Fredrick Ramsay Schumann

The appellant appealed his summary convictions on sexual interference charges involving two children at his parent's home day care.

The appeal court found that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence of both complainants and the appellant.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to properly consider one child's adoption of prior inconsistent statements to police, overlooked evidence relevant to the other child's credibility, and mischaracterized the appellant's testimony without basis.

The appeal was allowed, with acquittals entered for the charges relating to one complainant and a new trial ordered for the charges relating to the other.

The moving party, a self-represented father, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a motion judge's order that refused to rescind his accumulated child support arrears.

The father had initially appealed to the Divisional Court, which quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that the father failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, that the proposed appeal lacked merit as there was no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's finding of deliberate underemployment, and that granting the extension would cause undue prejudice to the responding mother, particularly given the father's history of unpaid costs awards.

The appellant was convicted of two offences under the Customs Act and received a conditional discharge.

The summary conviction appeal judge set aside the sentence, finding the trial judge erred in law regarding the mens rea requirement.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal judge misapprehended the trial judge's comments, which were directed at whether the conduct was planned and deliberate for sentencing purposes, not mens rea.

The trial judge's sentence was restored, and a request for a Kienapple stay was declined.

The moving party, who was in significant default on two mortgages held by the responding party, sought an urgent stay of a writ of possession pending her appeal of a summary judgment order.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion.

The court found no serious question to be determined, as the moving party admitted to substantial arrears and her arguments regarding technical defects in the eviction notice and lack of notice to her adult children under Rule 60.10(2) were without merit.

The court also found no irreparable harm and held that the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favoured the responding party, given the lack of payments for over four years.

On a written Rule 2.1 review, the court dismissed an action arising from power of sale proceedings, the subsequent sale of a property, and allegations that multiple defendants colluded to deprive the plaintiff of property and belongings.

The court held the plaintiff lacked standing because the property had been owned by a dissolved corporation, found no pleaded cause of action against the various defendants, and accepted that the claims were also abuse of process and statute-barred on their face.

The court further relied on overlap with an earlier Brampton action concerning the same underlying property dispute.

The entire action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants appealed an order regarding the assessment of solicitor accounts under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the authorization and direction signed by the appellants precluded them from disputing the respondent's right to assess all the accounts in issue.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $2,500.

During pre-trial proceedings involving allegations of abuse of process related to police handling of solicitor-client privileged communications intercepted under Part VI wiretap authorizations, the court had ordered production of privileged materials for judicial review under the McClure framework.

The Crown sought a judicial stay rather than comply with the order, asserting that compliance would require disclosure of solicitor-client privileged communications between police and Crown counsel.

The defence agreed to the requested remedy.

Considering the public interest in preserving solicitor-client privilege and the lengthy procedural history of the case, the court exercised its discretion to terminate the prosecution by entering a judicial stay of proceedings.

The applicants brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, alleging widespread police misconduct in the execution of wiretap authorizations, particularly regarding the interception of privileged solicitor-client communications.

During the motion, police witnesses testified about their handling of intercepted communications, prompting the applicants to seek disclosure of the legal advice the police received from Crown counsel.

The Crown asserted solicitor-client privilege over the advice.

The court held that while the individual officers did not waive privilege, the applicants met the threshold to pierce the privilege under the 'innocence at stake' exception as adapted for an abuse of process motion.

The court ordered a stage-two in-camera review of the privileged communications to determine if they should be disclosed to the defence.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission decision upholding a fine and suspension after his horse tested positive for banned substances.

The applicant challenged the validity of the Commission's rule imposing absolute liability on trainers for positive drug tests, arguing that a due diligence defence must be available.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission's broad statutory mandate to regulate horse racing in the public interest authorized the creation of an absolute liability rule.

The Court also found the Commission's rejection of the applicant's due diligence defence to be reasonable.

The appellant telecommunications company challenged a general warrant and related assistance order requiring it to produce stored text messages of two subscribers on a prospective, daily basis over a two-week period.

The majority held the general warrant invalid, with two concurring opinions reaching that result by different routes.

One plurality held that the prospective daily production of future text messages constituted an interception of private communications requiring authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code, making the general warrant unavailable under s. 487.01(1)(c).

The other concurring opinion held that even if not strictly an interception, the technique was substantively equivalent to one, precluding resort to the general warrant.

The dissent would have upheld the general warrant, finding the technique was disclosure of previously intercepted communications rather than an interception itself.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the dismissal of a Charter motion alleging a s. 7 breach arising from police failure to videotape the Intoxilyzer machine and related quality assurance checks during breath testing.

The court held that Charter applications require an adequate evidentiary foundation and that the record contained insufficient evidence about the breath testing process, videotaping practices, or potential prejudice to the defence.

In the absence of such evidence, the claim that the police deliberately failed to record potentially exculpatory evidence was speculative.

The court concluded that the trial judge made no error in dismissing the Charter motion.

The moving party sought disclosure of a full document from which excerpts had been included in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant.

The responding party argued disclosure was irrelevant, that no Charter breach had an air of reality, and that disclosure risked harm.

The court held that where a party relies on portions of a document to obtain a warrant, the opposing party is entitled to inspect the entire document under the best evidence rule and ordinary civil procedure principles.

A party cannot selectively disclose favourable excerpts while withholding the remainder.

The court ordered production of the full document.

The applicants brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order quashing their application for judicial review of ongoing regulatory disciplinary proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with the motion judge that the application for judicial review was premature because the issues should be determined at first instance by the regulatory hearing panel.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the respondent on consent.

Eight police officers sought judicial review of decisions by the Toronto Police Services Board allowing the Chief of Police to delay serving Notices of Hearing for public complaints arising from the G20 summit.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for prematurity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review of an interlocutory administrative decision.

The court noted the officers had an adequate alternative remedy to raise the issue of prejudice caused by delay through an abuse of process motion before the hearing officer.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to strike a jury notice in a complex insurance dispute involving allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and disputed policy values.

The plaintiff sought declarations regarding the validity and terms of two life insurance policies and their cash surrender values, while also claiming substantial damages.

The court held that the core issues concerned the legal status and interpretation of the insurance agreements, constituting declaratory relief within the meaning of s. 108 of the Courts of Justice Act, which mandates that such claims be tried without a jury.

The court further found that the extensive factual issues, competing expert actuarial and forensic accounting evidence, and complex legal doctrines rendered the case unsuitable for jury determination.

The jury notice was therefore struck.

The Ontario Harness Horse Association sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Racing Commission to redistribute purse monies among racetracks.

The Commission had adopted a Framework to move purse funds from racetracks with profitable slot machine operations to those with more active wagering to re-invigorate horse racing.

The applicant argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction, claiming it conflicted with federal pari-mutuel regulations and interfered with existing contractual rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission had broad regulatory authority under the Racing Commission Act, 2000, that its actions did not conflict with federal regulations, and that its regulatory powers permitted incidental interference with existing contracts.

The respondent, IIROC, brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review commenced by the applicants, an investment dealer and its CEO.

The applicants sought to quash a notice of hearing and other disciplinary steps taken by IIROC.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding it plain and obvious that the application could not succeed.

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act because IIROC's disciplinary powers arise from contract, not statute or public authority.

Furthermore, the application was premature as the issues should be determined at first instance by the IIROC Hearing Panel.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of breach of trust, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to obstruct justice.

The appellant argued that the evidence from the preliminary inquiry only showed he attempted to assist a friend navigate the criminal justice system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the totality of the evidence, including intercepted communications and the appellant's use of his position to access court officials, was sufficient to justify the committal to stand trial.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to quash their committal for trial.

They argued the preliminary inquiry justice lost jurisdiction by refusing to allow them to call witnesses who had provided information relevant to judicial pre-authorizations, which they intended to use to establish Charter breaches.

The preliminary inquiry justice and the appeal judge treated the proposed witnesses as sub-affiants who could only be cross-examined with leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the witnesses were properly characterized as sub-affiants and that the refusal to allow their cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry did not impair the appellants' right to make full answer and defence.