Freya Kristjanson

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages and indemnification arising from the purchase of a defective commercial truck.

The trial judge found that the appellants breached the contract by failing to provide a reasonably fit vehicle and subsequently failing to honour an agreement to exchange the truck.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings on breach of contract and indemnification, finding no palpable and overriding error in the interpretation of the contract or the admission of parol evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, dismissing the action against the individual appellants because there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil or find them personally liable for the corporation's breach of contract.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Halton Region Conservation Authority to void a development permit for a home renovation.

After the partial collapse of walls during construction, the Authority voided the permit without notice or a hearing, claiming the scope of work had fundamentally changed.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding it both unreasonable and procedurally unfair because the Authority failed to follow the mandatory show cause hearing process set out in section 8 of O. Reg. 162/06.

The self-represented applicant commenced two applications for judicial review of decisions of the Social Benefits Tribunal relating to disability support payments.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the applications as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the applications contained only vague and bald allegations, making it impossible to discern a legal basis.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to pursue his statutory right of appeal and provided no reasonable explanation for his delay in commencing the proceedings.

The applications were dismissed.

The mother brought a motion requesting the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to represent the parties' 13-year-old child in an ongoing high-conflict parenting dispute.

The father opposed the appointment, arguing it would force the child into the middle of the conflict, and sought to cross-examine the author of a Voice of the Child report on the basis of undue influence.

The court granted the motion, finding that the child had a right to have his views and preferences heard and that legal representation was in his best interests, particularly given the father's intention to challenge the reliability of the child's expressed views.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Media Development Corporation (OMDC) denying a film tax credit on the basis that its production, Reflections, was not a 'documentary'.

The applicant argued the OMDC's interpretation was unreasonable and fettered by anti-evangelical Christian bias.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard from Vavilov and found the OMDC's interpretation of 'documentary' and its application to the production were reasonable.

The court also dismissed the allegations of bias and procedural unfairness.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a police service's decision to disclose non-conviction information on a vulnerable sector check.

The applicant argued the reconsideration process was procedurally unfair because the police did not disclose the underlying information relied upon to make the decision, preventing the applicant from knowing the case to meet.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that procedural fairness required the police to provide access to the relevant information before the applicant submitted written submissions for the reconsideration.

The court quashed the decision and remitted the matter for a new reconsideration by a different decision-maker.

The appellants, a religious organization, appealed a decision denying property tax exemptions for certain properties under the Assessment Act.

The properties included portions of a temple site and several satellite sites used for Tai Chi classes.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the primary purpose of the satellite sites was not worship, but rather evangelization or physical health, and that the specific temple areas (sales area, campground, contemplative garden) did not qualify as places of worship.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence, refusing to re-open the hearing, and revoking his certificate of registration.

The appellant had failed to attend the discipline hearing, claiming a medical emergency, but the Committee proceeded in his absence and later dismissed his motion to re-open, finding his claims of illness lacked objective evidence and were part of a pattern of delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the Committee's decisions to deny adjournments, proceed in absentia, refuse to re-open the hearing, or impose revocation as a penalty for grossly inadequate clinical care and dishonest billing.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $25,000 on an unpaid invoice for engineering services.

The trial judge had rejected the appellants' limitation defence, finding the limitation period was suspended during settlement discussions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The court held that the limitation period expired before any settlement discussions took place, as the appellants had refused to pay the full invoice amount more than two years prior to the commencement of the action.

The judgment and costs order were set aside.

The applicant abandoned their application for judicial review.

The respondent sought costs of $35,000 on a substantial indemnity basis or $25,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Divisional Court found the requested amounts to be far in excess of what is normally awarded in such cases and fixed costs at $10,000 all-inclusive, payable by the applicant to the respondent.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order finding his two children in need of protection and placing them in the sole custody of the mother.

The father, who had not seen the children in over four years, alleged widespread misconduct by judges, lawyers, and social workers, but failed to file responding evidence on the summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the motion judge's decision, and upheld the refusal to grant an adjournment.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside the noting in default of the respondent and permanently staying a third party claim brought under the Construction Act.

The appellant had commenced the third party claim without seeking the required leave and sought to convert it to an ordinary civil proceeding more than five years after the limitation period expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a motion for leave to convert a construction lien third party claim must be brought before the expiry of the limitation period, and the motion judge made no error in refusing to grant leave nunc pro tunc.

The appellants (purchasers) appealed a summary judgment order forfeiting their deposit after a failed residential real estate transaction.

They argued they were entitled to rescind the agreement because the MLS listing misrepresented the home's square footage.

The motion judge found that the purchasers, one of whom was an experienced real estate agent, relied on their personal inspection of the property rather than the MLS listing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's factual inferences were reasonable and supported by the evidence, including the purchasers' repeated affirmations of their intent to close after discovering the actual square footage.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST to the responding party.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the applicant in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Lococo J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable forthwith to the plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Myers J. The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the moving party.

The appellant client appealed a motion judge's assessment of her former solicitor's account.

The motion judge had found the assessment officer lacked jurisdiction due to a contingency fee agreement, but relied on the officer's evidentiary record to conduct his own quantum meruit assessment, reducing the fees to $45,000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reliance on the assessment officer's report or his application of the Cohen factors.

The Court also lifted a sealing order that had been improperly requested.

The appellant, an environmental clean-up worker, suffered impairments from toxic exposure while cleaning up a chemical spill caused by a fatal collision between two trucks.

He applied for statutory accident benefits, which were denied on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the SABS.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal upheld the denial, finding that while the use of the vac-truck met the purpose test, it did not meet the causation test as the toxic substances, not the vehicle, directly caused the injuries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LAT made no errors of law in its articulation or application of the purpose and modified causation tests.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a Supreme Court of Canada costs order.

The motion judge had found the plaintiff was only required to repay $12,180, while the defendants argued the order required repayment of $200,000.

Rather than deciding the appeal, the Divisional Court ordered the parties to jointly apply to the Supreme Court of Canada for clarification of its own order, finding this to be the most efficient and proportionate method of resolving the ambiguity.