George W. King

Following the offender's convictions for importing and possessing large quantities of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown applied to revoke his bail pending sentencing under s. 532(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the certainty of guilt and the likelihood of a lengthy sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the presumption of bail continues post-conviction and the Crown failed to establish new facts or exceptional circumstances justifying revocation.

The court noted the offender's strict compliance with his release conditions and lack of flight risk, though it varied the conditions to remove a provision allowing him to leave his residence with his surety's written approval.

The respondent, having been successful in the main application for judicial review, sought partial indemnity costs of $45,000.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded due to the public interest exception, or alternatively, that the amount claimed was excessive.

The Divisional Court rejected the public interest argument, noting the applicant had a personal financial motivation for the proceeding.

However, the court agreed the claimed amount was excessive for a half-day hearing on a narrow issue, and fixed costs at $10,000 all-inclusive.

Both the moving parties and the responding parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the moving parties' motion for leave to appeal on the basis that the issue was moot in the context of the case.

The responding parties' motion for leave to appeal was granted, with costs to be determined by the panel hearing the appeal.

The two accused, commercial truck drivers, were charged with importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after CBSA officers found 31 kilograms of cocaine in their trailer at the Ambassador Bridge.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge and control.

The court rejected the testimony of the accused Sidhu, finding his explanation for his fingerprint on a box containing cocaine to be illogical and implausible.

Sidhu was found guilty on both counts.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the co-accused Singh had knowledge of the cocaine, as there was no physical evidence linking him to the drugs and other reasonable inferences existed.

Singh was acquitted.

The applicant, previously declared a vexatious litigant by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO), sought judicial review of two HRTO decisions that dismissed his latest human rights application and denied his request for reconsideration.

The applicant alleged the decisions were unreasonable, procedurally unfair, and tainted by bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the HRTO's decisions were reasonable, the applicant was afforded procedural fairness despite his failure to seek leave as required, and there was no cogent evidence to rebut the presumption of impartiality of the adjudicators.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a municipal council decision reprimanding him and suspending his pay for 30 days due to his participation in the Freedom Convoy protest.

The applicant argued the council failed to consider his section 2 Charter rights when imposing the penalty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the council was bound by the Integrity Commissioner's finding of misconduct, and any Charter arguments were relevant only to the Commissioner's finding, not the council's subsequent discretionary penalty decision.

The appellant, who acted as an agent and landlord but was not the property owner, appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding him jointly liable for a bad faith eviction under s. 57 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appellant argued the LTB erred in law by failing to apportion liability between the multiple landlords based on their respective roles, as he lacked the legal authority to sell the property.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the RTA is consumer protection legislation designed to balance rights between landlords and tenants, and does not require the LTB to adjudicate or apportion liability between multiple landlords.

The appellant father appealed a final restraining order granted by a motion judge during a motion for temporary relief.

The respondent mother had sought a temporary restraining order after being violently attacked by the appellant's father.

Neither party requested a final restraining order, and both were content with the temporary order in place.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by granting a final order on an interim motion without giving the parties an opportunity to make submissions.

The temporary restraining order was reinstated.

The accused, a denturist, was charged with 17 counts of sexual assault against multiple female patients.

The Crown alleged that the accused intentionally rubbed his penis against the buttocks of the patients while performing denturist services.

The court admitted the evidence of the complainants as similar fact evidence, finding it highly probative of the actus reus and credibility.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence and found the complainants' evidence credible and reliable.

The accused was found guilty on 13 counts of sexual assault.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a Hague Convention application.

The respondent (mother) sought over $215,000 in costs after successfully defending the application.

The court reviewed the principles of costs, including reasonableness and the parties' financial circumstances.

Despite the respondent's full success on the underlying application and a rejected settlement offer, the court significantly reduced the requested costs to $50,761.01.

The decision emphasizes that costs awards must be proportionate and subject to the reasonable expectations of the parties, especially given their modest financial circumstances, and that success is not divided when pre-requisite findings are made but the ultimate relief sought is denied.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario denying him access to his son's personal health information held by a family services agency.

The applicant argued he was entitled to the records under the Divorce Act and various privacy statutes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator's decisions to be reasonable.

The court upheld the adjudicator's findings that the Divorce Act did not mandate disclosure and that the agency properly exercised its discretion in considering the best interests of the child and the applicant's motives.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the orders of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with no order as to costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Shore J. dated March 21, 2023.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and made no order as to costs.

The moving party brought motions for leave to appeal two orders of the lower court.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal specific paragraphs of the orders dated June 27, 2022, and November 29, 2022.

Costs of the motions were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicant father sought the immediate return of the child to Ohio, USA, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The respondent mother opposed, relying on Article 13(b) (grave risk of harm) and Article 13(2) (child's objection).

The court found that the child was habitually resident in Ohio and wrongfully removed.

However, the court determined that both Article 13(b) and Article 13(2) exceptions applied, citing the father's controlling and abusive behavior, the child's forced performance of demeaning chores, the presence of loaded weapons, and the child's strong, independent objection to returning.

The application for the child's return was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a Certificate of Pending Litigation against their property after they terminated an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The appellants argued the motion judge failed to consider a schedule requiring direct deposit, improperly considered their subjective intentions, and erroneously assessed the property's uniqueness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants could not raise the schedule interpretation for the first time on appeal, and that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing the equities or the uniqueness of the property.

The plaintiff sued the defendant municipality for injuries sustained after tripping on beach stones scattered on a public sidewalk.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the sidewalk was not in an unreasonable state of non-repair and that it had no knowledge of the stones.

The court granted the defendant's motion, finding that the presence of the stones did not constitute an unreasonable state of non-repair as they could be easily avoided by a person exercising ordinary care.

Furthermore, the court held that the municipality was exempt from liability under s. 44(3)(a) of the Municipal Act because it did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, about the stones on the sidewalk.

The appellant appealed a trial decision granting custody, child and spousal support, and equal division of the proceeds of a jointly owned home to the respondent.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in treating the home as joint property, enforcing the parties' Islamic marriage contract (Nikah), excluding the Maher payment from net family property, and awarding spousal support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of family law principles.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's decision finding he breached the municipal Code of Conduct by disclosing confidential and solicitor-client privileged information to external legal counsel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Integrity Commissioner's decision was reasonable because the applicant lacked authority to waive the municipality's privilege or disclose confidential procurement documents.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness during the investigation.

The applicant, operator of Sunset Manor long-term care home, sought judicial review of a Director's decision ordering the home to cease admitting new residents due to a risk of harm.

The applicant argued the decision was tainted by a reasonable apprehension of bias because one of the inspectors was a former employee, that it was denied procedural fairness, and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the procedural fairness owed was met, and that the Director's decision was reasonable and justified based on a history of non-compliance.