Deena Baltman

The court granted a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter after finding that the delay in bringing Christopher Vaughan to trial, while technically under the 30-month ceiling set by R. v. Jordan, was markedly longer than it reasonably should have been.

The delay was caused by a major disclosure failure by the Crown and chronic institutional delays in Brampton, as well as the Crown’s decision to prefer a direct indictment, which further prolonged the proceedings.

The court found that the Applicant had acted reasonably throughout and that the Crown was responsible for the delay.

The indictment was stayed.

The court considered whether Charles Duku was criminally responsible for arson and mischief, following a trial in which he was found guilty.

After conviction, the Crown sought a verdict of Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) under section 672.34 of the Criminal Code, based on psychiatric evidence that Mr. Duku was suffering from active psychosis at the time of the offence.

The court accepted the expert evidence and the respondent’s consent, finding that Mr. Duku was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.

The court sentenced Brenda Dufort, convicted of importing approximately two kilograms of cocaine into Canada, to 5.5 years' imprisonment.

The decision reviews the facts of the offence, the offender’s background, and the relevant sentencing principles and case law.

The court found that while the usual range for first-time couriers is 6–8 years, several mitigating factors justified a sentence slightly below that range.

The appellant challenged his convictions for firearm and drug trafficking offences, and his 10-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in determining the scope of a s. 10(b) Charter breach (right to counsel).

The appellant contended that the delay in facilitating his lawyer call began earlier, at the point of arrest by Toronto Police Service (TPS), rather than only upon arrival at the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) station.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the initial delay by TPS was justified due to ongoing public and officer safety concerns and evidence preservation tasks.

The court concluded that the s. 10(b) breach only commenced at the DRPS station, as found by the trial judge, and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant, previously declared a dangerous offender and subject to a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO), appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for breaching LTSO conditions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentencing judge's decision, finding no error in failing to consider the principle of proportionality.

The court reiterated that dangerous offender proceedings prioritize public protection and require a thorough inquiry into managing offender risk, with less coercive options considered before an indeterminate sentence.

The sentencing judge's detailed reasons, which highlighted the appellant's history of non-compliance with treatment and continued risk, were upheld.

The appellant, Justin Lozon, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The central issue at trial was whether the deceased's motorcycle headlight was on, which the trial judge found to be true.

The appeal argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to apply the principles from *R. v. W.(D.)* regarding credibility analysis.

A fresh evidence application was also brought, claiming the motorcycle had mechanical difficulties, including the light.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the *W.(D.)* principles correctly applied, and the fresh evidence lacked cogency due to inconsistencies and the witness's credibility issues.

The appellant, N.A., appealed a one-year custodial sentence for historical sexual interference.

The trial judge had erred by concluding that a mandatory minimum sentence applied, which incorrectly precluded a conditional sentence.

Despite this conceded error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the numerous aggravating factors, including the victim's youth, the severe impact of the crime, the breach of a position of trust, and the appellant's victim-blaming, justified the sentence.

The court concluded that the case did not fall into the rare category where a conditional sentence would be appropriate for this type of crime, even with the legal error.

The accused, Charles Duku, was charged with intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire (arson) contrary to s. 434 of the Criminal Code, and mischief contrary to s. 430(3) of the Code, following a fire in his high-rise apartment.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including testimony from firefighters and an expert fire investigator who classified the fire as "incendiary." The defence did not call evidence.

The court found that the accused was the sole resident, was seen entering and exiting the apartment around the time of the fire, and possessed the means to set it.

The evidence indicated the fire was not accidental.

The court concluded that guilt was the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The plaintiff, Erwin Banfi, brought a motion for approval of a class action settlement and class counsel fees against multiple municipal and provincial defendants concerning alleged increased flood risk and reduced property values due to overdevelopment in Oakville.

The action, initially premised on property diminution, shifted focus due to difficulties in proving causation and quantifying individual damages.

The proposed settlement involved a $500,000 payment by defendants to the Intact Centre on Climate Adaptation for a flood education and protection program for class members, and class counsel fees of $495,000.

The court approved the cy-près settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the litigation's challenges and the material benefit provided to class members.

Class counsel fees and a $5,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff were also approved.

The accused, Laurie Toyka Simon, charged with importing cocaine, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after the Crown closed its case.

The defence argued that the actus reus of importing was not complete because the suitcase containing the cocaine was abandoned at the airport before clearing Customs.

The court dismissed the motion, ruling that the actus reus was factually completed when the accused physically took possession of the suitcase from the carousel and removed its luggage tag, and legally completed when the drugs crossed the border into Canada, regardless of final customs clearance.

The accused, Brenda Catherine Dufort, was charged with importing approximately two kilograms of cocaine from Trinidad into Canada.

The central issue at trial was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the requisite knowledge or was wilfully blind to the presence of the narcotics.

The defence argued she believed she was transporting currency.

The court examined text messages between the accused and a friend, which revealed discussions about drug exportation and the accused's direct involvement in such activities.

The court found the accused's explanations for these messages to be incredible and her credibility significantly undermined.

Based on the evidence, including the high value of the substance and the accused's deliberate failure to inquire despite suspicious circumstances, the court concluded that the accused either had actual knowledge or was wilfully blind.

Consequently, the accused was found guilty of the offence charged.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of prior physical, verbal, and emotional abuse by the accused toward her two daughters in an assault trial.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing the evidence was unreliable, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial.

The court ruled that none of the proposed evidence of prior disreputable conduct was admissible, citing a lack of evidentiary foundation, vagueness, the historical nature of many allegations, potential for collusion between complainants, an unexplored family law context, and the significant prejudice such evidence would cause in a jury trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a vehicle, raising grounds including the trial judge's failure to hear an 11(b) application, failure to consider Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9), wrongful admission of character evidence, and misapprehension of evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in any of the grounds.

The appellant failed to file necessary materials for the 11(b) application, and the trial judge's findings regarding Charter compliance and evidence were upheld, with deference given to the trial judge's assessment of facts and credibility.

The accused was charged with failing to stop after an accident resulting in death under s. 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused had the requisite mens rea, specifically if he knew or was reckless as to whether his vehicle struck a pedestrian.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the subjective knowledge or recklessness, concluding that the evidence supported the inference that he believed he hit a "construction thingy" rather than a person.

The accused's conduct immediately after the accident was not indicative of someone trying to avoid detection.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted.

This criminal trial concerned charges against Johnathan Cox and Steven Cox related to sex trafficking, procuring, advertising sexual services, financial benefit from sexual services, and aggravated assault.

The complainant (C) alleged Johnathan initiated her involvement in the sex trade, managed her activities, and took her earnings, as well as physically assaulting her.

Steven, Johnathan's father, was accused of facilitating C's sex work by renting hotel rooms and paying for advertisements.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and largely reliable, while rejecting Johnathan's evidence as unbelievable.

Steven's evidence was found conflicted, acknowledging his efforts to help C but also his knowledge and facilitation of her sex work.

Johnathan was found guilty on all counts except one procuring charge (over 18), while Steven was found guilty only of advertising sexual services, being acquitted of procuring and financial benefit charges due to a lack of specific intent to facilitate the purchase of sex.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of the plaintiff's action and a subsequent motion to restore it to the trial list.

The defendants sought fees and disbursements.

The court applied Rule 57 criteria, noting the serious allegations made by the plaintiff, numerous delays caused by the plaintiff's handling of the case, and the plaintiff's rejection of multiple settlement offers.

The court found the defendants' requested costs reasonable and ordered the plaintiff to pay specific amounts to the Bank of Montreal and York Regional Police, in addition to previously awarded motion costs.

The defendant, L.R., faced two charges of sexual assault.

The first count involved sexual intercourse where the complainant alleged intoxication and lack of consent, while the defendant asserted consent.

The second count involved an alleged attempt to force oral sex.

The court analyzed the complainant's capacity to consent, considering her alcohol tolerance, a pre-existing sleep disorder, and video evidence.

The court found the complainant had the capacity to consent and did, in fact, consent to the sexual activity in the first count.

The court also found the second allegation highly improbable.

Consequently, both charges were dismissed.

This case involved an alleged sexual assault.

The complainant's testimony was found to be highly unreliable due to profound inconsistencies with medical evidence and prior statements, and a lack of corroborative evidence.

The court also found contradictions from another Crown witness whose testimony was deemed credible and exculpatory.

The charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt.

The applicant father sought resumption of access to his 7-year-old daughter after an altercation led to the child's refusal to see him.

This was the third hearing of the motion, following previous decisions that the respondent mother had wrongfully withheld access and that mediation was imperative.

A parenting mediator provided a progress report indicating positive developments, including daily video calls and two successful face-to-face visits.

The court ordered the continuation of mediation, addressed minor issues regarding fees and communication, and scheduled a further hearing for October 2020 to review progress.

The court awarded the respondent, Ana Tone, full indemnity costs totaling $165,696.48, plus $8,705.48 in outstanding costs, against the applicant, Raymond Tone, following a bitter family law trial.

The applicant was found largely at fault for rejecting multiple reasonable settlement offers and for unreasonable and bad faith conduct throughout the litigation, including prolonging the trial with irrelevant testimony and changing counsel repeatedly.

The issues were numerous and complex, and the respondent achieved highly successful results on nearly all matters, far exceeding her offers to settle.

The court also noted the applicant's conduct wasted significant public resources.