James Duncan Lockyer

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the Ontario Securities Commission sought costs.

The Divisional Court awarded the Commission costs of the appeal fixed at $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis, finding no issue of broad public interest or misconduct by staff during settlement negotiations that would warrant denying costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission dismissing his application under s. 144 of the Securities Act to set aside a settlement agreement.

The appellant argued the agreement should be set aside due to non-disclosure by Commission staff regarding an investigation into a key witness for breaching a cease trade order.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Commission's decision not to revoke the settlement was reasonable, as the undisclosed information would not likely have affected the outcome of the administrative proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender (LTO) option.

The appellant also introduced fresh evidence of a 2010 risk assessment showing rehabilitation progress.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have imposed an LTO order in 1998 even with the fresh evidence.

The court noted that the appellant's progress should be assessed by the Parole Board, not through a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for spousal sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the grounds relating to the trial judge's reasons but allowed the appeal based on fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence included post-conviction allegations made by the complainant and undisclosed police reports that supported the defence theory that the complainant fabricated the allegations to gain sole custody of their children.

The Court found the undisclosed evidence met the Stinchcombe threshold and impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, facing financial difficulties, glued posters to public property as a cry for help.

One poster featured a city councillor's photo and the word 'murder'.

He was convicted of mischief and counselling murder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside both convictions.

The court held that the minor inconvenience of removing glue did not constitute damage for mischief.

Furthermore, the conviction for counselling murder was unreasonable, as the poster, viewed in context, was a plea for help, not an exhortation to kill, and the appellant lacked the requisite intent.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing the deceased in the appellant's apartment.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could consider the appellant's failure to retreat from his own home when assessing the reasonableness of his actions.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as there is no duty to retreat from one's own home when attacked, nor is it a factor for the jury to consider under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Multiple appellants challenged jury convictions for two first degree murders and attempted murder arising from a retaliatory gang-related shooting.

The court rejected allegations of unfair trial management, unfair jury instructions, improper admission of prior K.G.B. statements and preliminary inquiry evidence, erroneous refusal of severance, improper admission of intercepted artistic expression, and misdirection on cell phone location evidence.

Applying a threshold reliability analysis informed by Khelawon, the court upheld admission of a key unavailable witness's prior statements.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence application concerning synchronization of 911 and carrier clocks, holding the proposed evidence would not reasonably have affected the verdict given the broader evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed his 1995 conviction for aggravated assault in relation to the death of his infant son, which was based on a guilty plea.

The plea was heavily influenced by the unequivocal opinion of a pathologist that the infant died from non-accidental head injury.

Fresh expert evidence cast considerable doubt on that opinion, offering non-culpable explanations for the autopsy findings.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the conviction unreasonable, set aside the guilty plea, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and manslaughter in relation to the deaths of two sisters.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge made several evidentiary errors, including admitting frail eyewitness non-identification evidence, excluding evidence of the co-accused's motive and prior bad acts, admitting hearsay statements of the deceased, and failing to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory regarding the co-accused's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in 1995 for the death of her two-and-a-half-year-old son, based largely on the flawed pathological evidence of Dr. Charles Smith, who testified the child died of asphyxia.

Following a reinvestigation of Dr. Smith's cases, the Supreme Court of Canada remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to consider fresh evidence.

The fresh expert evidence demonstrated that the cause of death was unascertained and that Sudden Unexpected Death in Epilepsy (SUDEP) could not be excluded.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found the conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty in 1992 to criminal negligence causing the death of his infant son, based on flawed expert evidence from Dr. Charles Smith regarding Shaken Baby Syndrome.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, fresh expert evidence revealed that the infant's death was likely caused by natural disease processes or birth trauma, and that the triad of symptoms relied upon by Dr. Smith was not diagnostic of non-accidental head injury.

The Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea to prevent a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant participated in a home-invasion robbery during which his gun discharged, killing an occupant.

He was convicted of second degree murder under s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 229(c), arguing it violated s. 7 of the Charter by not requiring an intent to cause serious bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that subjective foresight of death combined with an unlawful object is a constitutionally sufficient mens rea for murder.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions, Vetrovec warning, and the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appellant, the mastermind of a terrorist bomb plot targeting locations in Toronto, pleaded guilty to terrorism offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 10 years.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and that a fixed term of 18 to 20 years was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a life sentence was warranted given the catastrophic potential of the plot and the appellant's guarded prospects for rehabilitation.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Ancillary to his leave application, he brought a motion for the release of trial exhibits (hair clippings) for forensic testing to determine if they were scalp or facial hair, which could support a fresh evidence application regarding his unreasonable verdict argument.

The Court held it had jurisdiction to make the order under the Criminal Code and the Supreme Court Act, and concluded it was in the interests of justice to allow the testing.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault, was granted court-appointed counsel under s. 694.1 of the Criminal Code for proceedings in the Supreme Court of Canada and incidental proceedings in the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The parties disagreed on the hourly rate to be paid by the Attorney General.

The Crown argued for the provincial legal aid tariff, while counsel sought higher rates based on their experience and the complexity of the case.

The Supreme Court held that the legal aid tariff is not conclusive, and the determination should be based on a broader assessment of what is fair and reasonable.

The Court fixed the rates at $225 per hour for senior counsel and $175 per hour for junior counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred in handling bad character evidence from a Crown witness and improper closing submissions by a self-represented co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's mid-trial instructions and jury charge were appropriate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence and the trial judge's refusal to make a DNA order or a delayed parole eligibility order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence and parole decision but allowed the Crown's appeal in part to impose a DNA order, noting that violence is not a pre-condition for such an order.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant's conviction for first degree murder was previously overturned by the Court of Appeal and a verdict of second degree murder was substituted.

The Court of Appeal then determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 12 to 15 years, while the appellant sought the minimum 10 years.

Considering the appellant's significant rehabilitation in custody, his lack of prior violent offences, and the circumstances of the offence, the Court applied the general rule from Shropshire and set the parole ineligibility period at 10 years.

The applicant, convicted of aggravated assault and other offences for administering cocaine to her two-year-old son, applied for bail pending her appeal.

She argued her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance due to a pending suspension by the Law Society and a breach of the duty of loyalty.

The Court of Appeal found the grounds of appeal to be weak, noting the trial judge had already dismissed a mistrial application on these grounds.

Given the serious nature of the offences and the weak appeal grounds, the court held the applicant failed to show her detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.