James D. Carnwath

The appellant physician appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which prohibited him from submitting accounts to OHIP for three years after he defrauded the public.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the College had jurisdiction to impose the billing prohibition under s. 51(2)(3) of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Court held that the penalty was reasonable and entitled to deference, and rejected the argument that the prohibition was equivalent to an additional three-year suspension.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct and incompetency.

The appellant argued that the Committee's refusal to grant him an adjournment due to his medical unfitness to instruct counsel or participate in the hearing constituted a denial of natural justice.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the uncontradicted medical evidence established the appellant's inability to proceed, and that the Committee's refusal to adjourn the hearing was a denial of natural justice.

The Committee's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a different panel.

The appellant appealed a decision of the License Appeal Tribunal confirming the Registrar's proposal to revoke his registration as a motor vehicle dealer.

The appellant argued he was denied natural justice and that the tribunal erred in its factual findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the hearing was appropriate, hearsay evidence was permitted under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, and there was ample evidence to support the revocation.

The appellant appealed a Board decision that found it had no jurisdiction to hear a claim for injurious affection under the Expropriations Act.

The Divisional Court held that while the Board correctly found the land was voluntarily dedicated rather than expropriated under s. 1(1)(a), it erred in concluding that s. 1(1)(b) required a taking of land.

Section 1(1)(b) contemplates an action for injurious affection where no expropriation has occurred.

The Court also found the Board erred in its interpretation of the limitation period under s. 22(1), holding that time runs from the completion of construction when actual damage is discovered, not from a pre-construction opinion.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for a full hearing.

The Minister of Health and Long Term Care appealed a decision of the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner regarding the disclosure of records of the Physician Services Committee.

The Minister argued the records were exempt under the 'labour relations' provision in s. 65(6)3 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Commissioner that 'labour relations' refers to the collective relationship between an employer and its employees.

Since members of the Ontario Medical Association are not employees of the Ministry, the exemption did not apply.

The father applied to reduce his child support obligations, claiming the child was in his custody for at least 40 percent of the time.

The motions judge granted the application and reduced the support retroactively, without making findings on income or analyzing the factors under section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The mother appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the principles from Francis v. Baker apply to all statutory exceptions under the Guidelines, requiring a presumption in favour of the Guidelines amount and clear and compelling evidence to justify a deviation.

The original support order was restored.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision which held that the commercial taking of water was not a 'use of land' under the Planning Act and therefore outside its jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the extraction of water using piping and pumps constitutes a use of land.

The Court held that the OMB erred in law by refusing to consider the water taking aspect of the proposed operation and directed a rehearing to consider the entire application for official plan and zoning by-law amendments.

The applicant sought judicial review of a coroner's decision denying him standing at an ongoing inquest.

The coroner found the applicant did not meet the statutory requirements for standing under either the public law or private law tests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the coroner's decision was entitled to curial deference and was not unreasonable.

The court emphasized the need to avoid interrupting the ongoing statutory hearing and found no serious error in principle that would justify interference.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissing her complaint that the union breached its duty of fair representation.

The applicant alleged the union failed to incorporate an agreed term regarding the repayment of Employment Insurance premiums into a settlement agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and found the Board's conclusion that the written memorandum reflected the final settlement was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke his appointment to an industry advisory committee.

The Minister revoked the appointment after learning the applicant was a member of the Hell's Angels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's exercise of discretion was not unreasonable and that the revocation did not violate the applicant's freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have quashed the decision, finding the revocation unreasonable given the applicant's good character, qualifications, and the fixed term of the appointment.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found he had entered into an exploitive sexual relationship with a patient.

The appellant challenged the Committee's credibility findings based on a letter, body markings, and psychiatric evidence regarding the complainant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no manifest error in the Committee's credibility assessments and holding that the penalty for such a profound breach of trust must stand.

The father appealed a decision setting aside a consent order that allowed him to deduct CPP disability benefits paid to his children from his child support obligations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge erred by failing to recognize that the issue was res judicata and by ignoring the statutory exception under s. 33(14) and (15) of the Family Law Act, which permits such deductions when parties consent.

The requester, an insurance company, sought access to Crown files prepared for a criminal prosecution under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Attorney General refused disclosure, and an Inquiry Officer ordered partial disclosure, finding that litigation privilege under s. 19 of FIPPA terminated when the criminal proceedings ended.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Inquiry Officer's interpretation of s. 19 was unreasonable and wrong in law, as the statutory exemption for records prepared by Crown counsel for litigation does not incorporate common law limitations on litigation privilege.

The Attorney General's application was allowed, and the requester's application regarding privacy exemptions under s. 21 was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision finding oppressive conduct and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge found that the corporation was represented to the respondent investor as the owner of a specific technology, but the individual appellant deliberately withheld title to the patents for his own purposes.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings, noting that the investor was entitled to rely on the representations made and that the doctrine of reasonable expectations applied.

The court also upheld the remedy, which included declaring the corporation the owner of the process and directing an accounting for profits derived from a related contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant applied for social assistance but failed to disclose trust funds held for her minor sons.

The local social services department cancelled her benefits and demanded repayment, finding the funds were accessible assets.

The Social Benefits Tribunal upheld this decision.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that because the trust was discretionary and the co-trustee refused to release the funds, the funds were not accessible to the beneficiaries.

The appeal was allowed, and the trust funds were excluded as assets for determining eligibility.

The appellant, owner of a mixed-use building, appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision upholding the assessment of its residential units as an income-producing multi-residential rental property.

The residential units were subject to a 999-year lease arrangement where 'co-owners' held an undivided percentage interest in the lease and a right to occupy specific units.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by strictly applying property law distinctions between leasehold and fee simple interests.

The Court held that under the Assessment Act, the leasehold interests were sufficiently similar to fee-based co-ownerships (like condominiums) to warrant similar assessment treatment.

The appellant was receiving $350 per week in spousal support from her first husband's estate, which terminated when she remarried the respondent at age 56.

The second marriage lasted only one year.

The trial judge dismissed her claim for periodic spousal support, awarding only a $10,000 lump sum, emphasizing the short duration of the marriage and her knowledge that remarriage would terminate her prior support.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the trial judge erred in principle by over-emphasizing the short marriage and the appellant's decision to remarry.

Applying the Divorce Act and the Moge framework, the court held the economic consequences of the marriage should be shared equally.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondent was ordered to pay $175 per week in spousal support until the appellant turns 65.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and commenced an action without complying with the defendant insurer's request for a Functional Capacities Assessment under s. 258.3(1)(d) of the Insurance Act.

The defendant successfully moved for an order compelling the plaintiff to submit to the examination.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order compliance and was restricted to considering non-compliance in awarding costs under s. 258.3(9).

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the court retains discretion to order compliance to further the legislative objective of facilitating early settlement.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the variation of spousal support in the face of a settlement agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the facts of the case did not warrant a fresh consideration of the causal connection principle established in previous case law.

The appellants, subcontractors on a school construction project, appealed a trial judgment limiting their construction lien recovery to the general contractor's 10 per cent statutory holdback.

The general contractor had posted a lien bond to vacate one of the liens before the primary subcontractor abandoned the project.

The appellants argued that posting security made the full bond amount available to all lien claimants in addition to the statutory holdback, relying on previous case law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that posting security under section 44 of the Construction Lien Act does not enlarge a contractor's liability beyond the statutory holdback and proper set-offs.

The court explicitly rejected the prior ruling in Francon, confirming that a contractor's liability to lien claimants is restricted to the amount fixed by the Act.