Gary Grill

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded, restricted firearm, careless use of a firearm resulting in injury, and possession of cocaine for trafficking.

The court imposed a global five-year sentence with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a two-year custodial term followed by three years of probation.

The decision extensively addresses systemic racism, the deplorable conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre, and the impact of family separation on the offender's children.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, restraint, and consideration of the offender's difficult life experiences and strong family support.

O'Shane Mitchell pleaded guilty to three counts of reckless discharge of a firearm and one count of possession of a loaded firearm.

The charges arose from a shooting incident where Mitchell, acting in self-defence against one aggressor who died, recklessly injured three other individuals.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a loaded firearm in an enclosed space, injuries to multiple victims, and the unrecovered firearm.

Mitigating factors included Mitchell's youth, difficult upbringing in a violent, racialized community, early guilty plea, remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (lockdowns, triple-bunking).

The court also considered the impact of anti-Black racism on the offender's background.

The judge imposed a global sentence of six years' imprisonment, reduced from an initial inclination of seven years due to the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

With credit for 735 days (enhanced to 3 years), Mitchell was sentenced to serve a further three years.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition, a DNA order, and a no-contact order.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce "gang evidence" (rap videos, social media posts, and expert testimony) to establish motive and party liability, and an intercepted telephone communication as an admission.

The court found the gang evidence's probative value to be tenuous, as the deceased was not a gang member, and its prejudicial effect (moral prejudice, reasoning prejudice, and risk of unconscious bias against young Black men) significantly outweighed any probative value.

Consequently, the gang evidence and related expert testimony were deemed inadmissible.

However, the intercepted communication, despite its ambiguity, was found to have sufficient probative value as a potential admission and limited prejudicial effect, thus rendering it admissible.

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The defendant, Dwight Dube, was charged with impaired driving and over 80.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) due to excessive force during arrest and improper implementation of the right to counsel.

The court found that police used excessive force, violating section 7 of the Charter, but found no violation of sections 8, 9, or 10(b).

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath sample evidence and police observations of potential impairment, leading to an acquittal on both charges.

The applicants, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, brought pretrial applications to exclude evidence.

They challenged warrantless police searches (s. 8 Charter), the grounds for their arrest, and alleged excessive force during arrest and transport.

The court dismissed all applications, finding that the applicants lacked standing to challenge the searches of the rental vehicle and condominium premises, that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, and that the force used during the dynamic takedown and subsequent transport was justified given the high-risk nature of the arrest and the applicants' resistance.

The applicant, charged with two counts of murder, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence extracted from an iPhone seized upon his arrest.

The applicant argued that the search warrant was overly broad, the police ignored its limitations, the affiant misled the issuing justice, and the police failed to file reports to a justice and lost a USB key containing the extracted data.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen phone and that the failure to file reports and the loss of the USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the Crown's case, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision staying sexual offence charges against the respondent for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was under the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the application judge erred by failing to attribute a 42-day period to defence delay when the defence rejected earlier trial dates offered by the Crown.

The Court also found that the application judge erred in his under-the-ceiling analysis by failing to properly consider local circumstances in Brampton, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Crown's proactive steps to secure earlier dates.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The accused, an animal rights activist, was charged with breaking and entering a mink farm with intent to commit mischief.

He admitted to trespassing and surreptitiously videotaping the animals to publicize their living conditions, but denied intending to commit mischief.

The Crown argued that the videotaping and subsequent publication of the farmer's personal information constituted mischief.

The court found that the surreptitious videotaping of a commercial property did not interfere with the lawful use of the property and caused no harm to the animals.

The accused was acquitted as the Crown failed to prove the intent to commit mischief.

Ridwan Dalmar, a 20-year-old first offender, was sentenced on two counts of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, one count of possession of a prohibited device, and one count of careless discharge of a firearm.

The Crown sought a 5-6 year sentence, while the defence sought two years.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's background, and prevailing legal principles, including the social context of the offences and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration conditions.

The judge found the offences grave but acknowledged the offender's moral blameworthiness was influenced by his fear for safety in his community and distrust of police.

The court applied pre-trial custody credits (Summers and Duncan credits) and a 6-month reduction for collateral consequences of serving a sentence during the pandemic.

The final sentence imposed was two years less one day in a reformatory, concurrent for all charges, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, Kyle Sparks-MacKinnon, was charged with second-degree murder.

He admitted to fatally shooting the victim but claimed self-defence, asserting the victim pointed a gun at him.

The Crown argued the accused shot the victim while he was in his car, in retaliation for prior incidents.

The court found that while the accused's credibility was questionable on some points, his testimony, supported by other evidence, raised a reasonable doubt regarding whether he faced a threat of force from the victim.

Despite the accused's significant role in instigating the confrontation by brandishing an illegal firearm, the court concluded that his response of using lethal force when facing a threat of death was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Crown's case was wholly circumstantial, relying on evidence of animus, opportunity, means, and post-offence conduct.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, engaging in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine if reasonable inferences of guilt could be drawn.

The court concluded that the cumulative evidence could support a reasonable inference that the applicant was the shooter, and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought bail on a charge of first-degree murder, which involved a highly organized, gangland-style execution.

The Crown opposed release on all three grounds: flight risk, danger to the public, and erosion of public confidence.

The court found the applicant's pre-apprehension behavior alarming, the offence grave, the Crown's case compelling, ties to the community minimal, the release plan weak, and a history of non-compliance with court orders.

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions, the court concluded that detention was necessary on all three grounds, particularly given the brazen nature of the attack and the applicant's role in a sophisticated criminal plot.

The application for bail was dismissed.

A young person was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm without licence or registration following a judge-alone trial.

The appellant appealed the convictions for manslaughter, aggravated assault, and careless use of a firearm, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the appellant fired his gun at retreating attackers and therefore acted unreasonably.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding that the appellant knew his attackers were retreating before he fired the first shot, and that the trial judge failed to properly apply the objective reasonableness standard for self-defence by imposing an unreasonably high burden on the appellant to weigh his response to a nicety within five seconds of being attacked.

The court allowed the appeal and entered acquittals on all three appealed charges.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to various wiretap authorizations, general warrants, and search warrants, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown conceded a s. 8 breach regarding a May 3, 2016 general warrant due to an error in identifying the specific condominium unit.

The court found that the other authorizations and warrants were validly issued and that the police did not act negligently or in bad faith.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the evidence obtained from the May 3, 2016 general warrant should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the prosecution.

The application was dismissed.

This decision addresses a voir dire to determine the admissibility of police statements made by Marcia Gittens and Horace McCalla, who are charged with failing to provide the necessaries of life and criminal negligence causing bodily harm to their son.

The Crown sought to admit the statements, arguing voluntariness and constitutional compliance.

The defence contended that the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found Ms. Gittens' statement inadmissible due to involuntariness, influenced by inducements, her emotional state, and police misrepresentations regarding the video recording and the duty to caution.

Additionally, her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when psychological detention crystallized during the interview, leading to exclusion under s. 24(2).

Conversely, Mr. McCalla's statement was deemed voluntary and admissible, as the police adequately informed him of his rights and potential legal jeopardy, and he was not found to be detained.

The defendant, Marco Maric, was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine based on an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the significant quantity of cocaine (10.5 kg destined for him, 4 kg found in his unit), his leadership role in a sophisticated operation, and motivation by greed.

Mitigating factors included his difficult childhood as a war refugee, strong family support, long work history, remorse, and significant time spent on restrictive house arrest bail (927 days).

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives for cocaine trafficking, while also acknowledging the defendant's rehabilitative potential.

The Crown sought 10-12 years, and the defence sought 7-8 years.

The court imposed a sentence of nine years, reduced to seven years and eight months after accounting for pre-sentence custody and house arrest credit.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition for certain items, a 10-year prohibition for others, and forfeiture of offence-related property and proceeds of crime.

This decision addresses a blended voir dire concerning the voluntariness of statements made to police and alleged Charter violations (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)) during the investigative detention of two accused, Anderson and Rhoden, following a vehicle stop linked to a shooting.

The court found that while initial detention and some searches were lawful, the detention became arbitrary after two hours (4:46 a.m.), and certain statements by Anderson were involuntary due to police inducement or trickery.

Consequently, evidence obtained after 4:46 a.m., Anderson's confessions of his real name, his videotaped statement to Det. Cobor, and evidence from the unlawful trunk search were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Early statements and the initial false name provided by Anderson were deemed admissible.

The accused was charged with multiple Criminal Code offences including uttering threats, assault, assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, sexual assault with a weapon, mischief, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, making child pornography, and voyeurism.

He was also charged with Controlled Drugs and Substances Act offences including trafficking cocaine, production of marijuana, possession of marijuana for trafficking, and possession of cocaine.

The trial hinged on the credibility of the complainant and a second witness.

The court found both witnesses to be unreliable, manipulative, and not credible.

The accused testified that the activities were consensual BDSM play.

The court acquitted the accused of all Criminal Code charges and found him guilty of possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana (as a lesser included offence to trafficking), but not guilty of trafficking cocaine or production of marijuana.

In a trial for second-degree murder, the accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude or edit a video recording of the killing, arguing the graphic images would inflame the jury.

The Crown voluntarily edited the video to conceal the pooling of blood and the gunshot wound to the deceased's head.

The court ruled the edited video recording was admissible, finding its probative value in showing the factual circumstances of the murder substantially outweighed any potential prejudice to the accused.