: improper cross-examination by the Crown regarding blood spatter evidence and improper cross-examination regarding a gun.

The Court of Appeal found no error or unfairness in the first ground, ruling that the Crown was entitled to challenge the appellant's version of events with contradictory reliable evidence.

Regarding the second ground, while the Crown conceded the questions should not have been asked, the court found no trial unfairness given the brevity of the exchange, the lack of objection from defence counsel, and proper jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed convictions for various criminal offences, arguing that he was entrapped by police.

The trial judge had previously found him guilty of 11 counts, staying 3 on entrapment grounds, and convicting on 8.

The appeal specifically challenged 5 of the remaining 8 convictions, alleging errors in the trial judge's analysis of both the "opportunity" and "inducement" branches of the entrapment test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's application of entrapment law, including her assessment of police conduct and the appellant's independent actions in committing the offences.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, alleging the trial judge erred in treating similar fact evidence and analyzing the complainant's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the grounds raised did not constitute errors of law alone, which is the only basis for a Crown appeal of an acquittal.

The court affirmed that weighing evidence or assessing credibility, unless based on ungrounded stereotypical assumptions, are not errors of law.

The appellant, P.B., appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's alleged failure to address material contradictions between Crown witnesses and the impermissible use of complainants' lack of embellishment to bolster credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inconsistency regarding a peripheral detail (a television in the appellant's room) was not a reversible error, especially given the complainants' age at the time of the events.

Furthermore, the court held that the trial judge's reference to the complainants' lack of embellishment was not used to improperly bolster credibility but rather to explain why their evidence was not rejected, particularly in light of defence suggestions of fabrication.

C.H. appealed convictions for mischief under $5000, uttering threats, common assault, and sexual assault committed against his former fiancée.

The appeal raised several grounds, including the trial judge's treatment of character evidence, application of the rule in R. v. W.(D.), evaluation of motive and delay in reporting, treatment of exculpatory evidence for sexual assault, and misuse of a prior consistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in most grounds.

While acknowledging an error in the trial judge's hypothetical comment on exculpatory evidence for sexual assault and the misuse of a prior consistent statement, the court concluded these errors did not contribute to the convictions or warrant setting them aside.

Lin Yang appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the sole defence witness, Ze Yi Xu, who offered exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two material errors in assessing Mr. Xu's credibility: a misapprehension of evidence regarding vehicle availability and an illogical reasoning error concerning Mr. Xu's delay in informing the police.

These errors were deemed essential to the trial judge's rejection of the witness's testimony.

The appeal was allowed, and a retrial was ordered.

The appellant, Devon Dinall, appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, conspiracy to traffic cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

His defence at trial was that he was involved in a marijuana trafficking conspiracy, not cocaine.

The primary ground of appeal argued that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on conspiracy and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, specifically by failing to instruct on the possibility of multiple overlapping conspiracies and misrepresenting his admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, viewed functionally and as a whole, clearly conveyed that conviction required proof of participation in a cocaine conspiracy, despite one misstatement.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction regarding expert evidence on drug slang.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a common unlawful purpose under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, arising from a failed robbery attempt of an illegal gambling club where a co-perpetrator shot and killed one of the owners.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in extending party liability, particularly given the shooter's possible motive of frustration or anger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the shooting was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of carrying out the common unlawful purpose, and that the specific mode or motive of harm does not negate foreseeability under s. 21(2).

The accused, Peyton Brown, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained during an investigative detention, search, and subsequent arrest, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges included possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and other related offences.

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect the individuals were connected to a criminal offence involving a firearm, justifying the investigative detention.

Furthermore, the court found that the firearm was observed prior to any pat-down search, and even if a search had occurred, it would have been reasonable for officer safety.

Consequently, no Charter violations were found, and the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition from the Ontario Review Board (ORB) ordering his transfer from the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) to the High Secure Forensic Program at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant argued the transfer was not the least onerous or restrictive alternative and that the Board erred by failing to address a "treatment impasse" particularly concerning his aversion to clozapine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the ORB's conclusion that the transfer was "necessary and appropriate" to manage public safety risk and meet the appellant's needs.

The court also found no evidence of a treatment impasse before the Board that would warrant intervention.

The appellant was convicted of possessing child pornography.

The appeal challenged the sufficiency of grounds for a search warrant, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) did not establish reasonable grounds for drug trafficking evidence at his apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the warrant could have been issued based on the totality of circumstances, including a credible and compelling confidential informant tip corroborated by police investigation and property manager information, despite some deficiencies in the ITO.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's conviction for sexual offences against a young child and entered an acquittal.

The trial judge had admitted the child's unsworn videotaped police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after a psychologist concluded the child could not testify without undue trauma.

The Court of Appeal majority found the trial judge erred in the threshold reliability analysis by failing to address the role of cross-examination and making a positive finding of no motive to fabricate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal dissent, and restored the conviction.

The appellant, a dual status dangerous offender under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board, appealed the Board's decision declining a placement hearing and affirming his detention in a penitentiary over a maximum-secure forensic hospital.

The Board found the penitentiary placement appropriate given the appellant's extreme risk of re-offence, supported by uncontradicted expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, emphasizing that a court-imposed penitentiary sentence takes precedence for dual status offenders and that the Board's paramount responsibility is public safety.

The appeal was dismissed as the Board's findings were reasonable and amply supported by the record.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit, arguing for a hybrid order allowing the hospital discretion over placement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the uncontested evidence that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety and posed a high risk of absconding.

The appellant, Gurkirat Rai, appealed his conviction following guilty pleas to multiple driving-related offences, including dangerous operation and driving while disqualified, which resulted in a permanent licence suspension by the Ministry of Transportation under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued his pleas were uninformed because his counsel erroneously advised him that his licence could be reinstated after 10 years, and he was unaware of the automatic lifetime suspension under the HTA or the cumulative effect of consecutive two-year suspensions.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to admit fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The court concluded that it was not credible that the appellant would have acted differently had he received accurate advice, given his primary motivation to be released from pre-trial custody quickly, his willingness to plead guilty despite knowing a lifetime Criminal Code prohibition was possible, the strong Crown case, and his subsequent conduct of re-offending.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of two respondents, Kalenda Kalonji and Sam Donaldson, on firearm and drug-related charges.

The trial judge had quashed a search warrant for a residence, finding no reasonable and probable grounds to believe firearms would be found there, and excluded the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her s. 8 Charter analysis by failing to consider reasonable common sense inferences that firearms would be kept at a person's residence, effectively elevating the standard of proof for issuing a warrant.

This error led to the improper exclusion of evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and ordered a new trial for both respondents.