Freya Kristjanson

The applicants sought a statutory injunction under section 380 of the City of Toronto Act to restrain the respondent from operating a commercial parking lot in contravention of a zoning by-law.

The respondent conceded the non-compliance but argued the parking lot was a legal non-conforming use.

The court found the applicants had standing as taxpayers and established a clear breach of the by-law.

The respondent failed to prove continuous use as a commercial parking lot since the by-law's passage, as the property was previously used as an accessory lot.

Finding no exceptional circumstances, the court granted the statutory injunction and related declaratory relief.

The appellant, Z. (Z.), appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one confirming treatment incapacity for anti-psychotic and side-effect medications, and another dismissing a preliminary motion to void the incapacity finding due to alleged unlawful detention under the Mental Health Act.

The court rejected the "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument, affirming that breaches of the Mental Health Act's detention requirements do not automatically void capacity findings made under the Health Care Consent Act.

The court upheld the Board's finding of incapacity for anti-psychotic medications, finding it reasonable.

However, the court found the Board's decision regarding incapacity for side-effect medications unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that such treatment was proposed or discussed with the patient.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the finding of incapacity for side-effect medications, while upholding the finding for anti-psychotic medications and the dismissal of the preliminary motion.

The plaintiffs moved for judgment in the amount of $150,000 based on Minutes of Settlement, following the defendants' default on installment payments.

The court considered whether the consent to judgment constituted an unenforceable penalty clause or if relief from forfeiture was warranted for payments already made.

The court found the stipulated sum was not unconscionable given the negotiated nature of the settlement and the original claim amount.

Relief from forfeiture was denied as the bargain was not unconscionable and the defendants were dilatory in seeking relief.

The motion for judgment was granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellant, Duca Financial Services Credit Union Ltd., appealed a Master's order declining to recuse himself from hearing a motion to set aside an administrative dismissal of an action.

Duca Financial alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the Master's case management actions and comments during the recusal motion.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias was established, and affirmed the Master's decision to continue hearing the motion.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside an order by Master Haberman, which had struck their statement of defence and dismissed their counterclaim due to their counsel's late attendance.

They also sought to set aside a Registrar's noting in default, default judgment, and writs of seizure and sale obtained by the plaintiff without notice while counsel were actively corresponding.

The court found the default judgment was improperly obtained through "sharp practice" and lack of notice, setting it aside without an inquiry into the merits of the defence.

The Master's order was also set aside under Rule 37.14(1)(b) due to counsel's inadvertence, emphasizing a contextual approach to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

The court imposed strict terms for the defendants to regularize their file and awarded $15,000 in costs to the defendants, payable by the plaintiff, largely due to the plaintiff's counsel's unacceptable conduct.

The applicant tenant, operating a Popeyes restaurant, sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the respondent landlord from proceeding with site servicing and parking lot construction work related to a plaza expansion.

The tenant argued the work would breach a lease provision prohibiting construction that materially interferes with its business operations or access.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the tenant failed to establish irreparable harm, as any losses could be quantified and compensated monetarily.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the landlord, who had contractual obligations and faced significant delays if the work was halted.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.