Freya Kristjanson

The applicants, granddaughters of the deceased, brought an action against the respondent, their aunt, seeking to set aside a 2008 agreement that transferred the deceased's interest in her home and pension income to the respondent in exchange for lifelong care.

The respondent had acted under a power of attorney for property.

The court found that the deceased lacked capacity to enter the agreement and that the respondent breached her fiduciary duties under the Substitute Decisions Act by making a transfer that was not 'reasonably necessary' for the deceased's care.

The agreement was set aside, and the respondent was ordered to return the property interest to the estate and account for commingled funds.

However, the court recognized the extraordinary care the respondent provided to the deceased and awarded her $273,039.54 in quantum meruit compensation as an equitable set-off against the estate.

The court declined to remove the respondent as an estate trustee or award punitive damages.

Cricket Canada applied under the Arbitration Act, 1991, to set aside severable parts of an arbitration award issued by the Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada (SDRCC).

The arbitration stemmed from allegations by Bilal Syed, an unsuccessful election candidate, concerning fraud, discrimination, bias, and by-law non-compliance in Cricket Canada's internal election process.

While the arbitrator ordered a new election, he also directed Cricket Canada to amend its by-laws and implement specific internal governance measures and prospective policy changes.

The court found these latter portions of the award to be outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and ultra vires the arbitrator's mandate, applying a correctness standard of review.

Consequently, these impugned decisions were set aside, while the remainder of the award, including the order for a new election, was allowed to stand.

The Landlord, 1694879 Ontario Inc., brought claims for fraudulent removal of goods against its tenant, Baffo's Incorporated, and several "Personal Defendants" who allegedly aided the removal.

Baffo's and the Personal Defendants brought cross-motions for summary judgment to dismiss these claims.

Baffo's also counterclaimed for wrongful distress and conversion, and sought punitive damages.

The court dismissed the Landlord's fraudulent removal claims against all defendants, finding no fraudulent intent as the goods removed were done so with the Landlord's consent (as brokered by police) and the remaining goods far exceeded the rental arrears.

The court granted summary judgment to Baffo's on its wrongful distress and conversion claims, finding the Landlord's actions illegal, excessive, and oppressive due to unlawful entry, lock changes, inflated arrears claims, seizure of fixtures, and unreasonable delay in selling goods.

The court also found Daryl Black, the Landlord's president, personally liable for the wrongful distress.

Punitive damages of $20,000 were awarded to Baffo's, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the Personal Defendants ($140,000) and Baffo's ($78,000).

Damages for wrongful distress and rental arrears were referred to a Master.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment to enforce a personal guarantee executed by the defendants in connection with a share purchase agreement (SPA) for solar energy companies.

The defendants' holding company, Lavender Glen, failed to make required payments, and despite subsequent amending agreements and acknowledgments of debt, the outstanding amount remained unpaid.

The defendants alleged pre-contractual misrepresentations as a defense.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants' misrepresentation claims were deemed vague, self-serving, and contradicted by the SPA's entire agreement clause and a later acknowledgment of debt.

Arguments of unconscionability and unpleaded fraudulent misrepresentation were also rejected.

The applicant, a single woman receiving a Canada Pension Plan (CPP) retirement pension, sought a declaration from the Superior Court that the CPP survivor pension provisions violate section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the ground of marital status, and sought an enhanced benefit.

The Attorney General moved to strike the application, arguing the Social Security Tribunal was the appropriate forum and that the applicant lacked standing.

The court found that the core issue fell squarely within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, which has the power to consider constitutional issues and provide appropriate remedies, even if it cannot issue a formal declaration of invalidity.

The court emphasized the principle of exhausting administrative remedies before resorting to superior courts.

The application was stayed, not struck, to allow the applicant to pursue her Charter arguments before the Minister and the Tribunal, with the possibility of returning to the Superior Court if the Minister refused to extend the limitation period.

The defendant, Marc Cohodes, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action commenced by the plaintiff, Mark Thompson.

The alleged libel imputed fraud against Thompson during his prior employment as a junior lawyer.

The court found that the expression related to a matter of public interest.

However, the plaintiff established grounds to believe his claim had substantial merit, that the defendant had no valid defence (justification or fair comment), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision finding they had partially waived solicitor-client privilege during an examination for discovery.

The underlying dispute involved whether the plaintiff was entitled to shares or stock options upon termination of employment.

During discovery, the individual defendant stated he had told others his lawyer 'botched' the documents.

The Master ruled this waived privilege over the instructions given to the lawyer.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that solicitor-client privilege is a substantive rule of law and that a partial waiver based on a discovery answer must be voluntary, informed, and clear.

The court found the defendants had not put their state of mind or reliance on legal advice in issue in their pleadings, and thus no implied or partial waiver occurred.

John Doe A, a former confidential police informer, brought a motion seeking a sealing order, publication ban, and amendment of pleadings to use pseudonyms in his civil action against the police, Crown, and former defence lawyers for alleged breach of informer privilege.

The court found that John Doe A was a confidential informer and that informer privilege is mandatory and absolute, subject only to the "innocence at stake" exception.

The court granted interim orders for a sealing order, a publication ban limited to the informer's identity, and the use of initials for the plaintiff and his family, applicable to pre-trial proceedings.

The court emphasized that civil accountability for breaches of informer privilege supports the rule's objectives and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test for discretionary publication bans does not apply to mandatory informer privilege.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that had set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2011 due to the plaintiffs' counsel's delay, and the motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought for 2.5 years.

The Superior Court found that the Master erred in law by misinterpreting the statutory context of Rule 48.15 repeal, incorrectly assigning blame to the defendants for not filing a defence, and failing to adequately consider the finality principle and the growing presumption of prejudice over time.

The court re-evaluated the Reid factors, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, did not demonstrate inadvertence, and did not move promptly.

Furthermore, actual prejudice to the defendants and intervenor was established.

The appeal was allowed, and the administrative dismissal was reinstated.

The Ferawana family sought specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property from the Uracs, or the return of their deposit.

The Uracs maintained that Ferawana failed to close and sought forfeiture of the deposit.

The court found that the purchaser, Ferawana, did not comply with his contractual obligations, including a waived financing condition, and that the vendors, the Uracs, did not breach any duty of good faith or honest performance.

The court dismissed Ferawana's application and granted the Uracs' request for the deposit, finding no basis for relief from forfeiture.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment based on a two-year limitation period under section 45(1)(h) of the Former Limitations Act.

The plaintiff argued that the applicable period was a six-year period under section 45(1)(g) for 'actions upon a case.' The court, after its own research, agreed that section 45(1)(h) applies only to penal actions and was likely inapplicable.

The motion was adjourned, and the defendants were given detailed directions to amend their pleadings to rely on section 45(1)(g) and re-bring the summary judgment motion, with the court remaining seized of the matter.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a civil claim for sexual assault, battery, and breach of fiduciary duty against her former criminal lawyer.

The defendant had previously pleaded guilty to criminal assault for the same incident but filed no evidence on the summary judgment motion, citing his Alzheimer's diagnosis.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability, as the defendant conceded the facts supporting the criminal conviction.

The court refused to adjourn the motion for a defence medical due to the defendant's delay.

The court awarded the plaintiff $70,000 in general non-pecuniary damages and $5,000 for future therapy costs.

The self-represented plaintiff sought leave to discontinue his action under Rule 23.01(2), claiming to be a person under a disability, with the intention of starting a new application based on the same 2013 events.

The court noted that the plaintiff misunderstood the procedural consequences, as a new application would likely be statute-barred.

Applying the CJC Statement of Principles on Self-Represented Litigants, the court explained the relevant law and procedural options to the plaintiff.

The court found the plaintiff was not a person under a disability within the meaning of the Rules and therefore did not require leave to discontinue.

The motion for leave was declined, and the plaintiff was given a deadline to either move for late filing of a statement of claim or discontinue the action.

The self-represented plaintiffs by counterclaim brought a summary judgment motion against the defendants by counterclaim, which was withdrawn mid-argument after the husband admitted he lacked his wife's authority to proceed.

The defendants by counterclaim sought costs and directions to prevent further steps until outstanding costs were paid.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs against the husband for unreasonable conduct, including collateral attacks on previous judgments and breaching the implicit warranty of authority.

The court also issued directions prohibiting the plaintiffs by counterclaim from taking further steps without leave or until costs were paid, and barred the husband from representing his wife.

The applicants sought to appoint Shilan Hasan as guardian of the person and property for Munir Nuri Saed under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, via a summary disposition procedure.

The court declined the application due to significant non-compliance with statutory requirements, including failure to properly serve the allegedly incapable person and relevant family members, an incorrect style of cause, and the absence of mandatory Management Plans, Guardianship Plans, and assessor statements.

The court emphasized the necessity of strict adherence to the rigorous application process outlined in the SDA, which provides crucial protections for allegedly incapable individuals.

The Applicants sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully obtaining a statutory injunction and declaratory relief against the Respondent for contravening a municipal zoning by-law.

The court denied substantial indemnity costs, finding the Respondent's conduct did not meet the "reprehensible" or "egregious" threshold required for such an award.

The court also rejected the argument that the public interest nature of by-law enforcement warranted higher costs.

Instead, the court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing fees and disbursements based on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, considering the complexity and importance of the matter.

The appellants appealed an arbitration decision that dismissed their claim for rectification of a unanimous shareholders' agreement.

The appellants argued that the right of first offer clause contained a mutual mistake by allowing a partial take-up of shares, and sought to rectify it to require an all-or-nothing purchase.

The arbitrator found no prior common intention to support rectification.

On appeal, the court held that the issues raised by the appellants were questions of fact or mixed fact and law, not extricable questions of law.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The moving party obtained a judgment for conversion against a lending corporation that unlawfully seized his equipment.

After the corporation declared bankruptcy, the moving party brought an action against the corporation's insurers under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that the tort of conversion involves interference with possessory rights, which does not constitute 'injury or damage to property' within the meaning of s. 132(1).

The claim was characterized as pure economic loss, which is not recoverable under the provision.

The moving party brought a motion for contempt against the respondent for failing to comply with two previous court orders requiring him to produce financial documents and attend an examination in aid of execution regarding an unpaid judgment.

The court applied the three-part test for civil contempt and found the respondent intentionally breached the clear and unequivocal orders despite having actual knowledge of them.

The respondent was found in contempt, ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs, and given an opportunity to purge his contempt before the penalty hearing.

Following the dismissal of the applicant tenant's motion for an interlocutory injunction to halt site servicing work at a commercial plaza, the court determined the timing and quantum of costs.

The tenant argued costs should be reserved to the application judge, while the respondent landlord sought costs payable forthwith.

The court held that the injunction issues were distinct from the main application and ordered costs payable within 30 days pursuant to Rule 57.03.

Applying the principles of proportionality and fair and reasonable compensation, the court fixed the landlord's costs at $28,000.