Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court order dismissing his negligence action against his former lawyers and ordering him to pay costs.

The action arose from the lawyers' representation in a companion motor vehicle accident claim.

The Superior Court dismissed the action because the appellant twice failed to attend a court-ordered defence medical examination by a neurologist, and made clear his intention never to comply with such an order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge had no alternative but to dismiss the claim given the appellant's refusal to comply with the court order.

The appellant father appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice ordering him to pay retroactive and prospective child support, including extraordinary expenses and arrears.

Both parties were self-represented.

The Court of Appeal found that section 48 of the Family Law Act applied to the matter, which provides that appeals from Ontario Court of Justice orders under Part III (Support) lie to the Superior Court of Justice, not the Court of Appeal.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and quashed it.

The respondent was awarded costs of $1,500.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of an on-duty police officer charged with dangerous operation causing death.

The officer was operating an undercover police vehicle at approximately 109 km/h in a 60 km/h zone when it struck and killed an 18-year-old pedestrian who was jaywalking.

The trial judge declined to leave the included offence of dangerous driving with the jury, finding no realistic scenario where dangerous driving could be proven without causation of death.

The appellate court upheld this decision but found reversible error in the jury charge, which treated causation as a live issue despite the trial judge's earlier ruling that it was not realistically available to the jury.

The court also found the charge misdirected the jury on the actus reus and mens rea elements of dangerous driving by focusing on the collision and the victim's conduct rather than the manner of driving itself.

This is a motion to vary the Court of Appeal's decision in a solicitor's negligence case.

The moving party sought to clarify the trial judge's discretion regarding the final quantification of damages and the process for calculating the damages award, subject to a ceiling of $36.9 million.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party could not bring itself within the applicable rules permitting reconsideration of appellate decisions, and that it was not in the interests of justice to invoke the court's narrow jurisdiction to reconsider.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution.

They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada.

The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed.

The appellants moved to vary this order.

The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances.

The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.

The appellants commenced a civil action for misfeasance in public office against a Canada Revenue Agency investigator and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging that the investigator had intentionally sworn a false Information to Obtain search warrants.

The action was discontinued on consent during trial after the appellants failed to establish key elements of their claim.

Approximately one month later, the appellants received Notices of Reassessment from the Minister of National Revenue reversing the original tax assessment.

The appellants moved to set aside the discontinuance based on these reassessments as fresh evidence.

The motion was dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the reassessments could not establish the elements of misfeasance in public office and did not meet the high threshold for setting aside a consent discontinuance.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial.

He appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in admitting a hearsay statement made by the deceased victim identifying the appellant as the shooter under the principled hearsay exception, and (2) that the trial judge erred by failing to give a "no probative value" instruction regarding the appellant's post-offence flight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the hearsay statement should have been admitted under the spontaneous statement exception and that a no probative value instruction was unnecessary in the circumstances.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that dismissed his appeal from convictions for assault and sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by confusing the distinction between a proved absence of motive to lie and the absence of evidence of a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that the legal principle was well-settled and the merits of the appeal were not strong.

The trial judge's statement that she did not find a motivation to fabricate was a rejection of the defence submission rather than a positive finding that no motive existed.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated December 21, 2016, which ordered his continued detention in maximum security at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant had previously been detained at Ontario Shores with community privileges.

He advanced two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board misapprehended evidence regarding when he decompensated after being moved to the minimum-security unit; and second, that the Board failed to address the impact of a medication change on his behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and confirming that the Board was aware of and properly considered the medication change in its decision.

The appellants were convicted of manslaughter following a trial by judge and jury.

Their convictions on break and enter to commit robbery were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The appellants appealed their manslaughter convictions on various grounds and sought leave to appeal their sentences.

The Crown also sought leave to appeal the sentence imposed on one appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury charge on the critical counts of manslaughter was insufficient to meet the functional requirements for an adequate jury charge, particularly in failing to adequately relate the evidence to the key issues and the parties' positions.

The conviction appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered on all original charges.

The appellant, a tobacco manufacturer on the Six Nations reserve, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of the Minister of Finance's demand for security under section 12(2)(f.1) of the Tobacco Tax Act.

The appellant manufactured tobacco for export and for sale on First Nations reserves, neither of which were subject to Ontario's tobacco tax.

The appellant argued the Minister's interpretation of the security requirement was unreasonable and that the provision was unconstitutional as an indirect tax on exported goods.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding the Minister's interpretation reasonable and the provision constitutionally valid as incidental to a valid direct taxation scheme.

Appeal from an application judge's decision regarding the division of property following the breakdown of a common law relationship.

The appellant sought sole beneficial ownership of a jointly-titled residential property (Brookdale Avenue) or, alternatively, a credit for his repayment of a joint line of credit used to finance its purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondent held a 50 per cent legal and beneficial interest in the property, but allowed the appeal in part by granting the appellant a $500,000 credit on division of sale proceeds for his repayment of the respondent's share of the joint debt.

On cross-appeal from a Superior Court judgment, the appellants challenged four discrete issues arising from a contractual dispute.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal in part, finding that the respondents were entitled to restitution of interest paid relating to the Petting Zoo property, prejudgment interest on damages awarded for the Petting Zoo, and reimbursement of municipal property taxes paid on the property.

The Court upheld the motion judge's calculation of principal owed and dismissed the appeal on the main issues.

The appellants were awarded costs of the cross-appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim on summary judgment.

The appellant was hired by Atomic Energy of Canada but was terminated after providing false information on his security clearance questionnaire and during the hiring process.

He failed to disclose his employment at Ivaco Rolling Mills and misrepresented his whereabouts when contacted about an employment offer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissal, finding that the breach of honesty went to the core of the employment relationship, particularly given the national security context and the appellant's access to nuclear facilities and sensitive information.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Deputy Judge's order for pre-trial inspection of an iPhone in a products liability case.

The appellant alleged the iPhone overheated and caused severe burns to his arm.

The central issue was whether Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court have jurisdiction to order pre-trial inspection of property.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that such jurisdiction exists under the Rules of the Small Claims Court where trial fairness and the interests of justice require it, and that the jurisdiction was properly exercised in this case.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim for survivor pension benefits following the death of Michael Shestowsky, a former employee of the respondent.

The appellant claimed entitlement to survivor benefits as a "spouse" under the Pension Benefits Act, which requires living together in a conjugal relationship for at least three years before retirement.

The trial judge found the appellant was not an eligible spouse based on objective, contemporaneous evidence including a cohabitation agreement stating the parties intended to commence cohabiting, pension election forms confirming no eligible spouse, and tax returns.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law and his factual findings were amply supported by evidence.

The respondent purchased the appellant's business in exchange for securities, with the appellant becoming a minority shareholder.

The acquisition agreement contained a representation and warranty regarding tax pools.

Years later, the Canada Revenue Agency disallowed the respondent's use of the tax pools and assessed approximately $11.8 million in additional taxes, interest, and penalties.

The respondent invoked an indemnity from the appellant, who argued the respondent had breached the tax pools representation and warranty.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the respondent, interpreting the representation and warranty as directed solely to the accurate identification of tax pools and their values at closing, not as a guarantee of future tax utilization.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurance company appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing its motion to recover $600,000 held back from distribution by a receiver.

The insurance company argued the funds were paid based on mistake of fact, lack of consideration, unjust enrichment, equitable subrogation, and constructive trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the trustee lawfully received the funds to reduce a legitimate outstanding debt and had altered its position in good consideration by deferring its receivership application.

The appellant failed to establish the defence of mistake of fact.

The appellants were successful on appeal from a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs following the appeal.

Counsel for the respondent agreed that the appellants' claimed costs of $18,686.25, comprising $17,132.50 in fees on the partial indemnity scale and $1,553.75 in disbursements, were reasonable.

The court ordered that amount in costs, inclusive of HST, be paid by the respondent to the appellants.

In a matrimonial dispute, the husband appealed the quantum of an equalization payment ordered by the trial judge, while the wife cross-appealed the quantum of child support.

The wife moved to dismiss the husband's appeal for non-payment of interim child and spousal support ordered by Lauwers J.A. The Court of Appeal found that the husband's failure to comply with the interim support order and his failure to pursue or perfect the appeal on a timely basis disentitled him from continuing with the appeal.

The court dismissed the husband's appeal with costs and correspondingly dismissed the wife's cross-appeal without costs.