Carolyn Jennifer Chambers

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of Ms. Bilek’s motion to stay an order removing a preservation order against Mr. Booth.

The court found Mr. Philbert’s (counsel for Mr. Booth) costs demand of $8,615.60 to be highly unreasonable and disproportionate, noting his failure to genuinely attempt resolution as instructed.

Ms. Chambers’ (counsel for Ms. Bilek) proposal of $3,000 was deemed reasonable.

The court fixed Mr. Booth’s costs at $3,000, inclusive, emphasizing the need for counsel to resolve issues, especially during strained court resources.

The respondent wife brought an urgent motion seeking a stay of a portion of a final order that directed the removal of a preservation order on the applicant husband's RRSPs, pending an appeal.

The appeal concerned the trial judge's interpretation of s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act regarding an unequal division of property based on unconscionability.

The motion was heard in writing due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the three-part test for a stay pending appeal, the court found that the respondent failed to establish a serious question to be tried, concluding that the trial judge had properly applied the high threshold for unconscionability.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant mother sought an order dispensing with the respondent father's consent to change their seven-year-old daughter's surname from McDonough to either Pastran-McDonough or McDonough-Pastran.

The parents had joint custody pursuant to a Separation Agreement that required mutual consent for name changes.

The father withheld consent and argued that no material change in circumstances had occurred since the Agreement was signed.

The court granted the mother's motion, finding that the proposed name change was in the child's best interests.

The court rejected the material change threshold as inapplicable to Change of Name Act applications and applied the statutory best interests test instead.

The applicant father sought a declaration that the child's habitual residence was in Toronto, Ontario, thereby establishing jurisdiction for the Ontario Court of Justice to make custody and access orders.

The respondent mother had removed the child to Edmonton, Alberta in November 2016 without the father's knowledge or consent.

The court determined that the mother's removal was surreptitious and that the father did not consent to or acquiesce in the move.

The court found that the child's habitual residence remained in Ontario at the commencement of proceedings and that Ontario retained jurisdiction.

The applicant mother sought child support from the respondent father for their 8-year-old child pursuant to the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002 (Ontario).

The mother sought retroactive support from May 1, 2014.

The father requested an earlier start date of January 1, 2014 and sought credit for payments made in 2014.

The court determined the appropriate start date, imputed income for 2015 based on the father's 2014 earnings due to his voluntary job departure, and calculated arrears.

The court ordered ongoing support based on the father's current income with a repayment plan for arrears.

This is a child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking a finding that a four-year-old child with significant developmental delays and special needs is in need of protection and should be made a crown ward for adoption.

The mother opposed the application and proposed placement with the paternal aunt under a supervision order.

The court found the child was in need of protection due to physical and emotional harm risks, including unsanitary home conditions, the mother's untreated mental health issues (including auditory hallucinations and depression), and the child's unaddressed special needs.

The court rejected both the mother's and paternal aunt's proposed plans as inadequate, finding neither capable of providing appropriate full-time care.

The court made a crown wardship order to enable adoption placement.

A separated father sought an order that the child reside primarily with him after the mother relocated from Toronto to Sutton without prior discussion, contrary to the cooperative expectations in a joint parenting arrangement under a separation agreement.

The agreement required both parties to reside within the "GTA" but did not define that term.

Applying the mobility analysis from Gordon v. Goertz as modified in Berry v. Berry for cases involving two custodial parents, the court assessed the child’s best interests, including the existing parenting arrangement, maximizing contact with both parents, and potential disruption to the child.

Although the court criticized the mother’s failure to communicate the relocation decision, it concluded that parental conduct did not demonstrate an inability to meet the child’s needs.

Considering continuity of care and the impending transition to school, the court determined that the child’s best interests slightly favoured residing primarily with the mother in Sutton with expanded parenting time for the father.