G. Dennis Lane

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration decision that allowed the employer municipality to fill new positions using management rights clauses rather than seniority provisions from predecessor collective agreements following amalgamation.

The Divisional Court quashed the arbitrator's decision, finding it patently unreasonable to apply management rights while ignoring the seniority provisions to which those rights were subject under the statutorily mandated composite collective agreement.

The plaintiffs were injured in motor vehicle accidents and commenced both accident benefit arbitration proceedings and tort actions.

In the tort actions, the defendants sought production of medical reports obtained during the arbitration proceedings.

The motions judges dismissed the requests, relying on the implied undertaking rule.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that neither the deemed undertaking rule nor the implied undertaking rule protected the medical reports from disclosure.

The reports were highly relevant to the tort actions, and the plaintiffs had waived their privacy interests by putting their medical conditions in issue.

The appeals were allowed and the plaintiffs were ordered to produce the reports.

The appellant appealed a Financial Services Tribunal decision that directed the Superintendent not to order the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board to pay her a pre-retirement death benefit.

The appellant and the deceased plan member had separated and executed a separation agreement dividing the pension, but the deceased later remarried.

The Divisional Court held that under section 48(13) of the Pension Benefits Act, the subsequent spouse's entitlement to the death benefit is subject to the former spouse's interest set out in a valid domestic contract.

The appeal was allowed and the Board was ordered to pay the appellant her share of the benefit.

The applicants, competitors in the wastewater treatment system market, sought judicial review of a decision by the Building Materials Evaluation Commission (BMEC) to amend their previously granted authorizations.

The BMEC initiated the review on its own motion due to interpretation difficulties and potential health and safety concerns.

The Divisional Court held that while the BMEC lacked express statutory authority to amend the authorizations outside of specific conditions, it possessed implied legislative authority to reconsider its decisions where public health and safety warranted, and was therefore not functus officio.

However, the Court quashed the BMEC's decision, finding that the BMEC breached the duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicants with adequate notice and disclosure of the information underlying the proposed amendments, thereby depriving them of a meaningful opportunity to respond.

The appellant appealed an order that imputed his income at $65,000, rescinded child support, and transferred a child's education fund to the respondent.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred in finding the appellant in default of financial disclosure obligations, as the order lacked a specific time limit and the hearing date had been advanced.

The court also found no basis for imputing the appellant's income at $65,000, noting that his actual income was $28,400 while the respondent's was $64,300.

The court allowed the appeal, recalculated child support based on the parties' actual incomes, and set aside the transfer of the education fund on the condition that the appellant maintain it for the child's benefit.

A journalist requested an electronic database of municipal election campaign contributors from the City of Toronto to investigate potential breaches of contribution limits.

The City and the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner refused disclosure, citing privacy exemptions under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA).

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Commissioner erred in interpreting the Municipal Elections Act, finding the database was a public record prepared under the Act.

The Court further held that the Commissioner's decisions on the privacy exemption and public interest override were unreasonable, as the public interest in scrutinizing the democratic process outweighed the minimal privacy intrusion of disclosing contributors' telephone numbers.

The application was allowed and the database ordered disclosed.

The applicant County sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision which found that private-home day care providers were employees of the County for the purposes of the Pay Equity Act.

The Tribunal had applied the common law 'total relationship' and 'organization/integration' tests to conclude the providers were employees.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding it to be patently unreasonable.

The majority held that the Tribunal ignored or irrationally discounted evidence demonstrating that the providers were independent contractors, such as their contracts, tax filings, and level of independence.

The plaintiff's disability benefits were terminated by the defendant insurer after two years.

The plaintiff sued for specific performance and sought an interlocutory injunction to reinstate payments pending trial.

The defendant sought an adjournment of the motion, which the motions judge granted on the condition that the defendant continue paying benefits for three months without prejudice.

The defendant appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing the motion was brought in the wrong venue and the condition amounted to an improper mandatory injunction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a venue irregularity does not automatically invalidate an order absent prejudice, and the payment condition was a valid exercise of discretion to mitigate the prejudice of the adjournment, not a determination on the merits of the injunction.

The appellant tenant appealed a Tribunal order terminating his tenancy so the landlord's son could occupy the unit.

The tenant argued the Tribunal erred in interpreting the 'good faith' requirement under s. 51(1) of the Tenant Protection Act, asserting that the landlord's primary motive was economic since the tenant paid below-market rent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that 'good faith' only requires a genuine intention to have a family member occupy the unit, regardless of whether the choice of unit was driven by economic reasons.

The court also found the Tribunal properly exercised its discretion under s. 84(1) by postponing the eviction rather than refusing it.

The appellant husband appealed a spousal support order of $1,800 monthly for ten years, arguing the respondent wife had waived support in their marriage contract.

The motions judge found the waiver resulted in unconscionable circumstances under s. 33(4) of the Family Law Act, as the husband had required the wife to quit her job as an exotic dancer, leaving her in poverty while he maintained a wealthy lifestyle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge properly considered the wife's lack of employment prospects, her immigration status, and the unconscionable result of the contract, and did not err in ordering ten years of support.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment fixing time-limited spousal support at $550 per month.

The wife, who was qualified in Early Childhood Education, refused to seek employment in her field, instead pursuing a lengthy and unrealistic educational program to become a teacher.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the time limit, as the husband should not bear the costs of an unrealistic educational program.

The quantum was also upheld, as the parties were in similar after-tax positions and the wife had exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The appellants, subcontractors on a school construction project, appealed a trial judgment limiting their construction lien recovery to the general contractor's 10 per cent statutory holdback.

The general contractor had posted a lien bond to vacate one of the liens before the primary subcontractor abandoned the project.

The appellants argued that posting security made the full bond amount available to all lien claimants in addition to the statutory holdback, relying on previous case law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that posting security under section 44 of the Construction Lien Act does not enlarge a contractor's liability beyond the statutory holdback and proper set-offs.

The court explicitly rejected the prior ruling in Francon, confirming that a contractor's liability to lien claimants is restricted to the amount fixed by the Act.

The applicant sought a 45-day extension of time to file a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Several creditors opposed, arguing prejudice from erosion of secured receivables and raising concerns about the debtor's good faith, including refusal to consent to a receivership.

The court held that material prejudice under s. 50.4(9) must be measured by the prejudice caused by the extension itself, not by the absence of positive cash flow, and found no creditor materially prejudiced.

The court also found the debtor had acted in good faith and with diligence since filing its notice, and that a viable proposal was likely.

The motion was granted with no costs.

The defendants brought a motion for a stay of the class action proceedings pending their appeal of the certification order.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that there was a serious issue to be tried, the defendants would suffer irreparable harm from unrecoverable expenses and reputational damage, and the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The action was stayed pending the appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant material supplier appealed a master's order discharging its construction lien and vacating its certificate of action.

The master had found the lien was registered out of time by applying the 'deemed completion' provision of the Construction Lien Act to the parties' prevenient arrangement.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the 'deemed completion' provision does not apply to a prevenient arrangement.

Instead, the time limit for preserving a lien under a prevenient arrangement begins to run from the date of the last delivery of materials, meaning the appellant's lien was perfected in time.