Janet Simmons

A dual-status offender appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to decline his request for a placement review hearing as part of his annual disposition review.

The appellant had been found Not Criminally Responsible in 1997 and subsequently convicted of murder in 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no error in declining to conduct a placement review hearing where the appellant had not requested one prior to the scheduled hearing date, other parties were not ready to proceed, and the disposition review hearing was already significantly overdue.

The court noted that the appellant remained entitled to request a placement review hearing under section 672.69(2) of the Criminal Code.

An appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 24, 2017.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for robbery in 2010, challenged the Board's decision to impose a detention disposition rather than a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued that a conditional discharge with treatment conditions could manage his risk as effectively as detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's disposition, finding that the Board correctly applied the legal test and that its conclusion was reasonable given the appellant's recent deterioration, non-compliance with conditions, medication non-adherence, and the limitations of the Mental Health Act in managing his risk.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but sought leave to introduce fresh evidence and to appeal his sentence on the grounds that it was imposed without consideration of collateral immigration consequences that arose from amendments to federal immigration legislation introduced after sentencing.

The Crown conceded that had these consequences been known at sentencing, they would have affected the result.

The court granted the fresh evidence application, granted leave to appeal sentence, and allowed the appeal, imposing a suspended sentence with credit for six months less one day of pre-sentence custody and two years' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and hydromorphone found in a safe in the basement room he had rented.

The trial judge found that the appellant had knowledge of and control over the drugs based on circumstantial evidence, including that the appellant was the last and only person to occupy the area where the drugs were found, the landlord's credible testimony that no one else had entered the home during the relevant period, and the discovery of a key to the safe on the appellant's person.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge did not err in his approach to circumstantial evidence and that his conclusion was logically based on the evidence and free of error.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault by Justice G. King of the Superior Court of Justice on May 4, 2015.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the trial judge committed reversible error in his application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal agreed with this concession and found reversible error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the sexual assault charge.

The appellant's application to introduce fresh evidence regarding ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed as moot.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her medical malpractice, defamation, and negligence claims against multiple defendants including paramedic services, nine physicians, a hospital, and a medical clinic.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment on all claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissals but amended the judgment regarding Royal Victoria Regional Health Centre to clarify that only claims relating to Triage Nurse J. Doe's actions on March 10 and 11, 2012 were dismissed, not all claims against the hospital.

The appellant's appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice conditionally approving a third-party litigation funding agreement for a proposed class action.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and thus only appealable to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional approval order was interlocutory, not final, because it did not finally dispose of the substantive rights of the parties.

The order merely conditioned approval on amendments to the funding agreement; failure to amend resulted in dismissal of the approval motion, not from the order itself.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant husband appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice (Family Court Branch) in which the presiding judge severed the husband's divorce claim and made substantive orders in favour of the wife, including orders regarding pension division and an extension of the limitation period under the Family Law Act.

The wife had not filed an answer and may have been in default.

The Court of Appeal found that while the court could impose terms to secure the wife's participation, it was not open to the court to grant substantive relief in favour of the wife that had not been sought.

The order was set aside and the matter was remitted to a different judge.

The applicant sought a review of a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside the dismissal of an appeal for delay.

The original appeal concerned a judgment ordering the applicant to pay amounts owing on a collateral mortgage securing a line of credit.

The motion judge found that the applicant's explanation for the delay was unconvincing, as he had an obligation to manage his affairs while out of the country, and that the merits of the appeal were weak.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the reasoning and dismissing the review motion with costs awarded to the respondent.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm arising from a swing stage collapse at a construction site.

The appellant, a project manager, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after five workers fell more than 100 feet when the swing stage collapsed.

Only two lifelines were available for six workers, contrary to provincial law and industry practice.

The appellant had authority to direct the workers and was aware of the safety breach but failed to take corrective action.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and the three-and-a-half-year concurrent sentence, finding no legal error or palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of law.

This appeal concerns the interpretation and application of section 76(5)(e) of the Securities Act regarding insider trading and tipping liability for successive tippees.

The appellants received material non-public information about a takeover bid for Masonite International Corporation through a chain of tippers.

The core issue is whether successive tippees who did not have actual knowledge that their source was in a special relationship with the issuer "ought reasonably to have known" this fact.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Ontario Securities Commission's findings against Miller but reversed the Divisional Court's decision to overturn findings against Cheng, restoring the OSC's liability and sanctions determinations.

The appellant purchased an agreement of purchase and sale for a property containing a pub-style restaurant, golf course, residential apartments, and other amenities.

A dispute arose regarding whether the residential apartments constituted a legal non-conforming use under applicable zoning by-laws.

The appellant refused to close, claiming the deficiency was not remedied.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion for summary judgment and the action, finding the appellant had waived its objection through conduct.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant had not communicated an unequivocal and conscious intention to abandon its right to rely on the deficiency, and therefore was entitled to return of deposits.

The appellant, a fitness club operator, appealed a judgment declaring it had lost its right to extend its commercial lease with the respondent landlord.

The application judge found the appellant had breached the lease by: (1) operating a fitness club at Park Road in violation of geographic non-compete restrictions; and (2) failing to calculate and report gross revenue in accordance with lease provisions for percentage rental payments.

The appellant was given notice to cure but failed to do so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no overriding or palpable errors in the application judge's interpretation of the lease, rejection of waiver and promissory estoppel defences, and refusal to grant relief from forfeiture.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim against an individual respondent on a Rule 21 motion.

The appellant was employed by the corporate respondent and alleged his employment was wrongfully terminated as reprisal for a workplace injury claim.

The motion judge struck the claim against the individual respondent, finding insufficient pleading of grounds to establish personal liability outside the scope of corporate duties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that while tortious conduct allegations may form the basis for personal liability against officers or directors, such claims must be specifically and adequately pleaded with clarity and precision.

Bald or vague assertions of intentional tortious conduct are insufficient to defeat a Rule 21 motion.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, the court found that the Crown engaged in improper conduct during cross-examination and closing address, including eroding the appellant's right to silence by suggesting he should have provided information to police earlier, and mischaracterizing forensic evidence.

The trial judge failed to provide correcting jury instructions to address these issues.

The court found that the cumulative effect of these problems resulted in an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant's employment was terminated in October 2012.

In December 2012, the appellant entered into a settlement agreement and release with the respondent.

In October 2014, the appellant commenced an action for wrongful dismissal, defamation, and conversion of his book of business.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss under Rule 21.01(3)(d) based on the settlement agreement and release.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of good faith, no fraudulent misrepresentation, and that the settlement agreement was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge improperly treated the Rule 21.01(3)(d) motion as a summary judgment motion and made findings of fact that were inappropriate at that stage.

The appellant husband appealed from a motion judge's order that struck his reply factum, rectified an overpayment of trust funds, and struck his pleadings for failure to comply with court orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on three grounds: the husband was denied the opportunity to respond fully to the wife's motion to strike; the motion judge overstated the wife's efforts to move the case to trial; and the motion judge failed to consider whether lesser remedies would suffice.

The court set aside the order striking the pleadings and substituted specific disclosure orders with consequences for non-compliance.

The appellant sought to purchase real property from the respondent under an offer accepted on October 10, 2015, which included a due diligence clause requiring written notice within 30 days that the condition was satisfied.

The appellant failed to provide such notice by the deadline of November 9, 2015.

Subsequently, the appellant submitted an amendment to the agreement that purported to extend the due diligence period to 60 days.

The application judge found that a new agreement had been created.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by failing to properly consider the distinction between resurrection of the original agreement and creation of a new agreement, and by not adequately addressing the parties' intentions regarding the fact that the original agreement had become null and void.

The matter was remitted to proceed by action.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice dated March 29, 2016 and December 6, 2016, as well as an associated costs award dated June 3, 2016.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement awarding costs to the respondent, The Toronto-Dominion Bank, on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant, a Jamaican citizen and former permanent resident of Canada, was detained for five years by the Canada Border Services Agency pending removal to Jamaica following a removal order based on serious criminality.

The appellant brought a habeas corpus application and sought Charter damages under sections 7, 9, and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his detention was arbitrary, indefinite, and constituted cruel and unusual treatment.

The application judge dismissed the Charter damages claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no breach of the Charter rights and clarifying that Charter damages claims cannot be joined to habeas corpus applications.