Fredrick Ramsay Schumann

A helicopter operated by an air ambulance service crashed shortly after takeoff from Moosonee, Ontario on May 31, 2013, killing four crew members.

The Crown charged the operator with six counts under the Canada Labour Code, alleging failure to ensure employee safety.

At trial, three counts remained: two alleging failure to provide pilots with means to maintain visual reference while operating at night (counts 3 and 4), and one alleging failure to provide adequate supervision by eliminating the Base Manager position (count 10).

The Crown argued that night vision goggles should have been provided.

The court found that while the crash was caused by controlled flight into terrain, the defendant exercised due diligence and complied with all regulatory requirements.

All three counts were dismissed.

The defendants, David Livingston and Laura Miller, pleaded not guilty to charges of breach of trust by a public official, mischief to data, and unauthorized use of a computer.

The Crown withdrew the breach of trust count at the close of its case.

The defendants brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the remaining two counts.

The court found that while the Crown failed to establish that actual data was destroyed, there was sufficient evidence that the defendants attempted to commit mischief to data without legal justification or colour of right.

The motion was allowed in part on the mischief to data count, which was reduced to attempt to commit mischief to data.

The motion was dismissed on the unauthorized use of a computer count.

The Crown sought to qualify Robert Gagnon, a retired OPP officer, as an expert in computer systems operation and forensic recovery of computer data.

The defence opposed qualification, arguing that Gagnon's extensive involvement in the police investigation and his expressed bias regarding the defendants' guilt disqualified him from providing independent and impartial expert evidence.

The court excluded Gagnon's evidence, finding that he had conflated the roles of expert and investigator, participated extensively in investigative strategy and team meetings, and demonstrated lack of independence and impartiality through his communications recommending charges and providing strategic legal advice to investigators.

These consolidated appeals arise from related class actions certified in 2012 concerning bingo license and administration fees charged by two municipalities.

The appellants, charitable organizations, sought to amend their pleadings after the opt-out period expired to claim disgorgement of all allegedly illegal fees received by the municipalities, including those paid by persons who had opted out of the class.

The Court of Appeal quashed appeals of interlocutory orders lifting protective orders that had shielded the identities of opt-outs during a reconsideration period, and dismissed appeals of orders refusing leave to amend the statements of claim.

The court held that the proposed amendments would fundamentally alter the nature of the certified claims and lacked reasonable prospect of success.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an action where the plaintiff, Saramia Crescent General Partner Ltd., was awarded $1,277,000 in damages for breach of lease.

The court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity scale up to November 8, 2016, and on a substantial indemnity scale thereafter, having beaten two offers to settle.

The defendants' arguments that the costs were excessive, that the issues were novel justifying a reduction, or that mediation costs should be excluded were largely rejected.

A minor reduction was made for communications costs.

The court also drew an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to disclose their own costs.

The defendant corporation brought a motion to quash counts 10 and 11 of an information charging it with offences under the Canada Labour Code.

The defendant argued the counts were defective because they failed to specify which prescribed regulations had been breached, contrary to the principles established in R v Wis Developments.

The Crown sought to amend the counts to allege breaches of section 124 rather than section 125 of the Act.

The court found the counts were fatally deficient in failing to identify the specific regulations allegedly breached, but permitted amendment to reframe the charges under section 124 as a single statutory duty to ensure employee health and safety, rather than specific regulatory violations.

The defendants brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel, Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP ("Gowlings"), from further representing the plaintiff.

The defendants argued that Gowlings possessed confidential information obtained during failed negotiations with four dissident partners (now associated with the defendants) and that Gowlings partners were likely material witnesses.

The court found that Gowlings held confidential information relevant to the claims, imparted under a reasonable expectation of confidentiality, and that there was a risk of misuse.

Given the lack of an immediate and effective ethical wall, and the early stage of litigation, the court granted the motion, disqualifying Gowlings.

The potential for Gowlings partners to be witnesses was considered an additional factor supporting disqualification.

The plaintiff, a former law student, sued his articling principal for professional negligence and the Law Society of Upper Canada (LSUC) for regulatory failures after his articling position was terminated two weeks into the year.

Both defendants brought motions under Rule 21 to strike the Statement of Claim for failing to state a cause of action.

The court struck the claim against LSUC without leave to amend, finding it immune under section 9 of the Law Society Act and that the plaintiff failed to plead bad faith or gross negligence.

The claim against the articling principal was struck with leave to amend, as it lacked sufficient material facts to support a professional negligence claim, though a theoretical cause of action was possible.

No costs were awarded due to the plaintiff's circumstances.

During pre-trial proceedings involving allegations of abuse of process related to police handling of solicitor-client privileged communications intercepted under Part VI wiretap authorizations, the court had ordered production of privileged materials for judicial review under the McClure framework.

The Crown sought a judicial stay rather than comply with the order, asserting that compliance would require disclosure of solicitor-client privileged communications between police and Crown counsel.

The defence agreed to the requested remedy.

Considering the public interest in preserving solicitor-client privilege and the lengthy procedural history of the case, the court exercised its discretion to terminate the prosecution by entering a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant telecommunications company challenged a general warrant and related assistance order requiring it to produce stored text messages of two subscribers on a prospective, daily basis over a two-week period.

The majority held the general warrant invalid, with two concurring opinions reaching that result by different routes.

One plurality held that the prospective daily production of future text messages constituted an interception of private communications requiring authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code, making the general warrant unavailable under s. 487.01(1)(c).

The other concurring opinion held that even if not strictly an interception, the technique was substantively equivalent to one, precluding resort to the general warrant.

The dissent would have upheld the general warrant, finding the technique was disclosure of previously intercepted communications rather than an interception itself.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the dismissal of a Charter motion alleging a s. 7 breach arising from police failure to videotape the Intoxilyzer machine and related quality assurance checks during breath testing.

The court held that Charter applications require an adequate evidentiary foundation and that the record contained insufficient evidence about the breath testing process, videotaping practices, or potential prejudice to the defence.

In the absence of such evidence, the claim that the police deliberately failed to record potentially exculpatory evidence was speculative.

The court concluded that the trial judge made no error in dismissing the Charter motion.

The moving party sought disclosure of a full document from which excerpts had been included in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant.

The responding party argued disclosure was irrelevant, that no Charter breach had an air of reality, and that disclosure risked harm.

The court held that where a party relies on portions of a document to obtain a warrant, the opposing party is entitled to inspect the entire document under the best evidence rule and ordinary civil procedure principles.

A party cannot selectively disclose favourable excerpts while withholding the remainder.

The court ordered production of the full document.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to strike a jury notice in a complex insurance dispute involving allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and disputed policy values.

The plaintiff sought declarations regarding the validity and terms of two life insurance policies and their cash surrender values, while also claiming substantial damages.

The court held that the core issues concerned the legal status and interpretation of the insurance agreements, constituting declaratory relief within the meaning of s. 108 of the Courts of Justice Act, which mandates that such claims be tried without a jury.

The court further found that the extensive factual issues, competing expert actuarial and forensic accounting evidence, and complex legal doctrines rendered the case unsuitable for jury determination.

The jury notice was therefore struck.