Janet Simmons

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision denying probate of a 2012 will and dismissing the probate application.

The trial judge found suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the will, determined that the appellant failed to prove the testator's testamentary capacity, and held that the appellant failed to establish the testator's knowledge and approval of the will's contents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision on all grounds, finding that the suspicious circumstances displaced the presumption of testamentary capacity, placing the burden on the appellant to prove capacity.

The court also rejected the appellant's application to admit fresh evidence on appeal, finding the due diligence requirement was not met.

The respondent bank sought indemnity under an insurance policy for losses arising from a Ponzi scheme operated by a customer.

The bank obtained partial summary judgment on the interpretation of the "direct financial loss" element of the fidelity coverage section.

The appellants (insurers) appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in granting partial summary judgment on a constituent element of a claim rather than on the claim itself, failed to interpret the policy as a whole, adopted a theory of liability not advanced by the parties, and misconstrued the relief sought by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and directed the action to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing the bank's motion for summary judgment while also dismissing the appellant's motion to strike the statement of claim, as well as a costs award and a case management order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeals, finding that the orders appealed were not final orders as they did not dispose of the action or finally dispose of an issue or defence.

The court held that the proper appeal route was to the Divisional Court and that the absence of a motion to quash did not afford jurisdiction to the Court of Appeal.

The appellants brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

No one appeared on behalf of the appellants at the hearing.

The motion was dismissed as abandoned.

Costs were awarded to the Toronto-Dominion Bank on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $6,749.67, and to Aping Co. Ltd. on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $300 plus applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for assault against her child and assault of a police officer for the purpose of resisting arrest.

The summary conviction appeal court judge had upheld the sentence on the basis of deference to the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that deference was not owed because the conviction appeal was allowed on the assault charges, which were the sole focus of sentencing submissions, and the trial judge provided no reasons for the assault police charge.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a conditional discharge with a three-year probationary period, which had already been served in full.

The appellant, a 54-year-old man with schizophrenia and a history of violence and harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to order his continued detention at a forensic psychiatric facility rather than grant a conditional discharge.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible in 2008 and lived in the community until December 2015, when he decompensated after stopping his antipsychotic medication.

The Board found he posed a significant threat to public safety due to his lack of insight into his mental illness, likelihood of discontinuing medication if discharged, and history of assaultive behavior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it was the least onerous and least restrictive alternative available.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision granting the respondent bank judgment for amounts owing on a line of credit, overdraft lending agreement, and two Visa cards.

The motion judge also dismissed the appellants' counterclaim and awarded substantial indemnity costs of $60,000 to the bank.

The appellants raised various arguments including delay in bringing the action, the impact of double mortgage payments, Charter rights, and procedural issues.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the appellants' arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated February 16, 2017.

The appeal was abandoned on consent, and costs were fixed in the amount of $2,500 payable to the respondent.

The appellant appealed her convictions on four offences relating to marijuana grow-operations and one count of breach of recognizance, as well as seeking leave to appeal her sentence.

She argued that her guilty pleas were invalid because she was uninformed of immigration consequences, that the facts did not support her pleas, that her counsel was in a conflict of interest, and that she was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

She also challenged the sentence as unfit due to failure to consider immigration consequences and claimed the forfeiture orders were grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and denied leave to appeal sentence, finding the guilty pleas were informed, no conflict of interest existed, the appellant received effective assistance of counsel, and the forfeiture orders were part of the accepted plea offer.

The appellant was convicted after a three-day trial of nine domestic violence offences against his wife, including two counts of assault, three counts of assault with a weapon, two counts of uttering death threats, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The charges were based on five alleged incidents occurring between September 2010 and August 2012.

The appellant was sentenced to 35 months in prison.

On appeal, the sole ground raised was ineffective assistance of counsel at trial resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the alleged deficiencies in counsel's representation did not result in an unfair trial or an unreliable verdict.

An appeal from a Superior Court judgment was adjourned pending receipt of the trial transcript and Digital Court Recording.

The Court of Appeal determined that it could not properly hear the appeal without these materials and ordered the Registrar to obtain copies for the panel and parties.

The appeal was rescheduled for February 2, 2018, with supplementary factums to be filed by both parties.

The appellant trust appealed from a summary judgment motion dismissal regarding a reassessment of provincial income tax under the Ontario Income Tax Act for the 2007 taxation year.

The central issue was whether waiver form T2029, a prescribed form under the federal Income Tax Act, operated to waive the limitation period for reassessing Ontario income tax.

The appellant argued that T2029 had never been prescribed for Ontario purposes and that government advice calling into question its prescription status prevented the waiver from operating.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, holding that section 48(15) of the Ontario Act deems any form purporting to be prescribed by the Provincial Minister to be a prescribed form unless called into question by the Provincial Minister.

The court found that T2029 clearly purports to be a prescribed form and had not been called into question by the appropriate authority.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order his surrender to the United States of America pursuant to the Extradition Act.

The applicant, a Mohawk of Akwesasne with Aboriginal heritage, argued that the Minister failed to give proper consideration to Gladue principles and his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that she had properly considered all relevant factors, including the applicant's Aboriginal background and Gladue principles, and that the applicant's circumstances were distinguishable from prior cases.

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Minister's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for impaired driving from the Superior Court's dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the proposed appeal and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The court determined that the case had no significance for the general administration of justice and denied the request for costs.

The appellant was convicted at trial of sexual interference and sexual assault arising from an incident in a laundry room involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of charges relating to a separate hotel incident but found him guilty of the laundry room charges.

The trial judge's conviction was based primarily on his finding that the appellant's failure to report the complainant's inappropriate sexual comments to her mother, cease contact with her, or tell her such comments were inappropriate demonstrated the falsity of his denial of sexual misconduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by failing to consider the appellant's explanation that he did not report the conversation to the complainant's mother because he feared it would cause a "big commotion" and potentially lead to self-harm by the complainant, given her documented mental health issues.

The Court held this failure to address a plausible explanation constituted a miscarriage of justice and allowed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for unpaid bonus installments under the respondents' Variable Incentive Plan (VIP).

The appellant resigned before the pay-out dates for the final installment of his 2009 bonus and two installments of his 2010 bonus, totaling $114,916.79.

The VIP contained an "active employment" requirement stipulating that employees must be actively employed on the payment date to receive installments.

The appellant contended that sections 11(5) and 13(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000 required the respondents to pay the future installments upon his resignation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the active employment requirement did not contravene the ESA because the future installments did not constitute wages to which the employee was entitled at the time of resignation.

The appellant appealed his conviction on various drug offences, challenging the validity of a search warrant on the grounds that material misstatements and omissions were made in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant contended that the warrant breached his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the omissions and alleged misrepresentations were not material to the issuance of the warrant and that a reasonable inference could be drawn that drugs would be found at the residence based on police observations and evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence and the lawfulness of police entry into his home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was not based solely on eyewitness identification but rather on a combination of circumstantial evidence and observations by experienced police officers conducting surveillance.

The court also found that exigent circumstances justified the initial police entry to prevent destruction of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference of a 14-year-old complainant.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the complainant's allegation of intercourse on multiple occasions, despite both the appellant and complainant initially denying sexual contact when discovered spooning on the appellant's bed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were infected by impermissible reliance on evidence of bad parenting, which was used to characterize the appellant as the type of person likely to commit the alleged offence.

The appellant appealed her conviction from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make more detailed inquiries into the appellant's mental status while she was testifying.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had made sufficient inquiries, the appellant had confirmed she was able to continue and had no difficulty with her memory, and defence counsel did not pursue the issue at trial.

No fresh evidence was produced to support the appellant's claim that her mental status would have interfered with her ability to testify.